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Stephen King (2000) has a clear demonstration of what it takes to write in “On Writing”. He 
starts his advice by telling an anecdote of when he helps his uncle replace a broken screen. 
Instead of bringing the only tool that is necessary for the job, his uncle asks Stephen to bring 
the toolbox with him. When Stephen asks him why he had to bring the entire toolbox, his uncle 
replies “I didn’t know what else I might find to do once I got out here, did I? It’s best to have 
your tools with you. If you don’t, you’re apt to find something you didn’t expect and get 
discouraged.” (King, 2000: 114). Thus, King concludes, “To write to the best of your abilities, 
you have to construct your own toolbox and then build up enough muscle so you can carry it 
with you. Then, instead of looking at a hard job  and getting discouraged, you will perhaps 
seize the correct tool and get immediately to work.” (King, 2000: 114) 
Xavier Martin, you showed me this toolbox. You showed me its endless, ever-
expanding layers, the tools that are in there and how to use them. I understand I shocked you by 
dropping the bomb of “not pursuing a research-oriented career in academia”, but your efforts 
are not in vain. This toolbox can be applied elsewhere as well. I’ll have to carry it in different 
areas now. But who knows, perhaps I someday will return with an even more complete 
toolbox. 
Nüfer Ates, you showed me other parts of the toolbox. Just as important, you motivated 
me to continue to carry it around and to look into it further. Thanks for the refreshing 
supervision you gave me! 
I would also like to thank the members of my doctoral committee: Karen Schnatterly, 
Marius Meeus, Niels Noorderhaven, and Gerwin van der Laan. I would like to thank you very 
much for your comments as this has helped push the quality of the dissertation forward, and it 
has also helped me develop personally. I would also like to formally thank the Netherlands 
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for their gracious (financial) support. 
 
 
Aswin van Oijen and John Bell, I had the pleasure of being teamed up with you for the 
course Strategic Consultancy. I was skeptic at first. “Do you really believe the students will 
come to the High Tech Campus to do this?” You showed me that (at least some) students’ 
curiosity, ambition, and potential cannot be overestimated. Renée van Poppel and Joyce Kox 
are excellent examples of this (sorry, Renée and Joyce, you will have to wait a bit longer, I’ll 
get back to you in a few). Aswin, being there when you were presenting your teaching ideas per 
your nomination of Teacher of the Year award was invigorating and you have definitely set a 
standard I can only dream of attaining someday. Getting the TiSEM teaching innovation award 
with you and John was terrific and my thanks to teach with you are eternal. 
 Which can bring me to only one other person, Bart Vos. It was great working with you 
Bart. It’s says enough about how much you can learn from a person “when someone has more 
letters in their titles than their original name” (weirdly one of the first things I remember you 
saying, which was in a class on Purchasing Management). Your jokes (were they?) created an 
excellent working atmosphere (at least for me).  
 Which then brings me to the person I may know longest in the department, Bert 
Meijboom. Same as John, Bart and Aswin, you taught me a great deal on teaching, especially 
in large groups. I really appreciate your confidence in my abilities and the opportunities you 
gave me throughout. But above all, I want to thank you for being the person you are. For me, 
you are the soul of the department. I cherish the fact that I was there when you were declared 
professor by special appointment. “Check your email,” you said with a stern face and you – 
literally – ran away. I got out of  my office to see what was happening and I was shocked to see 
your name tag removed from your door. He is leaving? I thought, but then I got the great news 
in my email box. I think I can write a full paper on my positive experiences with you, but in 
short – thank you! 
 Roland Levering (I wouldn’t dare to get your name wrong). Why, oh, why did I 
volunteer to share an office with you. The plants, yes, the answer may lay in the plants. No, 
 
 
jokes aside (which is a huge pile), it was a pleasure sharing an office with you. Little that you 
know, mayhap the dissertation would not have been finished if wouldn’t have joined you in 
your office (or, it would have been finished years ago). Seriously, I should stop the jokes and 
get to a proper acknowledgement here. So here you go: thank you! (Sorry I can’t put a gif in 
here!) 
 I would also like to thank others in the department (faculty and extramural fellows) for 
their collegiality and help along the way, including Astrid Kramer, Karin Thomas, Vincent 
Peters, Jean-Malik Dumas, Marjan Groen, James Small, Ton Appels, Ruud Hendrickx, Cindy 
Kuijpers, Shivaram Devarakonda, Zilin He, Joeri van Hugten, Elena Golovko, Jean-Francois 
Hennart, Adam Tatarynowicz, Jeroen Kuilman, Louis Mulotte, Fons Naus, Niels 
Noorderhaven, Tal Simons, Peter Snoeren, Alma Timmers, Feng Fang, Roland van de Kerkhof, 
Mathijs Verhulst, Jacob Derks, Yasir Dewan, Joshua Eckblad, Tao Han, Stephanie Koornneef, 
Mohammad Nasiri, and Xolani Nghona. 
 Some may now feel forgotten, but worry not, you deserve special attention. Joyce Kox, 
it was great to have had you as a student and to see you grow to become a lecturer. I am sure 
you have a bright future ahead. Miranda Stienstra, it was nice to share with you the joys and 
sorrows affiliated with pursuing a Ph.D. Vilma Chila, that counts for you as well! Ruud Sneep, 
you are a brilliant and kind person. I have enjoyed our conversations, above all else our 
experience at the other side of the world in Vancouver. I greatly appreciate all your help, which 
you continue to provide.  
This brings me to Richard Haans, who was there as well. Richard, I wouldn’t say you 
are similar to Ruud, but you are brilliant and kind as well. You are a role model for research 
master and Ph.D. students. You too, have left your mark on this dissertation. You too, have 
shown me the toolbox. It’s impressive that you were able to do that, and I am sure you will 
develop into a great scholar.  
Not only my mentors, teachers and colleagues deserve gratitude. Also my students have 
 
 
taught and helped me along the way. Joyce, I have mentioned you before. With some of my 
sketchy feedback in Strategic Consultancy you were able to show exactly what I meant. Renée, 
I have kept you waiting long enough now. Although our story continues in essay two, I would 
like to thank you for your ability to surprise me. Like an eel you chose your own path whilst I 
provided you with some directions and I am glad you did exactly that. I am sure there is a place 
for you in academia, but you’ll be a terrific consultant as well. Follow your dreams! 
I will not mention all the students I have seen throughout the years I taught Operations 
Management and Strategic Consultancy and supervised on their Bachelor and Master thesis, 
but your confidence and appreciation of my teaching skills make me a rapturous person. 
Yannick Lamens, Mark van Dijkhuizen, Maarit Raats, Huub van den Brok, Jonathan Davis, 
Lianne Takken, and Bart Beerens: Thanks for being my students! I know you were happy with 
my supervision, but I regret that I didn’t have the skills that I have now to supervise you. But 
that’s life. 
I would also like to thank Marion Wierda for her help along the way. Without it, this 
dissertation would have not existed. It was very beneficial to be able to talk to someone in the 
sector so as to check whether the mechanisms which I study actually existed in reality. Albert 
Vermuë, chairman of the Unie van Waterschappen helped me rethink the original design of the 
study and also allowed me access to all the rich data that is fed into the different essays. I am 
incredibly thankful for this. Also, others that worked at the different water authorities were very 
helpful and deserve my gratitude. 
And then there is life outside academia – yes there is. Antoine Kerkhof, thanks for 
being my friend throughout the years. Although you are not in the position to help me with the 
toolbox, you do help me to build up the muscle to carry it. 
Last but not least, my family. My doppelganger (or am I his?), brother, thank you for 
being. Your trailblazing gave me a head start, we could even hypothesize I am in this position 
because of that. We wouldn’t be able to test it anyway, but anyway, no matter the exact 
 
 
mechanisms, I believe that without you I wouldn’t be able to stand where I am today (who 
could I have had as a paranymph otherwise?!).  
And then there are my mom and dad who taught me the fundamentals. You said that 
someday I would see the value of picking strawberries. I see it now. Even if it is just to remind 
that things can always be tougher. To think for yourself is one of the fundamental lessons you 
have taught me, and without it, a Ph.D would be impossible to complete. You let me 
experience some very valuable life lessons by sharing your own hardships with me. And above 
all else, you give me the opportunity to do what I would like to do. Thank you for your total 
confidence in everything I do. 
Anika, I find it the hardest to articulate your influence and help in this dissertation. I 
can’t describe it. I can’t pinpoint it. No single word was put there by you, yet none of them 
would have been there, weren’t it for you. I have but two words for you. Although they have 
been mentioned before in this acknowledgement section, the beauty of words is that their 
meaning depends on the context. In this case, they carry much more weight. And here they are. 
Thank you.  
Now, I encourage you to read further. Yes, you reader, don’t put it down after having 
read the acknowledgement section. Yes, the rest of the dissertation is less emotive as this 
acknowledgement section, I give you that, but I am sure there are some things in the essays that 
would perhaps enlarge your toolbox as well.  
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The essence of the strategy concept entails “the dynamics of the firm’s relation with its 
environment for which the necessary actions are taken to achieve its goals and/or to increase 
performance by means of the rational use of resources” (Ronda-Pupo & Guerras-Martin, 2012: 
180). Fundamental to strategy is thus how a firm can retain fit with its environment amidst 
changes in either. This dissertation aims to contribute to the nexus of strategy and 
organizational change by studying when, why and which organizational changes are adopted, 
primarily from a behavioral perspective. 
 The organization theory and strategic management literature have long explored 
organizational change, which is defined as “change in how an organization functions, who its 
members and leaders are, what form it takes, or how it allocates it resources” (Huber, Sutcliffe, 
Miller, & Glick, 1995: 216). A variety of theoretical perspectives have explored this 
phenomenon, including population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), institutional theory 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996), organizational learning (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991), and 
behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) (Cyert & March, 1992). In this dissertation, I adopt a 
behavioral approach. In contrast to the other theoretical perspectives just mentioned, this 
approach puts the decision-maker as a human at the forefront and analyzes how said individual 
makes decisions pertaining to organizational change. 
The main assumptions of this dissertation are fivefold. First, decision-makers satisfice 
instead of maximizing (Cyert & March, 1992). They are driven by the attainment of the 
aspiration level of one or more goals and will choose the first alternative that is deemed 
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satisfactory from that standpoint (Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012). Second, attention 
is limited: only a limited set of elements can enter into consciousness at a given time, due to 
bounded rationality (Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1947). Third, due to their bounded rationality, 
individuals do not have complete information on possible solutions for the problems they face 
(Gavetti et al., 2012). That is, information is not readily available: it needs to be searched, 
which requires resources such as time, money, and attention. Given this, failure to achieve a 
satisfactory outcome triggers a search process which is thus problemistic in nature (Gavetti et 
al., 2012). Fourth, when faced with uncertainty, for instance on strategic decisions (Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, & Théorêt, 1976),  behavior is rule-based. That is, individuals use simple rules to 
guide their behavior. Search in the vicinity of a problem for its solution is one such rule (Cyert 
& March, 1992; Gavetti et al., 2012). Fifth, the organization consists of a coalition of groups, 
each with its own distinct goals and interests (Cyert & March, 1992). These groups can be 
legally part of the organization, e.g. managers, but also external parties, such as suppliers, are 
considered to be part of the coalition (Cyert & March, 1992). The roles of these different 
groups in the coalition are emphasized in the different essays of this dissertation. 
A behavioral approach is taken in this dissertation for multiple reasons. First, it has an 
excellent fit with the studied research settings. From preliminary qualitative inquiries, it 
became apparent that the decision-making processes were similarly structured as detailed in 
Cyert and March (1992). This is all the more important since I study public organizations and 
the assumptions of the strategic management perspective should reflect the empirical setting. 
The fundamental assumptions of BTOF resonated closely with the actual behavior of the 
individuals involved. Second, one of the prime functions of BTOF is to explain search and 
change, the core questions I attempt to answer (Cyert & March, 1992; Gavetti et al., 2012). 
Since BTOF focuses on how decisions are actually made, this theoretical perspective is all the 
more relevant when studying which decisions are made in organizations. Fourth, this allows for 
a contribution to “a behavioral theory of the interfirm” as called for by Gavetti et al. (2012) and 
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Baum and Ingram (2002). 
The organizational change literature rooted in behavioral theory consists of various 
streams upon which this dissertation builds. I characterize them based on the source of change, 
specified as the organizational level at which change originates. First, there is a stream that 
studies the role of the middle manager in stimulating and implementing change (e.g. 
Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). Middle managers are particularly important to study as they serve 
as linking pins between otherwise disconnected groups of organizational members, including 
operational staff and top managers as well as some external parties (Floyd & Wooldridge, 
1999; Huy, 2002). As such, they have knowledge of the day-to-day activities of the 
organization and have unique access to top management. Operational knowledge helps middle 
managers to notice needs and issues for organizational change and the access to top 
management enables the middle managers to voice them (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). Thus, 
middle managers can champion change and also serve as implementers of organizational 
change (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992). As such, they are an important constituency to take into 
account when studying organizational change. 
 Second, another stream focuses on the role of top managers and board members in 
orchestrating change (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). It is the role of management to define the 
“developments and events which have the potential to influence the organization’s current or 
future strategy” (Dutton & Duncan, 1987: 280), which includes the decision to change the 
organization. The composition of the top management team and board of directors plays an 
important role, as the type and variety of cognitive perspectives shape the interaction within the 
group that results in the decision to change (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Therefore, these top 
managers and board directors are also an important constituency to study when examining why, 
when and which organizational changes are adopted. 
 Third, other organizations may stimulate the focal organization to change. The literature 
on diffusion of innovations, in particular, examines which organizations are more likely to 
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adopt changes (Rogers, 2003). The key assumption is that decision-makers make the decision 
to adopt based on their own private information and with public cues of whether others also 
adopt (Greve & Seidel, 2015). A considerable body of literature has found that the more the 
focal organization is exposed to information on an innovation, the higher its tendency to adopt 
the innovation gets (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Davis, 1991; Greve, 1996; Haunschild, 1993; 
Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 1993; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). The main argument is 
that as the number of adopting firms connected to the focal firm increases, the focal firm 
receives an increasing quantity of social information or influence, which subsequently increases 
its changes of adopting that same practice (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997; Haunschild, 
1993; Kraatz, 1998). Furthermore, this literature has sought to uncover which types of firms are 
more likely to be relevant in influencing the focal firm to adopt an innovation. In sum, when 
considering organizational change, it is thus important to consider the interorganizational 
environment in which the organization is active (Martin, Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1998). 
Between them, these three levels help build an integral picture of the motivations, 
timing, and type of changes which a population of organizations engages in. In this dissertation, 
I aim to contribute to each of these streams and focus on one influence source per essay.1 
Depending upon the level of analysis, I draw more specifically on mechanisms from, or related 
with, classical behavioral decision theory (Cyert & March, 1992). One such theoretical element 
is the notion of internal and external reference points, whereby an organization’s reactions 
depend on its performance relative to expectations. A related mechanism is that of 
organizational learning (Levitt & March, 1988), which again may have an internal source but is 
also a function of external information (vicarious learning). However, at the more micro level 
(inside the firm), I draw more on literature that is behavioral in nature but also borrows from 
other perspectives. As a whole, going from intra- to inter-organizational sources, the 
                                                 
1 I also recognize that the levels are ultimately interdependent, in particular where top managers are responsible for 
the actual decision to change, even if change was initiated and may be implemented by middle managers, and top 
managers also have to integrate external cues about other organizations. 
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dissertation provides insight into why, when, and which organizational changes are adopted by 
organizations. 
Specifically, the four essays which constitute the main body of the dissertation consider 
respectively: (1) what tactics middle managers use to convince top management to undertake 
business model change initiatives, (2) how board diversity impacts strategic decision-making 
and how that in turn affects the ability of the organization to change, (3) how the attention of 
the decision-makers and attainment discrepancy jointly shape what kind of organizational 
change decisions are made, and (4) how partners and indirect (joint-supplier) competitors 
influence adoption of a new organizational practice. Each essay examines a different type of 
practices that are changed, but they generally deal with firm boundaries and innovation. The 
outcomes for the respective essays are changes in: (1) business model, (2) general 
innovativeness, (3) governance mode of particular activities, and (4) distribution method. 
Collectively, the essays provide diverse insights into organizational change with the same 
underlying theoretical assumptions, yet each essay also stands on its own. 
 
 




Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the four essays. As the figure illustrates, I study 
various sources of influences for organizational change, ranging from middle managers, to the 
top decision-makers, up to external constituencies. Each essay contributes to the various 
streams in the organizational change literature, primarily from a behavioral perspective.  
 
 
Figure 2: Structure of the dissertation 
 
Additionally, Figure 2 depicts the relationship between the four essays. Although the constructs 
may not be studied explicitly in the essays, it allows for an integral picture of organization 
change as it occurs at the studied organizations. Essay one shows the influence of middle 
management proposals on top management and board of directors, predominantly on what 
comes to their attention in their meetings. This essay also shows that middle management, 
through continuous informing top management, will shape its proposals so that they fit with the 
top management’s and board of directors’ attention. This resonates with Ocasio’s (1997) 
inertial view on organizational attention. The second essay focuses on board of directors’ 
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decision-making, whether this is political or not. Implicitly, the essay shows that the use of 
politics influences the decision-making that is driven by top management and board of 
directors’ attention, which in turn affects the decisions that are made in the organization. The 
third essay is on the top management and board of directors level and shows that their attention 
and negative attainment discrepancy jointly determine when and what kind of organizational 
change decisions are made. Last, the fourth essay shows that the organization’s suppliers and 
competitors provide information, to which the top management and board of directors can pay 
attention to, which ultimately drives the organizational change decision. 
 
Empirical settings 
The first three essays are studies of the Dutch water authority sector. In essence, these 
organizations (also sometimes known as water boards) are responsible for managing water 
barriers, for maintaining the level and quality of water in waterways, and for sewage treatment 
in their respective regions. Managing the water barriers and waterways has historically been 
among their most important activities, given the Netherlands’ vulnerable geography, where 
much of the land area is below sea level. Consistent with the Netherlands’ particular 
vulnerability to flooding and its population density, water authorities have been in existence 
since the twelfth century, and constitute one of the oldest forms of local authority in the 
country, having been vested in the Dutch constitution since 1848. Given its geographic 
situation, the Netherlands requires permanent and intensive public water management. 
The Netherlands has developed a complicated system of drainage ditches, canals and 
pumping stations to keep its low-lying areas dry for habitation and agriculture. The water 
authorities are tasked with managing and maintaining these critical systems, and also with 
pumping water into the hinterland to support agricultural irrigation: thus the nation’s 
waterways also serve as irrigation mechanisms. Over time, the water authorities also became 
responsible for water sanitation, i.e. purifying local water of enough household waste, industrial 
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pollutants and agricultural runoff that it can be pumped into rivers. 
By 2016, there were 22 water authorities in the Netherlands. A fundamental attribute of 
these organizations is that their top management is chosen via public election every four years. 
Another fundamental attribute is that they are empowered to levy their own taxes: so they 
represent a separate public governance level, alongside the Dutch national government, 
province, and municipality administrations. However, unlike those bodies, they are not 
considered to be general government authorities, but rather as functional bodies whose remit is 
limited to public water management. Water authorities have their own ‘trade association’ - the 
Association of Regional Water Authorities (also known as ‘Dutch Water Authorities’) - which 
discusses industry-wide problems and opportunities with the national government. 
Note that these water authorities differ from water utilities. Water utilities provide 
drinking water services to residential, commercial, and industrial sectors of the economy; in 
contrast, water authorities are not providers of water to households and firms - that is the 
responsibility of separate water utilities - but keep waterways in the hinterland at levels such 
that agriculture can pump water out of them for irrigation purposes at no cost to farmers. In 
addition, the water authorities’ sanitation responsibilities only involve removing waste and 
pollutants from wastewater so that it is of sufficient quality to be pumped into rivers. The water 
utilities downstream can then pump the water into their own treatment plants and purify it so 
that it can be used by households and firms. 
Although water authorities are public organizations, their governance is quite similar to 
that of business firms. Each has a board of directors of approximately 25 individuals (the exact 
number depends on the size of the water authority) who are elected for four year terms and 
meet approximately every two months. Of these directors, five typically also make up the top 
management team which meets approximately every two weeks. The chair of the top 
management team is appointed by the Crown (the national government), typically for six years. 
The decision-making process is structured so that the top management team first decides on an 
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issue at hand and then (depending on the issue’s importance) the board of directors makes the 
final call. If the decision is relatively minor, the board will not be involved at all.2 The Water 
Authorities Act of 1991 determines that the prime task of the board of directors is to make sure 
that the tasks of the water authority are appropriately executed by monitoring top management 
and setting rules for the strategy or policy to be designed by top management. They are also 
required to approve other items, such as the budget, tax rates, and the annual report. 
There are four categories of directors in the board of directors: (1) inhabitants, (2) firm 
owners (excluding agricultural firms), (3) agricultural firms, and (4) nature representatives. 
Representatives of the inhabitants are selected through a voting process by all inhabitants of the 
region in which the water authority operates. Representatives of firm owners are selected by the 
chamber of commerce. Representatives of agricultural firms are selected by the employer’s 
organization for the agriculture industry, the Dutch Federation of Agriculture and Horticulture. 
Representatives of nature are selected by the Dutch Forest and Nature reserve owners 
association. The province in which the water authority is located decides on the number of seats 
that each category has in the board of the directors.  
Although the directors are all responsible for the appropriate execution of the water 
authority’s tasks, directors’ opinions on how this should be done may vary. In particular, their 
role as representative for a certain category may influence this. For instance, a representative 
from agriculture will more likely seek to secure funds for projects that benefits local farmers. 
After their term, a more successful representative is more likely to be selected again (or voted 
in again); which is one of the prime individual goals of the directors. 
In the water authorities we study, middle managers are intermediate-level managers, 
i.e., they are neither members of the Board or the top management team, but nor are they 
                                                 
2 The Water Authorities Act (1991) prescribes that top management should prepare all the matters that must be 
considered or decided upon in the board of directors. Although a number of these matters are mentioned explicitly 
in the Act (e.g., determining the budget), the Water Authorities Act (1991) does not specify what exactly these 
matters are. The Act does prescribe that the board of directors should monitor the executed policy and strategy of 
top management. Hence, top management does need to put forward to the board of directors those matters that 
allow the board of directors to monitor top management. 
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employees without supervisory responsibilities. We define middle managers as “managers who 
operate at the intermediate level of the corporate hierarchy” (Dutton & Ashford, 1993: 398). 
They are the civil servants with supervisory responsibilities. They are the prime sources of 
innovation projects designed for organizational change, which they propose to top management 
for approval. If the change project necessitates a substantial amount of resources, the board of 
directors has the ultimate say in the decision-making process. Hence, the middle managers are 
the sources for organizational change, whereas the top managers and directors are the decision-
makers for organizational change. 
Since every water authority is tasked with water management in its own region, water 
authorities do not face competition. As a population of organizations, they can only be 
dismantled by the national government. Even then, their existential right is vested in the 
constitution, thus dismantling these organizations would require a change in the constitution 
with all the onerous procedures involved. Indeed, this would involve the dismantling of all 
water authorities: A single water authority cannot be dismantled. Nevertheless, the province in 
which the water authority is located, can decide on a merger between water authorities. Poorly 
performing water authorities can in such a way be merged into more successful ones. 
Although poor performance of these organizations may have less severe consequence 
than for other types of organizations, such as firms that can go bankrupt, the decision-makers 
are incentivized to ensure good performance. First, as previously mentioned, they are required 
by law to make sure the organization executes its tasks properly. Second, the performance of a 
water authority is frequently and publicly benchmarked with that of others. Being a decision-
maker of a relatively poorly performing organization is thus not in the personal interest of the 
directors and top managers. This effect is exacerbated by the fact that directors serve a four 
year term, after which they are subject to election or re-nomination for the next term. Poorly 
performing boards are thus likely to be selected out. 
In total, the intricacies of this setting are substantial. There are important advantages of 
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using this setting, however. First, the composition and size of the board of directors is 
determined exogenously. Second, by their public nature, these organizations allow for the 
comprehensive data collection on the minutes of all their board of director meetings. In 
addition, although confidential, the minutes of top management team meetings have also been 
collected. Third, the water authorities have specific and restricted governance mode options 
when it comes to organizing or reorganizing activities. Thus, it allows for a more structured and 
cleaner theorization and analysis of this phenomenon (in chapter 4). 
A disadvantage of using this setting pertains to the generalizability of the findings. 
Specifically, this setting diverges from more traditional research settings in strategy research, 
such as publicly listed firms, in the specific categories of stakeholders, the tasks of the board of 
directors and possibly the inherent politicality of the decision-making process. As such, the 
findings require replication. In each essay I discuss this issue in more detail. 
Although water authorities offer an interesting context to study intra-organizational 
processes and collaboration with peer organizations, their status makes them less relevant for 
studying the diversity of external influences on change. In the last, more externally oriented 
essay, I study a different industry with greater visibility of direct and indirect ties: the global 
video game industry (2006-2013). Traditionally, video game publishers have sold products 
through independent retail stores. With the introduction of the seventh generation video game 
consoles (Playstation 3, Xbox360 and Wii), digital distribution channels became available. This 




Throughout this dissertation, I employ different research methods as they befit the research 
questions of the respective essays. Given the process-oriented question in the first essay, I 
employ a qualitative approach. I start with the collection and analysis of archival sources to 
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gain a thorough, multi-facetted understanding of the case’s technical and organizational 
intricacies (Yin, 2009). Getting acquainted with the subject via archival information is a fruitful 
way to prepare the researcher for the interview stage, especially in retrospective cases. 
Moreover, archival documents can give the researcher a specific indication of the process, 
which can then be leveraged in the interviews (Yin, 2009). The fact that our archival sources 
reported precisely who was involved in each document and meeting also informed my selection 
of interviewees. 
For essays two and three, I draw upon a unique collected set of archival documents: all 
minutes of board of directors meetings in 2008-2014 (in essay three I also use the confidential 
minutes of top management meetings in 2008-2014). The analysis differs between the two 
essays given the constructs that are studied. In the second essay, I study a dimension of 
decision-making, which can be captured by using word counts analysis as a proper dictionary 
can be constructed that covers the construct to be studied. For the third essay, I use topic 
modeling since for the construct of interest, attention, it is much more difficult to create an 
appropriate dictionary, thus making word count analysis inferior. Topic modeling is also more 
applicable in this essay as the overall change in the use of words reflects a change in attention 
(Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007). Hence, attention can and should be captured by considering 
the full text, not just the use of certain words as specified in a dictionary.  
Computer-aided text analyses hold important advantages and disadvantages. Foremost, 
it is a more reliable and cost-effective method compared to human-coded techniques. Human-
coded techniques also assume that the substance of topics and the rules of coding documents 
are known a priori (Quinn, Monroe, Colaresi, Crespin, & Radev, 2010). One advantage of 
human-coded techniques is that the coding scheme of text in documents can be highly 
sophisticated and contingent, increasing the validity of the study. Yet, especially when 
considering a large set of documents, the use of multiple coders becomes necessary, making it 
difficult to track whether (1) the same rules are used by the coders and (2) the coders use 
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adequate rules to capture the constructs to be studied. Hence, provided we as researchers are 
also boundedly rational, human-coded techniques may be superior when the amount of text to 
be studied is low, but computer-aided text analyses become superior as the amount of text 
increases. Another strength is that content analysis allows for rendering the rich meaning of 
organizational documents (qualitative data) coupled with quantitative analysis (Duriau et al., 
2007).  
Last, for the fourth essay, I created a more traditional secondary dataset, which I 
analyze through event history methods. 
 
Intended contributions 
The first essay (chapter two) – Business model change: Managerial roles and tactics in 
decision-making – considers the decision-making process behind business model change, 
focusing specifically on the tactics middle managers employ to gain support for such changes. I 
aim to extend and refine the body of evidence about how business model changes gain 
acceptance in large organizations, and thus help explicate a process that is notoriously difficult 
to accomplish. The case study shows that, to promote a business model change initiative, 
middle managers leverage external agreements made by the organization, and keep top 
management continuously informed about the progress of the business model change initiative. 
Although recent research has begun to uncover the stages of business model change on one 
hand, and the various roles and considerations involved on the other, I explicate how a change 
initiative can proceed towards acceptance, i.e. what are the mechanisms that ensure that a 
business model change initiative is ultimately accepted. 
This paper seeks to extend and in some ways modify one stream of literature that 
focuses on middle management roles in strategic and general management, and another stream 
pertaining to issue selling and initiative championing. I propose that middle management plays 
a specific role in identifying business model change opportunities and in initiating such 
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changes. My findings shed new light on the manner in which this role can be played, in 
particular by contrast with the landmark work of Burgelman (1983b). Moreover, the tactics I 
uncover extend those found in previous research on issue selling and championing, and provide 
some original contrasts with extant work, that may inform future research in that area. 
I also examine conceptually how business model change differs from other types of 
organizational change. I theorize that such differences include economic impact, the number of 
parties involved, and the complexity of the interactions between these components. Although 
my case evidence does not allow for the empirical verification of these premises (or of their 
absence: Cuypers & Martin, 2010), I believe my conceptual contribution can inform future 
empirical research that may contrast business model and other organizational changes more 
fruitfully along specific dimensions. 
The second essay (chapter three) – Clear blue water: The mediating role of politics in 
the board diversity-organizational innovativeness relationship – seeks to extend the literature 
on board diversity by explicitly studying the mechanism by which board diversity affects firm 
innovativeness. I introduce a novel concept, stakeholder diversity, and show that it influences 
how decisions are made and whether conflict is resolved politically in the board of directors’ 
decision-making process. Diversity itself does not directly influence innovativeness, but does 
so indirectly by increasing the amount of politics in the board of directors’ decision-making 
process.  
For decision-making research, I aim to show how politics in decision-making can have 
far-reaching implications for an organization. I attempt to demonstrate that political decision-
making not only affects the organization’s financial performance, but also its innovativeness. I 
also seek to demonstrate that board diversity is an important precursor to the relationship as 
more diversity makes the board of directors’ decision-making process more political. For the 
innovation literature, I aim to show that political decision-making is an important indicator for 
the innovativeness of the organization. 
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The third essay (chapter four) – Being in deep water: Negative attainment discrepancy, 
organizational attention, and interorganizational relationship formation in the Dutch water 
authority sector – synthesizes the attention-based view with the behavioral theory of the firm to 
show that organizational attention shapes which type of decision is more likely to be made in 
response to negative attainment discrepancy. I aim to contribute to expanding and 
operationalizing the attention-based view, and to linking with behavior decision theory. I also 
demonstrate that topic modeling can be used to measure broader categories of attention that 
other textual methods cannot do justice to. I also aim to contribute to the behavioral theory of 
the firm; I aim for a theoretical contribution in identifying the boundary conditions under which 
negative attainment discrepancy influences decisions, specifically the decision to engage in an 
interorganizational relationship (IOR). Last, the IOR literature is increasingly exploring 
behavioral determinants (e.g. Tyler & Caner, 2016). I contribute to this field by showing that a 
synthesis of attention-based and behavioral theories can shed original light on IOR formation. 
The fourth essay (chapter five) – “In this world, it’s copy or be pasted”: The role of 
suppliers in innovation adoption – aims to extend the innovation adoption literature by 
studying the role of different actors in the innovation adoption process. I theorize that firms are 
more likely to adopt an innovation when their competitors have adopted that innovation, but 
that this is more than a simple matter of serving the same role in an industry. I distinguish 
between (1) competitors with which the focal firm has a direct business relationship (direct 
competitors) and (2) competitors with which the focal firm has an indirect relationship through 
a mutual supplier (joint-supplier competitors). In so doing, I uncover the role of firms that 
cannot adopt the innovation in question, e.g. suppliers, but share information on the innovation 
between firms. These intermediaries serve as cross-pollinators of the innovation. It is 
paramount to include these actors in study of the adoption process, although they may not be 
the adoption subjects.  
Furthermore, I start to uncover which suppliers have greater influence in the focal 
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firm’s decision to adopt the innovation. Earlier innovation adoption research  has showed that 
the adoption of certain types of firms, such as large and prestigious firms, make the focal firm 
more likely to imitate adoption of the innovation (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Haunschild & 
Miner, 1997). I argue that those social approval assets make the supplier more persuasive in its 
sharing of information on the innovation.  
Third, by building on the work on outcome-based imitation, I aim to show that 
continued adoption of the same innovation by the same reference firm produces a strong 
influence for the focal firm to also adopt. Hence, not only the decision to adopt, but also the 
extent of adoption is important to explain adoption processes. 
 As a whole, the dissertation advances our understanding of why, when, and which 
organizational changes are adopted. I also hope that this dissertation will inspire new research 
on organizational change so that someday, we will be able to grasp the complex behavior of 












































































































































































































 Chapter 23 
 




We study the decision-making process behind business model change, focusing specifically on 
the tactics managers employ to gain support for such changes. We first argue for the prominent 
role of middle management in business model change, and second, we revisit the literatures on 
issue selling and championing as they may apply to business model change decision-making. 
We subsequently analyze the case of a business model change initiative in the Dutch water 
authority sector, revealing two specific tactics that middle management employed to obtain top 
management’s agreement to business model change: leveraging external agreements and 
continuously informing top management. We discuss how these findings extend and in some 
ways suggest a rethink of the literature on organizational change. Finally, we describe the 
specificities of business model change that distinguish it from other types of change. In sum, 
this article demonstrates the interest of research at the nexus of business models and 
organizational change. 
  
                                                 
3 This chapter is the result of joint work with Xavier Martin. It appeared in 2015 in Advances in Strategic 













































































































































































































A growing stream of literature over the last ten years has examined the business model concept. 
Researchers have arrived at powerful conceptualizations in which business models “provide a 
set of generic level descriptors of how a firm organizes itself to create and distribute value in a 
profitable manner” (Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010: 157) and “describe the design or 
architecture of the value creation, delivery, and capture mechanisms [the organization] 
employs” (Teece, 2010: 172). Although more attention is being paid to how business models 
evolve over time, very little research has addressed the problems of changing from one 
business model to another, even though this is known to be a critical transition that affects firm 
survival (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). 
In this paper, we tackle this gap by examining the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ of business 
model change decisions. Our research question is: ‘What are the main tactics employed by 
managers to gain acceptance for a business model change initiative?’ Specifically, we study 
managerial roles and tactics in the decision-making processes involved in business model 
change. We study these processes from the stage where decision-makers pay attention to a 
potential change, all the way through to the point where top management decides to launch a 
revised business model. We pay special attention to the tactics that middle managers employ to 
ensure that the business model change initiative progresses. Through a case study, we discover 
two tactics that - to our knowledge - have not hitherto been identified as such, or described in 
the literature, that enable middle managers to buffer and promote business model change. Thus, 
we explicate conditions for business model change at the decision-making process level of 
analysis. Subsequently, to inform future comparative research, we explore conceptually how 
the conditions for business model change may differ from those for other types of 
organizational change. 












































































































































































































the body of evidence about how business model changes gain acceptance in large 
organizations, and thus help explicate a process that is notoriously difficult to accomplish. Our 
case evidence shows that, to promote a business model change initiative, middle managers 
leverage external agreements made by the organization, and keep top management 
continuously informed about the progress of the business model change initiative. Although 
recent research has begun to uncover the stages of business model change on one hand, and the 
various roles and considerations involved on the other, we contribute to this literature by 
explicating how a change initiative can proceed towards acceptance, i.e. what are the 
mechanisms that ensure that a business model change initiative is ultimately accepted. 
Second, we aim to contribute to the literature on organizational change. Our research 
extends and in some ways modifies one stream of literature that focuses on middle management 
roles in strategic and general management, and another stream pertaining to issue selling and 
initiative championing. We propose that middle management need to play a specific role in 
identifying business model change opportunities and in initiating such changes. Our findings 
shed new light on the manner in which this role can be played, in particular by contrast with the 
landmark work of Burgelman (1983b). Moreover, we explicate the tactics middle managers 
employ to convince top managers to agree to business model change, which enable them to 
overcome top management’s reluctance, and which are thus essential to the execution of 
business model change. The tactics we uncover extend those found in previous research on 
issue selling and championing, and provide some original contrasts with extant work, that may 
inform future research in that area. 
Third, we examine conceptually how business model change differs from other types of 
organizational change. We theorize that such differences include economic impact, the number 
of parties involved, and the complexity of the interactions between these components. Although 
our case evidence does not allow for the empirical verification of these premises (or of their 












































































































































































































contribution can inform future empirical research that may contrast business model and other 




Given their different positions in the firm, top management and middle management may differ 
in how they recognize and respond to opportunities for organizational change. Middle 
management is closer to the organization’s day-to-day activities, so will naturally pay attention 
to opportunities that involve inter-unit interactions and relationships with buyers, suppliers and 
other partners. Some middle managers are especially close to the firm’s current and potential 
customers, which enables them to make vital inputs into business model change (Baden-Fuller 
& Haefliger, 2013; Baden-Fuller & Mangematin, 2013). Meanwhile, top management’s role is 
to set the organization’s overall goals and allocate its resources, so it naturally attends to 
higher-level strategy rather than to specific business model interfaces or partners. Our analysis 
of published articles on organizational change (see below) corroborates our premise of middle 
management’s prominent role in business model change.4 
Burgelman’s case studies (Burgelman, 1983a, b, 1991, 1994) focused on the changes in 
some of the firm’s core activities. We argue that these changes encompassed a change in its 
business model (among other things), although Burgelman did not employ that term as it was 
not in use at the time. Specifically, Burgelman (1983b) studied how managers decided how to 
produce a new product and to whom to sell it - elements of value creation and capture at the 
firm’s boundaries that are part of the business model as it is now understood (Amit & Zott, 
2001; Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010; Teece, 2010). Burgelman (1983b) showed that the 
initiators of change were middle managers, who first and foremost paid attention to the 
                                                 
4 Note that we focus here on studies of larger organizations. The following argumentation may differ as a matter of 













































































































































































































potential value of a specific opportunity and how to unlock that value. It was these business- 
level managers - not top management - who observed the commercial opportunities for a new 
activity. The key position in the opportunity recognition process turned out to be that of group 
leader in the R&D department, i.e. someone who held a first-line supervisory position 
(Burgelman, 1983b). This process required that middle managers convince top managers to 
commit resources to capitalize on the opportunity: making them aware of the opportunity and 
its potential was a key step in the change process. 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) and Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) reported similar 
patterns. In their case studies - of Xerox and Polaroid respectively - they showed how middle 
managers were the main driving forces and instigators of the business model changes that 
would be required to make new technologies profitable, as they could see the need for a 
different business model to unlock their value. Consistent with these findings, Khanagha, 
Volberda, and Oshri (2014) found that middle managers in a large telecommunications firm 
saw the need to shift to cloud computing, and were able to convey the importance of this 
opportunity to top management. Thus, we can see that middle management has a special role to 
play in business model changes, and that the success or failure of such changes may hinge on 
their ability to convince top management. However, what is lacking in this literature is a focus 
on the potentially critical process issue of how middle management is able to convince top 
management to agree to business model change. However, two allied literature streams - to 
which we turn next - may be relevant here, as they address processes of organizational change 
in general. 
Issue selling and championing 
Since myriad initiatives vie simultaneously for top management’s support (Lovas & Ghoshal, 
2000), middle managers need to employ various tactics throughout the decision-making 
process to convince top management to pursue their proposed initiative. We define the actions 












































































































































































































making process as ‘decision-directing tactics’. 
We turn next to literature streams on issue selling and championing that examine the 
dimensions and mechanisms of change decision processes. The literature on issue selling shows 
that individuals outside top management teams can shape an organization’s actions by directing 
top management’s attention to particular issues, which may either be opportunities or problems 
(Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill, & Lawrence, 2001; Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill, Hayes, & Wierba, 
1997; Dutton & Jackson, 1987). Issue selling is defined as “the process by which individuals 
affect others’ attention to and understanding of the events, developments, and trends that have 
implications for organizational performance” (Dutton et al., 2001: 716). Issue selling “shapes 
the direction and rate of strategic adaptation at the firm level by affecting the content of an 
organization’s ... agenda” (Dutton et al., 1997: 408). By prompting top management to pay 
attention to specific matters, issue selling centers on and plays a critical role in the first stage of 
the decision-making process, i.e. the identification of issues that may lead to organizational 
change (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Dutton et al., 1997), but does not extend to study how middle 
management can offer and advance solutions to these issues, and so shape the contents of the 
responses. 
Meanwhile the literature on championing focuses specifically on how middle 
management can propose solutions to certain issues to top management (Floyd & Wooldridge, 
1992), and so how the latter can be prompted to support the initiatives that middle managers 
propose. This championing of alternatives has been defined as the “persistent and persuasive 
communication of strategic options to top management” (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992: 155). 
The main differences between issue selling and championing lie in the nature of what is 
proposed to top management and the stages at which it is proposed. Issue sellers push abstract 
issues or ideas, whereas champions typically push concrete solutions towards fruition (Ashford, 













































































































































































































These literatures have revealed various kinds of decision-directing tactics, which can 
be grouped into four basic choices (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). The first is packaging, which 
refers to the way an initiative is framed or presented (Andersson & Bateman, 2000; Dutton & 
Ashford, 1993; Dutton et al., 2001; Sonenshein, 2006). The second is channels, which refers to 
whether the initiative is advanced in public (such as weekly staff meetings) or in private 
(Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Dutton et al., 2001). The third choice is involvement, which concerns 
whether to conduct the issue selling and/or championing individually or to get others involved 
(Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Ginsberg & Abrahamson, 1991). The fourth choice is the level of 
formality, such as giving official presentations to top management or pushing initiatives 
informally around the coffee machine (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). Both issue selling and 
championing literatures have contributed potential tactics or mechanisms, albeit with different 
emphases across the four choices. Table 1 summarizes the decision-directing tactics so far 
identified in these literature streams. 
 
An important limitation of these past studies concerns the nature of the issue and 
initiatives that are studied empirically, which typically revolve around the incremental 
improvement of specific organizational operations. Dutton et al. (2001) focused on various 
Table 1 Summary of decision-directing tactics in the literature 
Choices of decision-
directing tactics Issue selling literature Championing literature 
Packaging Highlight financial implications Frame the issue as a financial opportunity 
 
Present an issue as incremental change Acquire a large depth of information on the 
issue  Present issue succinctly Present an issue as simple 
 Continuous proposal making Use metaphorical language to champion the 
issue  Tie issues to the profitability goal Frame an issue as urgent 
 Tie issues to market-related issues  
 Tie issues to the concerns of key 
constituents 
 
 Tie issues to other issues  
Selling channels Use public channels  
Involvement Coalition building Use of external agents 













































































































































































































operational issues in a hospital context, such as the need for an in-house mini-laundry, requests 
for an increase in the dialysis budget, and consolidation of registration systems; Piderit and 
Ashford (2003), Dutton, Ashford, Lawrence, and Miner-Rubino (2002), and Ashford et al. 
(1998) focused on speaking up about the treatment of women in organizations; and Howard-
Grenville (2007) studied environmental issues associated with the production of 
microprocessors. Other studies have administered questionnaires to understand the process of 
selling issues in hypothetical situations (Dutton et al., 1997; Sonenshein, 2006), or have been 
conceptual, not taking the nature of the issue into account (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987; Ling, Floyd, & Baldridge, 2005). To our knowledge, the issue selling and 
championing literatures have not considered cases of business model change. Thus, although 
Burgelman (1983b) has shown that middle management may play an important role in change 
situations that encompass business model change, evidence is lacking about the processes 
middle managers might use to convince top management to agree to business model change. 
This conclusion points to the need for exploratory work to study the decision-directing 
tactics employed in business model change initiatives. We turn next to this task, with a 
qualitative focus on discovering decision-directing tactics that may not have been identified as 
such in previous research. In this next section, our overall research question remains the same, 
but we address it empirically as: “ What are the main tactics that managers employ to gain 
acceptance for a business model change initiative ?” 
 
Decision-directing tactics for business model change: A case study 
Inductive work is appropriate to identifying decision-directing tactics in business model 
changes. As became apparent from our conceptual development, existing theory cannot give a 
specific answer to the research question. Moreover, because decision-directing is a complex 












































































































































































































inductively is especially appropriate (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). As could be expected 
from the literature, in the case we study, we found that business model change was instigated 
by middle management. 
Research Setting 
We selected the case of a regional water authority in the Netherlands. In essence, these 
organizations (also sometimes known as water boards) are responsible for managing water 
barriers, for maintaining the level and quality of water in waterways, and for sewage treatment 
in their respective regions. Managing the water barriers and waterways has historically been 
among their most important activities, given the Netherlands’ vulnerable geography, where 
much of the land area is below sea level. Consistent with the Netherlands’ particular 
vulnerability to flooding and its population density, water authorities have been in existence 
since the twelfth century, and constitute one of the oldest forms of local authority in the 
country, having been vested in the Dutch constitution since 1848. Given its geographic 
situation, the Netherlands requires permanent and intensive public water management. 
The Netherlands has developed a complicated system of drainage ditches, canals and 
pumping stations to keep its low-lying areas dry for habitation and agriculture. The water 
authorities are tasked with managing and maintaining these critical systems, and also with 
pumping water into the hinterland to support agricultural irrigation: thus the nation’s 
waterways also serve as irrigation mechanisms. Over time, the water authorities also became 
responsible for water sanitation, i.e. purifying local water of enough household waste, industrial 
pollutants and agricultural runoff that it can be pumped into rivers. 
By 2015, there were 24 water authorities in the Netherlands. A fundamental attribute of 
these organizations is that their top management is chosen via public election every four years. 
Another fundamental attribute is that they are empowered to levy their own taxes: so they 
represent a separate public governance level, alongside the Dutch national government, 












































































































































































































considered to be general government authorities, but rather as functional bodies whose remit is 
limited to public water management. Water authorities have their own ‘trade association’ - the 
Association of Regional Water Authorities (also known as ‘Dutch Water Authorities’) - which 
discusses industry-wide problems and opportunities with the national government. 
Note that these water authorities differ from water utilities as commonly found in other 
countries. Water utilities provide drinking water services to residential, commercial, and 
industrial sectors of the economy: in contrast, water authorities are not providers of water to 
households and firms - that is the responsibility of separate water utilities - but keep waterways 
in the hinterland at levels such that agriculture can pump water out of them for irrigation 
purposes at no cost to farmers. In addition, the water authorities’ sanitation responsibilities only 
involve removing waste and pollutants from wastewater so that it is of sufficient quality to be 
pumped into rivers. The water utilities downstream can then pump the water into their own 
treatment plants and purify it so that it can be used by households and firms. 
As noted above, water authorities have seen their responsibilities change over time, 
albeit over a scale of decades and centuries. More recently, they have begun to think about how 
else they might be able to create value for society. A number of reasons have been advanced for 
such changes, such as image building, responding to ongoing existential threats from national 
politicians keen to concentrate power, and fiscal limits. This impetus has led to various 
initiatives to reconfigure how water authorities create and share value, one of which we study 
in the case described below. 
Although water authorities are public organizations, their governance is quite similar to 
that of business firms. Each has a board of directors of approximately 25 individuals (the exact 
number depends on the size of the water authority) who are elected for four year terms and 
meet approximately every two months. Of these directors, five typically also make up the top 
management team which meets approximately every two weeks. The chair of the top 












































































































































































































The decision-making process is structured so that the top management team first decides on an 
issue at hand and then (depending on its importance) the Board of directors makes the final 
call. If the decision is relatively minor, the Board will not be involved at all. In the case we 
study in this paper, the top management team was involved at the end of each decision-making 
stage, whereas the Board was involved in the final decision as to whether or not to implement 
the business model change, as befits important decisions. 
We defined middle managers earlier as “managers who operate at the intermediate level 
of the corporate hierarchy” (Dutton & Ashford, 1993: 398). In the authority we study, middle 
managers are intermediate-level managers, i.e., they are neither members of the Board or the 
top management team, but nor are they employees without supervisory responsibilities. 
Case description 
Our case study examines the decision-directing tactics that middle managers employed to 
propel one business model change initiative from one stage to the next, where stages indicate 
increasing top management commitment and the end-goal is to convince the Board to give this 
initiative the final ‘go ahead’ towards full-scale operational implementation. The primary unit 
of analysis is the decision-making process. We consider the case from the point where middle 
managers recognized an opportunity (or threat) up to the point where the Board decided to 
implement the changed business model. Thus our analysis encompasses the whole decision-
making process (Mintzberg et al., 1976). We deem the decision to change the business model to 
be complete once the Board explicitly agrees to implement the business model change and 
allocates financial resources to do so at full operational scale, which constitutes the end 
boundary of the case. The full-scale implementation of the business model change is thus not 
part of the case - but all the intermediate steps leading up to this decision are. 
The case we select is a project we call ‘ELEC’ at ‘Water Authority Y’ (both 
pseudonyms), in which this water authority considers whether to generate electricity from the 












































































































































































































organization would change how it created, distributed (delivered) and captured value, by 
engaging in the generation of electricity - aside from its responsibilities for maintaining water 
levels and quality - and delivering this electricity directly to industrial users. From a business 
model standpoint, the source of value generation would change based on a novel form of value 
generation (Zott & Amit, 2007). Monetizing this activity would also be altogether different: the 
electricity would be sold on a unit basis to firms near the water treatment plants, whereas the 
authority’s current activities are monetized by levying broad taxes on the region. In addition, 
the proposed change would modify the organization’s core mission. So the change would 
appear very complex, and likely to generate uncertainty and hesitancy among top managers and 
Board members. As an instance of organizational change, the case has some structural 
similarities to Burgelman’s (1983b) study of a large diversified firm implementing a new 
activity. However, our analysis deals precisely with the business model change, and our study 
also departs from Burgelman (1983b) in focusing on the decision-making process, and 
specifically on the decision-directing tactics employed by middle management. 
Data sources 
We collected data from two main sources: archival documents and semi-structured 
retrospective interviews. 
Archival documents. We analyzed an exceptionally comprehensive set of formal 
administrative documents relating to top management decisions. These were drafted by middle 
management, asking formally for decisions (e.g. extra resources, permission to proceed to the 
next stage) and including memos - typically one to five pages long - and other reports and 
documents, plus larger sets of technical and decision reports. Each document contained details 
of who was involved in writing and shaping the text, and to whom it was addressed and for 
what purpose. We obtained them based on Water Authority Y’s reporting obligations as a 
government entity. We also had access to agendas and notes of all related meetings of top 












































































































































































































These documents were supplemented by internal notes, strategic planning documents, 
presentations, press reports and e-mails: all were precisely dated, which allowed us to develop a 
comprehensive timeline. A typical problem with using archival sources is biased selectivity and 
access, which results in incomplete evidence (Yin, 2009). However, we were given access to 
the organization’s ERP system in which all of these documents were stored, reducing the 
possibility that valuable archival documents were missed, as we were not reliant on an 
interviewee to provide them. We also asked management for any other kind of archival sources 
that might have not been stored in the organization’s IT system, to ensure extra 
comprehensiveness. 
Table 2 reports the type and number of archival documents that we found most 
relevant for this study. Consistent with our research question, this includes the main 
documents providing information about the process of influencing and making decisions 
about ELEC. We identified 73 such documents issued over the four and a half years during 
which the idea unfolded and the decision was made. Measured per year, the number and 
diversity of the internal documents we were able to exploit compares well with those of a 
strategy study that used the same mix of methods (Crossan & Berdrow, 2003). The table 
excludes documents of less importance for our research question - such as mentions of ELEC 
alongside other projects (though we used such documents as relevant, e.g. to identify the 
timeline) - and documents (e.g. press releases) that merely described the outcome rather than 
the decision process. We verified over 200 other documents mentioning ELEC or related 
issues (e.g. an agreement with the national government to which we refer below), and iterated 
between reviews of documents, interviews, and our analyses to ensure it was comprehensive. 
Many of the documents listed in Table 2 were addressed to top management or shed light on 
how middle management dealt with top management, which is consistent with our premise 
that middle management played a key role in the process of pushing the ELEC proposal up 













































































































































































































One drawback of using archival documents as a primary data source is that written 
documents do not necessarily contain the unmitigated truth (though of course, nor may other 
sources). Each document was written for a specific purpose and audience - their authors may 
have had different interests, so that for some purposes archival documents alone do not fully 
report on what is being studied (Yin, 2009).However, for our research question, using internal 
documents as a primary source is actually a strength of the research design, since we aim 
specifically to study how authors framed their reports to direct the Authority’s decision about 
the initiative. Many documents were written in preparation for discussions between middle and 
top management, so they are integral written communications, rather than the retrospective and 
potentially filtered summaries of communications and decisions to which some studies are 
limited - although we also obtained and exploited minutes and other ex-post decision reports. 
Finally (as detailed below) we also conducted interviews that allowed us to verify some of the 
documents. The combination of archival documents and interviews allow for making 
exceptionally strong and robust inferences from case studies (Yin, 2009). 
Interviews. We interviewed multiple managers at Water Authority Y, as well as industry 
representatives such as experts from the Association of Regional Water Authorities. Our 
interviews revealed that one middle manager of Water Authority Y was extensively involved in 
Table 2 Main archival documents analyzed 
Type of document (number of documents) Publication 
dates 
Proposals: Proposals typically consist of a short summary about the initiative at hand, an 
agenda of the meeting at which the proposal is to be discussed, information about who wrote 
the document and the top managers who are expected to respond. We also matched the 
response of top management to each proposal. (12 documents) 2009-2013 
Presentations, reports and other supporting documents: These documents contain in-depth 
information, and mostly extend a letter or proposal. (18 documents) 2008-2013 
Minutes of middle management meetings: These are short notes of meetings where middle 
management discussed the progress of the ELEC project and prepared for meetings with top 
management. (9 documents) 2008-2013 
Emails/letters: These are communications to and from middle management that contain 













































































































































































































the entire decision-making process and was extremely knowledgeable about the case. We 
interviewed this manager for multiple hours over several conversations, corroborating the fact 
that he was a key informant (Yin, 2009). We also found no other employee who was as 
extensively involved in the ELEC decision process: nevertheless, we held extensive interviews 
with two respondents in related positions, as well as with general managers, and their responses 
confirmed those of our key informant. Although including respondents who were only 
marginally involved may raise threats to internal validity if their responses cannot be cross-
checked - because response errors are likely to be higher for such informants (Kumar, Stern, & 
Anderson, 1993) – in our case their supplementary responses helped ensure the completeness 
and validity of our fieldwork. 
To avoid retrospective bias, we triangulated the information obtained from our 
interviews by cross-checking our interview transcripts against archival documents. Each 
interview lasted between one and two and a half hours, all were taped and transcribed verbatim, 
and the transcriptions sent back to the interviewees to check the validity of their contents: all 
were approved. As part of our agreement with Water Authority Y for this study, we went back 
to the interviewees after writing the initial draft of this paper so they could provide feedback, 
and to ensure the validity of the results. The respondents agreed emphatically with our 
descriptions of the mechanisms and tactics employed by middle management as described 
below. We also presented our findings to top management, who likewise concurred. 
Research approach 
Our research approach differs from traditional ethnographic research in that we started by 
collecting and analyzing archival documents before conducting in-depth interviews. Using 
archival documents as primary or initial data sources is an accepted methodology for 
qualitative research in general (Yin, 2009), but it is seldom used in strategic management 
research (see Crossan & Berdrow, 2003). Instead, documents are used for triangulation 












































































































































































































a secondary role. Thus, our approach deserves elaboration. 
We started with archival sources, including some descriptive and external documents 
not listed in Table 2 but discussed above, to gain a thorough, multi-facetted understanding of 
the case’s technical and organizational intricacies (Yin, 2009). Performing the primary analyses 
based on archival data is a fruitful way to prepare the researcher for the interview stage, 
especially in retrospective cases. Moreover, archival documents can give the researcher a 
specific indication of the process, which can then be leveraged in the interviews (Yin, 2009): in 
this case the documents hinted at certain decision-directing tactics that were used in the 
decision-making process. The fact that our archival sources reported precisely who was 
involved in each document and meeting also informed our selection of interviewees. 
The extensiveness of the documentation made available to us allowed us to construct a 
detailed timeline of the decision-making process and identify the points of interest for this 
study, by analyzing when documents reported a conversation between middle management, 
when top management needed to make a decision about the project, and when the activities in 
the decision-making process changed significantly (e.g. from identifying the opportunity to 
developing a way to capitalize on it). Constructing a timeline based on the documents is a 
valuable way of reducing recall bias: in this case, it was especially important as the sequence of 
events we studied began approximately 5 years before the detailed fieldwork was undertaken, 
although we were in contact with the organization before the decision process was completed. 
Furthermore, the timeline, along with the highlighted points of interest, provided a solid basis 
for our interviews,5 which revealed the decision-directing tactics in detail. Graphical 
representations - such as an annotated timeline - are “particularly useful for understanding 
process data as they allow for the simultaneous representation of multiple dimensions, and can 
                                                 
5 Initially we obtained unassisted recall from our interviewees, which allowed for data triangulation, and we could 
subsequently go through the timeline with an interviewee to discuss relevant points of interest. In some instances, 
the interviewees actively recalled events when seeing the documents and timeline, or we were able to use the 
timeline to achieve clarifications from the interviewees. This illustrates a further advantage of our methodology 












































































































































































































be used to show precedence, parallel processes, and the passage of time” (Langley, 1999: 700). 
Data analysis 
Our analysis process consisted of three steps: data reduction, data display, and iteratively 
drawing and verifying conclusions. The data reduction consisted of categorizing and coding the 
relevant data we collected. We started reducing the data by constructing the timeline and 
developing tentative categories of decision-directing tactics. For example, the steady stream of 
documents and communications about the ELEC project middle managers sent to top managers 
suggested what we refer to below as the ‘continuous informing tactic’. The timeline and 
preliminary categorization of archival data guided our interview protocol. 
As the interviews added to our raw data, we revised our timeline and constructed a 
narrative of the case (on which we report in the next section). The narrative, cross-referenced to 
the reduced data and iteratively triangulated against raw data as it came up, gave us a broad 
view of the Authority’s decision-making process about the ELEC idea, and ultimately 
identified the specific decision-directing tactics that middle managers used to convince top 
management to agree to the whole initiative. 
Keeping both our research question and the broad literature on issue selling and 
championing in mind, we began coding the interviews while simultaneously returning to the 
archival documents to uncover decision-directing tactics and understand their logic. Although 
guided by the literature, we remained open to new decision-directing tactics. We took excerpts 
of interviews about middle management’s tactics to convince top management specifically into 
account, which allowed us to uncover additional decision-directing tactics and update the 
tentative categories we distilled from the archival documents. Table 3 shows these main 
findings, describing how and where each new tactic was uncovered.6 Our findings were 
                                                 
6 The table features two essential tactics that were not described in the literature reviewed above. We also observed 
tactics previously described in the issue-selling literature, such as highlighting financial implications, presenting 
the issue succinctly, or tying the initiative to market-related issues; however, those tactics were less salient in 
archival documents in this case, and interviewees described them as less important. We take this both as indicating 












































































































































































































subsequently verified with the interviewees, and we presented a preliminary version of this 
paper to middle and top management to determine if we had interpreted the data correctly. The 
attendees agreed with our interpretation and codification of the data, as well as with the 
conclusions we formed. 
Table 3 Summary of novel decision-directing tactics found at ELEC 
Source/Tactic Tactic inferred from Example 
Archival documents   
Leveraging external agreements Explicit mention of an agreement 
between the focal organization and 
outside constituencies that stipulates 
an organizational target 
Proposal mentioning that ELEC could 
be used to meet an energy target, and 
including a copy of an agreement with 
the national government that specifies 
this target for the water authorities 
Continuously informing top 
management  
Number and nature of contact points 
between middle and top management 
Proposal mentioning that middle 
management aims to inform top 
management regularly about the 
status of ELEC 
Interviews   
Leveraging external agreements Quoting or mentioning an agreement 
between the focal organization and 
outside constituencies that stipulates 
an organizational target  
“So if you let top management sign 
such an agreement, you [can then] get 
their support if you want to initiate a 
project like ELEC.” 
Continuously informing top 
management 
Quotes about the importance of 
maintaining ongoing contact between 
middle and top management 
“We speak monthly with [the top 
manager] where we discuss the main 
points [of the initiative].” 
“[Top management] informally gets 
to know about the recent 
developments, but we also do it 
formally by composing a [report].” 
“So if [the top manager] does not 
want to go in a certain direction, you 
know that you shouldn’t develop the 
initiative in that way.” 
“[The top manager] is informed about 




                                                                                                                                                           













































































































































































































Summary of the narrative and findings of the ELEC case 
We identified different stages in the decision-making process as the background to our 
findings. The first stage was the identification stage, where middle management discovered the 
opportunity to generate and sell electricity from materials collected at their wastewater 
treatment plants, while they were looking for ways to reduce energy costs and waste. However, 
it was an external event that ensured that recognition of this opportunity built and eventually 
spread from middle management to top management. 
This external event was a contest organized by the Association of Regional Water 
Authorities in which the authorities were invited to submit ideas to modernize the public face 
of water authorities, which had been plagued by a ‘dusty’ public image that threatened the 
legitimacy of the organizational form itself. One of the ways suggested to improve their image 
was to create and implement innovative projects that would increase their public visibility. 
ELEC was such a project, as it was argued that the Authority would become more visible if it 
were to sell electricity directly to other organizations or even to households. At the contest, four 
water authorities presented similar proposals: to make their wastewater treatment plants energy 
neutral and, in the long run, to become energy providers. 
Days after the contest, these four water authorities met to discuss the need to engage in 
preliminary research to ascertain the feasibility of their ideas, and created a tentative 
consortium to share in this effort. This marked a critical transition in the decision-making 
process, from opportunity recognition to increasingly sophisticated analysis. Water Authority Y 
decided to commit a small sum of money for preliminary - mainly desk - research, most of 
which was carried out by water authority employees, although three consultancy companies 
were hired to handle some of it. Within half a year, it became clear that the general idea was 
technically and financially feasible, but more extensive research would be needed before top 












































































































































































































Top management support was required to ensure the transition to the development 
stage, as Water Authority Y would need to invest more money in research. At this point, a 
separate agreement made earlier by top management with the national government proved 
instrumental in helping middle management to persuade top managers to pursue the ELEC 
project further. This ‘Multi-year agreement on energy efficiency’ included a public undertaking 
by all water authorities’ top managements (via the Association of Regional Water Authorities) 
to increase energy efficiency by 2% per year. The final agreement stated that this goal could be 
achieved through any combination of efficiency gains in processes or supply chains, and the 
use of renewable energy. The last point turned out to be critical, as the ELEC concept could 
contribute directly towards this element. As one interviewee put it: 
The 2% [target] was not a motive to invest in the ELEC project, but it facilitated 
the progress of this project. [...] We could go to top management and say, 
“Well, have a look, Water Authority Y agreed to this and this back then, it would 
really help if we implement this ELEC project. ” 
The next stage included research on the exact location where the ELEC project could be 
realized, in-depth research about its technical details, and finding potential partners to buy the 
energy surplus generated. Water Authority Y also hired an external consultant to draft a 
comprehensive technical and business case to help with this effort. Consistent with previous 
research (Mintzberg et al., 1976), this development stage took up the vast bulk of the decision-
making process. Especially during this period, which included relatively long stretches between 
development milestones, middle management made concerted efforts to inform top 
management regularly about the progress, both orally and in writing. 
First, a middle manager undertook to talk to his senior counterpart regularly to maintain 
the project’s visibility: importantly, this was done routinely, as a matter of course, even if no 












































































































































































































to proactively ascertain top managers’ preferences, so as to orient the ELEC project towards 
their way of thinking: 
We speak monthly with [the top manager whose portfolio concerns wastewater 
treatment] where we discuss the main points [of the project]. 
We do so to keep [top management] informed on the initiatives, so [they] know what is 
in the pipeline. [,..][The relevant top manager] is informed about the matter, but does 
not have to make a decision. 
It is an informal meeting where I hear in what direction [the top manager] wants to go. 
So, if [the top manager] does not want to go in a certain direction, you know that you 
shouldn’t develop the initiative in that way. 
Second, middle management effectively made sure that top management as a whole 
received and acknowledged written information about the project at least once every three or 
four months - again, even when there was no breakthrough progress or major conclusions to 
report. This is all the more remarkable as we found no evidence that top management requested 
regular reports (or that such reporting was culturally ingrained); rather, middle management 
initiated these communications proactively in the ELEC case. 
The middle managers referred to the communications thus created as a ‘continuous’ 
rather than a ‘constant’ informing process: one with sufficient frequency, regularity and 
bilateral ‘bandwidth’ that ensured ELEC stayed in top managers’ minds. This long-lasting 
effort also ensured that no gaps or discrepancies in understanding were left unnoticed by 
middle management, and that top management could be confronted with the technical and 
business case directly once it was complete: 
Top management is informed and then we get the final report of the consultant, 
and then the next steps become very tangible. The final report concludes what we 












































































































































































































stage and then we are looking at the best way to implement this ELEC project. 
We are not yet going to implement it [on a large scale], but we are going to 
investigate how to implement it and then we draft a list of smaller projects which 
we can pursue towards the ELEC project. 
One interviewee elaborated on why continuously informing top management was very 
important in directing their support for the ELEC initiative: 
Well, if you have a project that is not supported by a top manager, if there is no 
top manager who is willing to defend the initiative in front of the whole top 
management team, it becomes very difficult. To some extent, that top manager 
needs to become the owner of that initiative. 
At the completion of the development phase, the ELEC project was split into three smaller 
‘sub-projects’ that were separate but complementary. Middle managers evaluated each sub-
project and the feasibility of their implementation. Following the completion of this 
development stage, middle management put all three sub-projects forward to top management 
at the same time, each necessitating its own decision. This signaled the beginning of the short 
final selection stage. In April 2013, top management decided to implement all three subprojects 
- and thus the ELEC project as a whole - so completing the decision-making process for this 
case. Full-scale implementation of ELEC was then begun. 
 
Discussion 
Although much attention has been paid to business model change or innovation, in fact little 
research has examined the who and the how of business model change. Specifically, we set out 
to discover what tactics managers use to gain acceptance for a business model change initiative. 
Our review of the literatures on middle management roles and on issue selling and 












































































































































































































effect organizational change, research that specifically examines business model change from 
these process perspectives has been lacking. Accordingly, we focused specifically on the 
decision-directing tactics used in a case of business model change. The case study of the ELEC 
project unearthed specific tactics that middle managers used to direct top management towards 
supporting the business model change initiative, and thus to advance the decision-making 
process from stage to stage. Two tactics were especially important. 
For one thing, middle management used an existing external agreement to gain support 
from top management. Specifically, they linked the ELEC project with an agreement 
previously made by top management relating to improving energy efficiency. This compact 
differed from typical managerial policies and commitments in that it was a sector-wide 
agreement with a powerful external party (the government) that basically specified a goal for 
the organization, but left it with flexibility as to how it should be attained. The agreement was 
meant to secure support and legitimacy from external stakeholders, so we refer to it - and others 
like it made by top management - as an external agreement. Middle management deliberately 
leveraged this external agreement to gain support for the ELEC project. We argue that, by 
leveraging such existing external agreements (and possibly by advocating them in the first 
place), middle management can gain top management support to propel related projects 
through the decision-making process. 
Our fieldwork suggests some mechanisms by which leveraging external agreements 
helps propel related projects forward. The fact that top management agreed to the goals 
stipulated in the external agreement created an expectation, by association, that it would attend 
to any initiative that promised to further their attainment. Although that expectation does not 
guarantee the initiative will be supported (Cyert & March, 1992), it makes it much more likely 
that it will at least be acknowledged and properly examined (Bower, 1986) – as certainly 
happened with ELEC. Such mindful treatment, in turn, makes it more likely that a project 












































































































































































































expected to be generously supported and to succeed (Bower, 1986; Ghosh, Martin, Pennings, & 
Wezel, 2014). It is therefore up to middle management to show that their initiative furthers the 
attainment of such superordinate goals. As mentioned above, one interviewee conveyed just 
that impression. Furthermore, that middle manager suggested that, if top management were not 
favorably inclined, it would need to provide a better reason to reject an initiative linked with an 
existing external agreement. This type of mindful attention may be especially relevant when 
initiatives are perceived as high-risk and complex to analyze, as business model changes 
generally are (something to which we return in the next section). This helps explain why we 
observed this mechanism as being prominent in the ELEC case, although it has not previously 
been described in the issue selling literature. 
There may be an exacerbating factor related to the context and type of external 
agreement. In this sector, external agreements are normally between individual water 
authorities and the national government (or between the whole industry and the national 
government, as described above), i.e. they bind the organization to the highest government 
authority. While the energy efficiency agreement (and other similar agreements, such as one to 
lower overall costs and thus the burden on taxpayers) was meant to increase the legitimacy of 
the water authorities, it compelled them to come up with projects to increase the effectiveness 
of their activities lest they lose both funding and political support. The middle managers 
promoting ELEC understood this well, and thus specifically sought to leverage this external 
agreement. Indeed, one interviewee mentioned that it would be smart in future to encourage 
external agreements based on initiatives related to ones they wished or intended to pursue. 
In summary, we expect the effectiveness of the tactic of leveraging an external 
agreement to be a function of the strength of that agreement, and of its ‘fit’ with the intended 
new initiative. We recognize - as did the interviewees - that this combination was unexpectedly 
strong in the ELEC case: nevertheless, more generally, our finding about the role of external 












































































































































































































and offers a new mechanism via which middle management can gain support for its initiatives. 
In effect, the strength of the external agreement elevates the power of the middle managers 
working on an associated initiative. Although the external agreement that propelled the ELEC 
project may have been unusually formal and visible, because it involved the national 
government, we believe that similar external commitments can also be identified in other 
contexts - such as in CEOs’ statements in annual reports (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), in 
other corporate and marketing communications, in alliances that require extensive and durable 
collaboration (Cuypers & Martin, 2007; Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006), or in 
industry-wide self-regulation initiatives (King & Lenox, 2000). 
The issue selling literature has described a looser yet potentially powerful class of 
tactics labeled as packaging, referring to the way an issue is framed or presented linguistically 
and visually (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). Such research has shown that tying the issue being sold 
to broad organizational goals helps issue sellers gain support (Dutton et al., 2001). These goals 
do not necessarily have to be explicit, e.g. goals may be to increase revenues or to enhance 
patient care, without specifying the desired extent of such increase or enhancement (Dutton et 
al., 2001); and are typically internal, rather than externally agreed and communicated. The 
ELEC case departs from this in several important ways. First, the agreement was precise and 
quantified as to its end goals, if not its means; second, the agreement was with a powerful 
external party; and third, the agreement was highly public. We surmise that, although not 
common, such conditions make for exceptionally strong packaging of an initiative, as may be 
required for business model change. Thus, we extend the issue selling literature by uncovering 
an especially powerful tactic: tying the issue to a broader organizational goal that is explicitly 
formulated, that commits the organization to a powerful external party, and that is highly 
visible. Future research may yet explain when it is necessary to leverage such strong 
agreements, but our analysis clarifies and extends considerably the range of elements (here, 












































































































































































































A related argument in the championing literature is that having knowledge of the 
organization’s internal and external contexts helps champions gain support for their issue 
from top management (Andersson & Bateman, 2000). Through careful preparation, they can 
gain access to data to develop meaningful and positive presentations of given issues to make 
to top management (Andersson & Bateman, 2000). The ELEC case shows that champions 
can indeed capitalize on superior information, but also elaborates on one way in which they 
can do so. By specifically understanding the prior commitments top managements have 
made externally and publicly, champions can direct decisions in such a way that top 
management will have to support initiatives or risk being labeled inconsistent in their 
behavior. If top management wants to retain the trust of middle management (and others), 
and their authority over them, they need at least to be consistent in their claims about goals 
and means. Such agreements bind top management, and so may empower middle managers 
in ways the championing literature has not fully elucidated. Because championing is 
primarily an internally oriented activity, aimed at harnessing the organization’s resources, 
future research may yet elaborate the respective effects of the ‘external’ and ‘public’ factors 
- acknowledging that the two tend to be related, but that an agreement with an external 
partner may not be known to the general public - and reveal under which conditions such 
agreements may be most effectively leveraged. Although in our case the exogenous nature 
of the external agreement is unambiguous, such research could also consider under what 
conditions middle management may advocate general agreements in anticipation of specific 
organizational changes that may go against top management’s existing preferences; and 
conversely under what conditions such agreements may be signed strategically by top 
management with a view to binding themselves - and their entire organizations - in a 
credible fashion (see Postrel, 1991). 
The second decision-directing tactic middle managers employed involved continuously 












































































































































































































substantive reports to top management, both formally and informally and via both oral and 
written channels. Middle management also used this mechanism to develop its own awareness 
of top management’s preferences as they evolved. Continuous informing also kept top 
management’s attention on the project, and so prepared them for an eventual - hopefully 
positive - decision. 
Although the literature has previously reported continuous proposal making (Dutton et 
al., 2001), the mechanism whereby this tactic relates to effective issue selling remains unclear, 
as is the distinction between adding information about a given project and repeating the same 
proposal. The ELEC case helps clarify and in some ways modify our understanding of this 
mechanism. We find that continuous informing helps maintain top management’s attention and 
primes them for eventual decisions,7 and also helps middle management to identify top 
management’s preferences, and to refine their initiative to align it with the latter’s concerns as 
they evolve. Moreover, it may help overcome top managers’ cognitive biases (Kaplan, Murray, 
& Henderson, 2003), ensuring that they get used to the idea of change and can gradually come 
to accept it, without reverting to defensive or inert positions (Tripsas, 2009). As awareness of 
the new model becomes more ingrained, expectations of further information and milestones 
also become axiomatic to top management. We argue that continuous informing plays an 
essential role in cases of business model change - such as ELEC - because the systemic and 
complex change involved requires the steady shaping of top managers’ minds. 
Dutton et al. (2001) found that the early involvement of top management and 
continuous proposal making helped issue sellers gain their support. They argued that this was 
because issue sellers rarely had the chance to present all their proposals at once, and so instead 
brought issues forward one at a time. In our case, this middle management behavior is not a 
consequence of the information context - indeed the project was presented as a whole from the 
start, and only later broken down into pieces (which would then be reassembled). Rather, 
                                                 












































































































































































































continuous information provision (and seeking) was a deliberate tactic middle managers used to 
ease the transitions between the stages; that is, the continuous effort was intentional. Further, 
our timeline shows that continuous informing took place even when they were no substantive 
new issues to be put forward. 
Our finding differs in another specific from those of Dutton et al. (2001): We do not 
find that middle management continuously ‘pushed’ their initiative in the sense of promoting it, 
but rather that they informed top management of events as they happened throughout the 
initiative’s stages. We found their written communications about ELEC were heavy on 
information, but virtually devoid of forceful subjective opinions, as were the oral 
communications according to interviewees. In our context, the research stages did the 
‘pushing’, because their end-points provided compelling and agreed-on bodies of evidence, 
which resolved major elements of uncertainty in what was a complex project. Indeed, once the 
decision-making process went into its later, solution development, stage, middle management 
no longer needed to ‘sell’ the project per se; rather, they aimed to keep top management 
objectively informed about research results. (Of course, this would work better if the research 
consistently supported the initiative's viability.) Again, we surmise that this is especially 
relevant for business model change. Future research may uncover to what extent continuous 
informing works for various initiatives, especially those that require harnessing complex 
information. 
Our findings about leveraging external agreements and continuously informing top 
management also extend - and to some extent modify - the literature on managerial roles in 
change initiatives. Specifically, Burgelman (1983b) found that middle managers who had 
identified opportunities for new activities generally needed to develop awareness about the 
promise of these new activities without revealing their plans prematurely. So they were forced 
to scavenge for resources and conduct their tests and analyses covertly, and even sought to 












































































































































































































consistent with the favorable view of “skunk works” around the same period (Kidder, 1981); 
but this view might have become somewhat outdated, given the growing intensity of corporate 
information and control systems and the tightening of organizational slack under global 
competition (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Martin, 2014). In our case, middle managers were more 
open to top management from the onset, and used more visible decision-directing tactics. 
Rather than developing the activity covertly, the middle managers in this case actively sought 
to link the initiative with an external agreement with the national government - that is, they 
raised the internal visibility of the project effectively by linking it with a publicly-made 
external commitment. This was also manifested when an early version of the proposal was 
presented at an open contest organized by the Association of Regional Water Authorities, as 
described above. Moreover, openness was a necessary condition from the outset for middle 
managers to be able to inform top management continuously, and to adjust the project based on 
their responses. Importantly, leveraging a public agreement and continuous informing were 
complementary tactics that reinforced each other to keep the idea of business model change 
alive in top managers’ minds during the project’s relatively long gestation. As such, our 
findings represent an alternative configuration to the covert resource and communication 
pathway that Burgelman (1983b) described. Future research may examine under what 
conditions covert vs. overt pathways of middle management influence are the more effective.8 
Of course, our findings also inform the business model literature. Although recent 
advances have begun examining the process of business model change and its various stages, 
we know relatively little about how such processes progress from stage to stage. For instance, 
Khanagha et al. (2014), found that middle managers could convey a business model change 
opportunity to top management, but how they did so remained unclear. Similarly, other studies 
                                                 
8 Note also that Water Authority Y’s middle management was much more resource-constrained than that described 
in the Burgelman (1983b) case. Different constraints on middle management may lead to different decision-
directing tactics. Although our case study is not sufficient to tease out this difference, this is another relevant 












































































































































































































found that sensing new business models is critical to engaging in business model innovation, 
but have remained silent about how top managers become aware of these opportunities, let 
alone come to support them (Achtenhagen, Melin, & Naldi, 2013; Aspara, Lamberg, Laukia, & 
Tikkanen, 2013; Mezger, 2014; Miller, McAdam, & McAdam, 2014). Our paper extends and 
redirects this research in several ways. 
Conceptually, we argue that middle managers are well positioned to recognize and 
seize opportunities for business model change or innovation, but also that they can then drive 
the process of deciding in favor of the change. Empirically, we elucidate that middle managers 
attempt to direct top management’s business model change decisions by leveraging external 
agreements and by continuously informing them about the progress of research on initiatives. 
We thus advance a view of business model change and innovation as a longitudinal decision-
making process, within which specific mechanisms and roles can be studied in depth. This 
view integrates what have been disparate pieces of understanding of the stages and sense-
making dimensions of business model change and innovation, and the roles of top and middle 
managements. Rather than the recent emphasis on top management and individual leadership 
(see also Sosna, Trevinyo-Rodríguez, & Velamuri, 2010; Svejenova, Planellas, & Vives, 2010), 
we develop a perspective that sees business model change as a middle-up sense-making process 
that proceeds via the continuous provision of information. Furthermore, as opposed to an 
internal or otherwise market-oriented foci of attention, our findings link the business model 
with other goals and constituencies (such as the external energy efficiency agreement). The use 
of both tactics contrasts in particular with the narrower (and eventually stalled) process that 
Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) describe to explain the failure of business model change at Kodak. 
Finally, the novelty of our findings relative to the extant organizational change literature 
(described above) suggests that the tactics and other processes involved in business model 
change may differ in structural ways from those involved in other types of organizational 












































































































































































































Our methodological approach, starting with archival documents and then generating 
further inferences via interviews, is also worth discussing. It is not unprecedented, even in 
strategic management (Crossan & Berdrow, 2003) – but it is not typical in organizational 
change research, where most issue selling research follows a classical ethnographic approach 
starting with and primarily based on interviews (e.g. Dutton et al., 2001; Howard-Grenville, 
2007; Piderit & Ashford, 2003). But archival documents can be especially valuable as a 
primary data source for research on change decision-making for three reasons. First, evidently, 
the contents of the documents may be used to uncover different tactics. Specifically, accessing 
the original documents used as inputs into decisions (as opposed to just minutes or ex post 
reports) provides a direct window into how managers framed the decision. Our paper 
demonstrates this approach; using fieldwork, only extensive participant observation could 
match this level of detail. Second, the frequency and type of documents may provide evidence 
for a certain type of tactics, as it did in this study. Third, the very choice of language used in 
writing such documents may be an issue selling tactic in itself (Sonenshein, 2006). When 
studying the framing and selling of change initiatives, any biases discovered when examining 
archival documents can actually inform the research. In addition, despite their many strengths, 
interviews by themselves may invoke not only recall but also rationalization biases arising from 
interviewees’ beliefs about who directed the decision. 
Of course, archival and interview sources can be complementary (as in our research, 
and many other studies). Overall, we conclude that an approach starting with in-depth analysis 
of the archival documents that served as inputs into decisions is suited to the study of 
organizational change decisions. Furthermore, this is all the more so when the decisions under 
study unfold over long periods and challenge traditional managerial roles, two conditions that 
exacerbate the risk of bias in retrospective interviews. We believe that this definitely applies to 
decisions about business model changes, among others, but further comparative research would 












































































































































































































conventional interview-led techniques for studying decision-making about organizational 
change. 
Although external validity is an issue with every case study, it is worth noting the 
intricacies of the setting and whether the findings are generalizable to other settings. On the one 
hand, the role of middle management as sources for organizational change is quite similar to 
that found in more traditional research settings, as in firms (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). On 
the other hand, the role of top management in this setting is more restricted to approving and 
deciding on organizational change, rather than being the source of change itself. This is more 
unique to these organizations compared to regular firms. Hence, it may be easier for middle 
managers to bring initiatives to the attention of top management in our case study, since these 
initiatives do not compete as strongly with the ideas of top management as they would in firms. 
Nevertheless, we deem this difference to be a matter of degree, not kind. 
As for the transferability of the tactics to other settings, external agreements are likely 
to be less pervasive in other settings, or at least less salient, than in the more political water 
authority setting. However, this may still be a viable tactic in other settings as well, provided 
these agreements exist. One caveat is that the top managers and directors of a water authority 
are, by virtue of being elected, more politicians than water managers. As such, they may be 
especially mindful of these external agreements and complying with them than managers 
would. Continuously informing top management will likely be more difficult in other settings 
as top managers do not only decide on, but are also a source for organizational change. Still, 
this may also be a valuable tactic in other settings, if middle managers have the opportunity to 
use it. Nevertheless, to conclude about the external validity of this essay, replication in a more 













































































































































































































Business model change vs. other organizational change 
We now turn in detail to one final issue - how business model change, as we have studied it 
above, may differ from other types of organizational change. 
In principle, we see three main ways in which business model changes may differ from 
‘ordinary’ organizational changes. First, business model changes stand to be more fundamental 
in economic terms than most other types of changes. That is, changing the business model 
unsettles a whole series of elements within and across the firm’s external boundaries that are 
foundational to its economic logic, which follows plainly from the fact that business models 
pertain to the very logic of how organizations create, deliver, and capture value (Amit & Zott, 
2001; Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010; Teece, 2010). Thus, a change in an organization’s 
business model transforms both its core activities and its critical interfaces, such as those with 
suppliers and partners (Zott & Amit, 2010). Accordingly the success or failure of business 
model change can deeply affect the firm’s profitability (Zott & Amit, 2007), and even its very 
survival (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). This contrasts with the type of relatively narrow, 
operational issues that we found described in previous issue selling literature, even when 
purported financial benefits were part of the issue packaging.9 Theoretically, one may imagine 
other types of change that are also fundamental in economic terms, though there are few. They 
may include some instances of strategy change by which the firm thoroughly modifies its scope 
and competitive approach (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Martin, 2013; Martin, Mitchell, & 
Swaminathan, 1994; Martin & Van den Oever, 2013), which would make a particularly 
interesting comparison with business model change. Nevertheless, we argue that business 
model change is economically more fundamental than ‘ ordinary’ organizational change, 
                                                 
9 Recall that Dutton et al.’s (2001: 716) classical definition of issue selling refers to “events, developments, and 
trends that have implications for organizational performance”. This treatment does not presume that the 
performance implications are particularly substantive; indeed, they may even be exaggerated as part of a 
packaging tactic. Meanwhile, as reviewed above, most of the issues described in the issue selling and championing 
literatures may have been important to a specific constituency, but were not as fundamental in economic terms (in 












































































































































































































certainly as studied previously in the issue selling and championing literature. 
Second, the number of critical economic partners involved in the change effort is likely 
to be greater for business model change than for other types of change, as may their diversity. 
The business model centers on the focal organization, but transcends it and spans its boundaries 
to encompass relationships with buyers, suppliers and other economic partners (Zott & Amit, 
2010). As a result, business model change involves not only the focal organization, but also the 
other firms and organizations in its current activity system - plus (possibly wholly different) 
actors that will be involved in the focal organization’s new business model, as stood to happen 
in our ELEC case. By contrast, the ‘ordinary’ changes used to develop past issue selling theory, 
even if they were relatively large in scale, have typically related solely to the focal organization 
or to a narrow subset of its (current) external partners - such as discussions about the need for 
more nursing departments in a general hospital (Dutton et al., 2001), or concerns about gender 
equity (e.g. Piderit & Ashford, 2003). 
Third, the complexity of the process is likely to be higher in business model change. 
Complexity increases as the number of a system’s components increases, but also with the 
unpredictability of the interactions between them (Levinthal, 1997; Salomon & Martin, 2008; 
Simon, 1962). As argued in the preceding paragraph, business models encompass an unusually 
large number and diversity of organizational elements and interfaces (e.g. a value proposition, 
revenue model, and distribution channels). In addition, the fact that the business model is a 
configuration of value creation, delivery, and capture mechanisms ensures that the interactions 
between these components are harder to comprehend, predict and control, as each change in the 
configuration creates tradeoffs in a spiral of consequences that reverberate both within the firm 
and at its boundaries (Martin, 2002; Martin, Swaminathan, & Tihanyi, 2007; Reed & 
DeFillippi, 1990; Scuricini, 1988). The effectiveness of a business model relies on its systemic 
consistency (Zott & Amit, 2010), so any adaptation creates a cascade of change among 












































































































































































































because it involves external actors, which are legally separate decision-makers with goals and 
priorities of their own that cannot be resolved by fiat (Martin, 2013; Martin & Salomon, 2002). 
Conclusions 
Because of these three specificities - fundamental economic impact, number of components 
involved, and complexity of their interactions - we expect business model change to be one of 
the most arduous and risky changes an organization can undergo. We argued earlier that middle 
management plays an essential role in identifying and promoting business model change 
opportunities. As our case illustrates, the ultimate goal is to obtain top management agreement 
and support for the change: conversely, if top management denies their support, the drive 
towards business model change will surely fail (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Hierarchical 
discrepancy - meaning that those who best understand the business model change may not be 
those who eventually have to agree to it - compounds the three specificities just discussed. This 
implies that, from top management’s standpoint, the cognitive impediments to understanding 
and agreeing to change can be expected to be especially high for business model change. 
Unless they can be reassured about the importance and feasibility of the new business model, 
top managers are likely to resist the change as hampering their organization’s ongoing 
performance (Amit & Zott, 2001). Moreover, the success of the current business model is likely 
to influence what information is fed into and filtered out of the decision-making process 
(Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002), which makes it harder to convey the benefits of business 
model change, as compared to ‘ordinary’ changes, and may intensify top management’s 
reluctance to commit to engage in business model change. This reluctance, in turn, makes it 
both more difficult and more important for middle managers - who we earlier identified as the 
key actors where business model change is concerned - to gain their superiors’ support. For this 
reason, the two tactics identified in our case study - leveraging existing commitments made by 












































































































































































































change initiative in a manner that is critical where business model change is concerned. It 
remains to be seen how effective such tactics might be for other types of organizational change. 
More generally, a comparison with other types of organizational change would require 
more data than our single case allows, but represents a doubly important opportunity for future 
research. First, such research would help further enrich current theoretical perspectives, such as 
the issue selling, championing and middle management literatures, by describing a richer menu 
of potential solutions and identifying contingencies for their relevance. Secondly, it would 
increase our understanding of business model innovation, an increasingly important construct 
in the strategic management field. Again, a comparison with other types of change - perhaps 
most promisingly, with strategy changes - would be informative. We have identified three 
dimensions - economic impact, number of parties involved, and the complex interdependencies 
between them - and an exacerbating factor - the hierarchical discrepancy inherent in a middle-







Clear blue water: The mediating role of politics in the board 
diversity-organizational innovativeness relationship 
 
Abstract 
This paper proposes a new type of board diversity, stakeholder diversity—the extent to which 
different stakeholders are represented on the board—and investigates its effect on organizational 
innovativeness through politics in board decision-making. Because of differences in interests 
among stakeholders, we theorize that stakeholder diversity increases the extent of politics in the 
board-level decision-making process. Subsequently, we argue that political decision-making 
reduces organizational innovativeness. We test these hypotheses on the population of Dutch 
water authorities by analyzing minutes of board of director meetings. We indeed find that 
stakeholder diversity positively affects politics. Moreover, the more political the decision-making 
in an organization, the less innovative that organization. We conclude by discussing the 






Although much research has studied corporate boards, there is little consensus on the optimal 
member diversity in such a board (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). For instance, age 
diversity has been associated with higher firm value (Kim & Lim, 2010), gender diversity makes 
members more likely to voice their concerns and thus to instigate strategic change (Westphal & 
Bednar, 2005), and occupation diversity inhibits strategic change (Goodstein, Gautam, & 
Boeker, 1994). Two countervailing mechanisms account for these inconsistent findings. 
Advocates of diversity claim that diverse teams engage in more task-related conflict, which 
involves disagreements on the work to be performed (e.g., allocation of resources), as different 
members possess unique resources, networks, and expertise—but consider more alternatives 
through such conflicts (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Janssen, Van de Vliert, & Veenstra, 1999; 
Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2013). Opponents of diversity argue that diverse teams engage 
in more emotional conflict, which is counterproductive for decision making (Barkema & 
Shvyrkov, 2007). Conflict thus plays a fundamental role in explaining the effects of diversity.  
Given that we need more clarity and tests on the intervening mechanism by which 
diversity affects outcomes (Johnson et al., 2013; Lawrence, 1997), we introduce in this paper a 
new type of board diversity that directly caters to the degree of conflict in decision making. In so 
doing, we aim to generate more detailed insights into how board diversity affects firm outcomes. 
We conceptualize the organization as a political coalition of members with different goals and 
interest (Cyert & March, 1992). Viewed from this behavioral lens, we study the degree to which 
board members differ in their goals and interests by studying the heterogeneity within the board 
of stakeholder representation. This concept, which we label as stakeholder diversity, will allow 




they affect innovativeness. In this way, we can better understand why certain organizations are 
more innovative than others, which is important given that innovation can be an important way 
to retain environmental fit (Miller, 1992). That is, organizations, even public ones, may face their 
business model going obsolete (Van den Oever & Martin, 2015) and engage in a continuous 
search for improvement, e.g., in cutting costs. Innovation is key to catering to these demands. 
We specifically study whether stakeholder diversity influences the degree of political 
decision making on the board and how political decision making can in turn affect organizational 
innovativeness. Such research is important, as the way that organizations decide to allocate 
resources to innovation projects may affect which initiatives are fed into the decision-making 
process as well as whether innovative initiatives are selected.  
In short, this paper aims to uncover how stakeholder diversity affects the degree to which 
political decision making is present and how politics influence organizational innovativeness. 
Formally, our research question is as follows: “What is the relationship between stakeholder 
diversity and political decision making, and to what extent do politics influence organizational 
innovativeness?” By answering this question, we seek to explain the mechanism by which 
stakeholder diversity can influence organizational innovativeness.  
We study these relationships in the Dutch water authority industry. Dutch water 
authorities are one of the main expert organizations in the field of water management, and they 
constitute an excellent arena to study our research question. First, in these organizations, the 
board of directors makes decisions to engage in an innovation that requires a significant amount 
of resources; thus, we can adequately apply decision-making measures to study firm 
innovativeness. Second, since the board of directors decides on the allocation of funds to an 




making process is a necessary precursor for an innovation to arise. Third, these organizations 
keep detailed minutes of their board of director meetings, making it possible to measure the 
forms of decision making adequately. Fourth, the boards of these organizations comprise 
individuals who represent different categories of stakeholders, allowing us to measure diversity 
differently by going beyond demographic characteristics. Fifth, a common problem for studies 
on boards of director is that the composition of the board is endogenously determined (Johnson 
et al., 2013). In our setting, the degree of stakeholder diversity is determined by the province and 
is thus exogenous.  
The tasks of the water authorities’ board of directors are similar to those of public firms, 
yet there are some subtle differences. First, the fundamental role for these directors is to monitor 
top management and to set rules for the strategy and policy that top management wants to 
develop. They are also tasked with approving the budget, annual account, and annual report, but 
they also set tax rates for different stakeholder groups. The directors are expected—but not 
required by law—to protect the interests of the stakeholders that they represent (which can be 
inhabitants, business, agriculture firms, and nature). Failing to protect these interests may result 
in them not being re-elected in the next term. As for innovation projects, the board’s involvement 
is limited to approving the allocation of resources to projects that require substantial resources.10 
Hence, the primary role of the board of directors is to engage in decision control. 
This research contributes to the literature on board diversity, decision making, and 
innovation in multiple ways. For board diversity, we introduce a novel concept, stakeholder 
diversity, and show that it influences whether conflict is resolved politically in the board of 
directors’ decision-making process. Diversity itself does not directly influence innovativeness, 
but it does so indirectly by increasing the amount of politics in the board of directors’ decision-
                                                 




making process. Regarding decision making, we show how politics in decision making can have 
far-reaching implications for an organization. We demonstrate that political decision making 
affects organization’s not only financial performance but also innovativeness. We also 
demonstrate that board diversity is an important precursor to the relationship, as more diversity 
makes the board of directors’ decision-making process more political. For the innovation 
literature, we show that political decision making is an important indicator for organizational 
innovativeness.  
Finally, we offer a methodological contribution by developing a new approach to 
measure politics and innovativeness. Most studies measure decision-making approaches by using 
questionnaires, which are less accurate and more obtrusive than directly observing the minutes of 





The bulk of research on board diversity has examined how demographic characteristics can 
influence a firm’s strategic actions and performance. A key assumption is that demographic 
characteristics are indicators for an individual’s experiences, cognitive styles, values, and skills 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The more demographically diverse the team, the more diverse the 
knowledge bases and perspectives that each individual brings to the team (Jehn, Northcraft, & 
Neale, 1999). Another stream in the board diversity literature focuses specifically on such 
knowledge bases by examining human capital characteristics, which are the skills and 




The implications of such demographic and human capital diversity have been difficult to predict. 
On the one hand, demographic diversity can increase conflict, as the members will have different 
ideas (Kosnik, 1990). On the other hand, demographic diversity can reduce conflict, as members 
will be hesitant to voice their concerns owing to a lack of social integration (Westphal & Bednar, 
2005). Moreover, increased conflict may be beneficial, as it allows directors to better monitor top 
managers, yet it may be detrimental for the board’s ability to provide resources (Van Ees, Van 
der Laan, & Postma, 2008). Nonetheless, boards are stronger in their advisory function when 
their diversity in tenure and industry experience is greater (Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 
2010). Given that a focus on demographic characteristics has generated contradictory findings 
and given that such characteristics are weak proxies for the underlying cognitive dimensions of 
interest (Lawrence, 1997), we focus on a different type of board diversity that is a stronger proxy 
since it caters more directly to the interests and goals of the board members. 
 Not only do board members differ in their demographics, past studies have also examined 
the type of knowledge and contacts that different board members can bring (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985; Byrd & Mizruchi, 2005; Hillman, 2005; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). For 
instance, having former politicians on the board of directors allows an organization to gain 
knowledge on the public policy process, a channel of communication to existing politicians, and 
legitimacy (Hillman, 2005). Bankers can provide expertise in the form of financial or investment 
advice (Byrd & Mizruchi, 2005). However, bankers will protect the interests of not only the 
board on which they serve but also the bank for which they are simultaneously working (Byrd & 
Mizruchi, 2005). Thus, board members also differ with respect to the interest that they protect. 
That is, board members represent different stakeholders, defined as “any group or individual who 




To understand the impact of board members with different interests, we develop the 
concept of ‘stakeholder diversity’, which is defined as the degree of heterogeneity of board 
members that represent different stakeholders. Stakeholders can present both a constraint and an 
opportunity to an organization. They can constrain the organization through their control over 
resources (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999), but they can also be beneficial to the organization by 
providing inputs for knowledge creation and social capital (Dyer & Hatch, 2006; Krause, 
Handfield, & Tyler, 2007). Having diversity in this dimension is thus important to secure 
different stakeholders’ interests (Abdullah, Ku Ismail, & Nachum, 2016; Goodstein et al., 1994; 
Triana et al., 2013). 
 A board with more stakeholder diversity can alleviate the constraints on the organization 
as securing different stakeholders’ interests can allow an organization to garner more resources 
from these parties (Gazley, Chang, & Bingham, 2010). Moreover, different stakeholders pay 
attention to different issues that befit their interests and goals. Diversity will ensure that more 
perspectives will be brought into the board’s decision-making process. Hence, such boards may 
be more adequate in ascertaining more and different resources for the organization. They will 
also be more adept at monitoring top management since the perspectives of multiple stakeholders 
will be taken into account. Yet, to understand how stakeholder diversity will affect political 
decision making, we first discuss the specifics of the political decision-making concept.  
Political Decision Making 
Political decision making occurs when decision-makers form coalitions and take a position with 
which their group’s interests are protected and maximized (Elbanna & Child, 2007). Politics is 
defined as the “intentional acts of influence to enhance or protect the self-interest of individuals 




interest is often at the expense of organizational goals (Kreutzer, Walter, & Cardinal, 2014). 
Such acts may involve forming coalitions, lobbying, withholding information, and controlling 
agendas (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). For instance, coalitions promote their view as the only 
accurate solution (Shrivastava & Grant, 1985). Finally, the preference of the most powerful 
coalition will triumph (March, 1962; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974). Political decision making is 
usually said to occur in situations where no common goals are present, where preferences and 
beliefs differ, and where it is unclear whose beliefs should guide the decision (Pfeffer, 1981). 
That is, politics arise from conflict (March, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981) and from situations where 
power is not distributed equally (Shepherd & Rudd, 2014).  
Innovativeness  
Innovativeness can be considered a planned attempt to derive expected benefits from change 
(West & Anderson, 1996). Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Théorêt (1976) describe a general three-
step strategic decision-making process, namely, identification, development, and selection, 
which can be used to evaluate innovation decisions. The identification phase occurs at the 
operational level and among middle managers, as that is where the practical diagnosis can be 
done and where possible improvement is generally first recognized. The development stage also 
occurs at the middle manager level, as they have the resources (time and knowledge) to pursue 
such possible improvement. The selection phase (screening, evaluation, and authorization) 
generally occurs among the top management team, who will decide whether to implement or 
prevent the innovation (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Thus, the innovation decision is dependent 
on not only the final decision-makers but also lower level employees and middle managers. 






The Influence of Stakeholder Diversity on Political Decision Making 
Essential in the work on team diversity is that diversity evokes conflict (e.g. Knight et al., 
1999; Pelled, 1996; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). On the one hand, diversity in the 
knowledge bases of team members evokes task-related conflict—that is, discussions on 
what needs to be done by the organization (Jehn et al., 1999). Consequently, team 
members become aware of (1) more issues, (2) more viewpoints regarding the issues, and 
(3) more alternative solutions (Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007). On the other hand, diversity 
can spur emotional conflict in which arguments are interpersonal (Amason, 1996; Jehn et 
al., 1999; Pelled et al., 1999), especially when there is low group emotion regulation 
(Van den Berg, Curseu, & Meeus, 2014). It has thus been hypothesized that task-related 
conflict results in positive team outcomes and that emotional conflict results in negative 
team outcomes (Pelled, 1996). 
However, it is not the type of conflict per se that is the mechanism by which 
diversity leads to positive or negative outcomes. It is important to understand whether 
such conflict is resolved politically. Members of different stakeholder groups may engage 
in political tactics to sway the board in viewing the particular issue with which their 
department faces with as being pertinent while understating or failing to grasp other 
departments’ concerns (Beyer et al., 1997; Dearborn & Simon, 1958). That groups have 
different interests is inherently present in the stakeholder diversity construct, since 
stakeholders are defined by their interests (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Lant, Milliken, & 
Batra, 1992; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). 




degree of political decision making. First, when diversity implies disagreements over 
strongly held beliefs, as is often the case for stakeholder diversity, extensive decision 
making may lead to less constructive discussions, not issue resolution (Glick, Miller, & 
Huber, 1993). One group may be inclined to go behind the back of other teams to address 
strategic issues, making the process less comprehensive (Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999). 
Furthermore, for board members representing one group of stakeholders, providing 
complete information on their viewpoint can leave them vulnerable to discretion from 
other board members. For instance, board members can be placed in a dire negotiation 
position when they express the exact amount of budget that they want to allocate to a 
certain project that benefits a certain stakeholder group.  
 Second, boards with more stakeholder diversity will also have more 
disagreements, as they have different views on issues and solutions (Glick et al., 1993). 
Individuals in more diverse teams will have different interests that influence whether they 
pay attention to certain issues, how they interpret the issue, and how they view the best 
potential course of action. For instance, a division manager whose division has 
overcapacity will be more inclined to vote for a course of action that will relieve his 
overcapacity problem, although this may not be in the best interest of the overall firm. 
Thus, by virtue of having different interests, the use of political tactics may increase as 
diversity increases. 
Third, social identity prescribes that individuals classify team members of diverse 
groups into in-group categories and out-group categories, where they identify more with 
their in-group than with the out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Consequently, 




1979). Such behavior can elicit political behavior, as individuals across groups will have 
to employ tactics that will justify their preference for suggestions made by in-group 
members and their repulsion toward suggestions made by out-group members. 
Fourth, (stakeholder) diversity induces task-related conflict (Jehn et al., 1999), 
which can rapidly deteriorate into social conflict (Jarzabkowski & Searle, 2004). 
Perceived personal attacks evoke emotional behavior that is political in nature 
(Jarzabkowski & Searle, 2004). Thus, individuals in a (stakeholder) diverse team are 
likely to engage in politics in order to further their interests. Overall, these four 
arguments lead us to the following hypothesis.11 
H1: Stakeholder diversity positively influences the extent to which the board of 
directors’ decision-making process is political. 
Political Decision Making and Innovativeness 
In political decision making, decisions are made by the most powerful coalition. Not every 
member is valued equally, and thus, not all opinions and viewpoints are considered similarly. In 
general, there are three reasons why political decision making hampers organizational outcomes.  
 First, political tactics involve the distortion and restriction of information flows between 
coalitions (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Cyert & March, 1992; Dean & Sharfman, 1996). 
Thus, when deciding on the budget allocation for innovation projects, information regarding the 
project is distorted or withheld. Thus, it is increasingly difficult for board members to understand 
the intricacies surrounding innovation projects, making it less likely that they will commit 
resources to these inherently risky projects. 
                                                 
11 Since stakeholder diversity specifically relates to the different interest of the board members, other types of 





Second, political decision-making processes are time consuming because of their divisive 
nature (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Elbanna, 2006). Given the limited time and attention that 
decision-makers have (Ocasio, 1997), decision-making topics that require more time will force 
other topics to be postponed for later meetings. Political processes force attention to a mixture of 
interests, power bases, and positions (Dean & Sharfman, 1996). This situation draws attention 
away from what should be decided given current environmental conditions; thus, suboptimal and 
fewer decisions that deteriorate organizational innovativeness will be made.  
Third, some innovation projects that may not benefit the dominant coalition of the 
organization may be excluded altogether. Political decision-making processes are centered on the 
self-interests of individuals or groups instead of organizational goals (Dean & Sharfman, 1996). 
Self-interests can be in conflict with organizational goals (Dean & Sharfman, 1996). For 
instance, the directors in water authorities are elected and thus not keen on allocating resources 
for innovation projects that only have long-term benefits; they would rather use resources to 
relax tax rates if the project does not benefit the interests of the group that they represent. Thus, 
only a subset of the innovation projects—those that are in line with the interests of the most 
powerful group—will be pursued, again leading to less innovativeness.  
In sum, in a political board of directors, information is restricted and distorted, limited 
innovation projects will be considered, and the opinion of the most powerful coalition/person 
triumphs.12 Therefore, it is expected that political activity in the board of directors’ decision-
making process decreases decision-making quality and the selection of innovative alternatives, 
resulting in the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
12 Political decision making at the board level can also positively influence innovation, since it may allow 
innovations that are in line with the interest of specific groups of the organization to be implemented. Yet, such 
behavior can evoke political behavior from other groups in the organization, for which the innovation is not in their 
interest, which leads to a distortion of information, a time-consuming process, and attention to be drawn away from 




H2: Political board of directors’ decision-making negatively influences the 
innovativeness of an organization. 
The arguments presented above indicate that stakeholder diversity increases the amount 
of politics in the board of directors’ decision making and that politics, in turn, decrease 
organizational innovativeness. Thus, stakeholder diversity does not directly predict 
organizational innovativeness. Although (stakeholder) diversity may invoke conflict that 
may (when conflict is task related) or may not (when conflict is emotional) allow the 
organization to be more innovative, it is crucial to understand how conflict is resolved 
and thus decisions are made. Even task-related conflict, if it is resolved politically, may 
have negative consequences for organizational innovativeness, since information will be 
distorted, the process will be more time consuming, and the opinion of the most powerful 
coalition will triumph. Hence, to understand the link between stakeholder diversity and 
innovativeness, it is imperative to study the mediating effect of politics. Given that we 
hypothesize that stakeholder diversity influences politics and that politics influences 
innovativeness, we argue that politics thus mediate the relationship between stakeholder 
diversity and organizational innovativeness. 
Specifically, in this context, members of the board of directors, by virtue of the 
Water Authorities Act of 1991, engage mostly in decision control and do not propose 
their own innovation initiatives. Therefore, the source of innovation generally lies with 
middle management (as also indicated in the previous chapter of this dissertation). A 
board with greater stakeholder diversity thus becomes more difficult to convince, as 
board members with more discrepant views need to be persuaded of the merit of the 




representatives to engage in political behavior in order to obstruct the decision. In turn, 
this political behavior will lead to decreased innovativeness, which again shows the 
mediating effect of politics. Consistent with agency theory, then, will the board of 
directors provide checks and balances on the middle managers’ desire to innovative?  
H3: The board of directors’ political decision making mediates the relationship 
between stakeholder diversity and organizational innovativeness. 
Methodology 
We test our hypotheses in the Dutch water authority sector, not to be confused with water 
utilities (Van den Oever & Martin, 2015). The Dutch water authorities are one of the main expert 
organizations in the field of water management. They focus on safety (e.g., against flooding of 
rivers), water quantity (e.g., the availability of fresh water for farmers), water quality (e.g., the 
quality of pond water; the habitat for fish), and sewage treatment. This task is important since the 
Netherlands has a complicated system of drainage ditches, canals, and pumping stations to keep 
the low-lying parts dry (and wet) for habitation and agriculture. Water authorities have existed 
since the twelfth century, and they are one of the oldest forms of local authority in the country, 
having been vested in the Dutch constitution since 1848 (Van den Oever & Martin, 2015). 
As of 2016, 22 water authorities exist in the Netherlands. A fundamental attribute of 
these organizations is that their board of directors is chosen via public election every four years. 
Another fundamental attribute is that they represent a separate public governance level, 
alongside the Dutch national government, province, and municipality administrations. They can 
thus levy their own taxes. However, water authorities are considered to be functional bodies 





Although water authorities are public organizations, their governance is quite similar to 
that of business firms. Each has a board of directors of approximately 25 individuals (the exact 
number depends on the size of the water authority) who are elected for four-year terms and who 
meet approximately every two months. Of these directors, five typically also compose the top 
management team, which meets approximately every two weeks. The chair of the top 
management team is appointed by the Crown (the national government), typically for six years. 
The strategic decision-making process is structured so that the top management team first 
decides on an issue at hand, and then (depending on its importance), the board of directors makes 
the final call. If the decision is relatively minor, the board will not be involved at all.  
Data Collection 
We considered the population of 27 water authorities during the period 2008-2014.13 The unit of 
analysis for this study is each regional water authority per year, resulting in 170 observations.14 
To gather information on innovativeness, we collected news articles from the Factiva database. 
To measure politics, we collected the internal minutes and decision lists of board of director 
meetings of each water authority. To measure various control variables, we collected the annual 
reports of the water authorities. To measure innovativeness and the forms of decision making, we 
transformed the qualitative data into quantitative data by using content analysis. 
Content Analysis  
Content analysis has become an important tool for analyzing a variety of research questions 
(Duriau et al., 2007; Short, Broberg, Cogliser, & Brigham, 2010). The basic method involves 
                                                 
13 A large number of mergers occurred before 2008 in the water authority sector. Since we manually collected the 
data on each water authority, extending the time period to before 2008 would have greatly challenged the 
organizations’ memory. To ensure their cooperation, we chose not to go back further than 2008. 




word frequency count (Duriau et al., 2007). We apply the eight-step procedure of Weber (1985), 
‘The Weber Protocol’, with a recording unit of ‘words’. Emphasis lies on defining categories, 
testing keywords, assessing the reliability of keywords, revising the dictionary, and thereafter, 
coding the text. Content analysis functions by finding word counts of keywords that indicate a 
certain cognitive scheme or thought orientation (Woodrum, 1984). 
The keywords used in this analysis exist in dictionaries. Usually, dictionaries are created 
based on previous studies. However, none of the variables used in this study have been measured 
by content analysis before; thus, we needed to build a new dictionary for each decision-making 
dimension and for innovativeness. To compose the dictionaries, the most relevant and valid 
keywords were chosen based on testing the keywords. The relevant keywords were selected 
based on the hit rate, correctly observed hits, of at least 0.8 (80%) (Porac, Wade, & Pollock, 
1999), and then on the highest number of occurrences/hits. 
Dependent Variable 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡. Researchers often measure innovativeness by assigned patents, new product 
introductions, productivity, or accounting measures, such as revenue growth (e.g. Lavie & Drori, 
2012; Love, Roper, & Vahter, 2014; Sampson, 2007). In the case of the Dutch water authorities, 
none of these measures can be used, as they are government institutions, so they do not aim to 
make profits and do not usually apply for patents. Therefore, we used a more direct measure: the 
number of reported innovation projects. We measure this variable by investigating news articles. 
Since the water authorities are public organizations and since the Dutch population elects the 
board, innovations are publicly reported to show progress. We discussed the use of this measure 
for innovativeness with the water authorities, and they endorsed the use of this measure. 




et al. (1994). For water authorities, innovativeness is defined as the application of concepts and 
ideas that are novel to the organization. These novel concepts or ideas may be embodied in 
products, processes, or services, as well as in organization, marketing, or management systems. 
We also sought to incorporate the dictionaries developed by Ceci and Iubatti (2012) and Uotila, 
Maula, Keil, and Zahra (2009). Consequently, we obtained the following dictionary: project, 
investment, experiment, trial, test, pilot, new, and scoop. The proposed keywords were tested for 
their false hit rates based by randomly reviewing 10 articles per year. For each keyword, at least 
two years and 20 articles were reviewed. Using 0.40 as a threshold for the false hit rate, the two 
keywords ‘trial’ and ‘experiment’ were chosen. Their false hit rates and number of total hits were 
0.1750 and 254, respectively, for ‘trial’ and 0.2250 and 1151, respectively, for ‘experiment’. For 
‘trial’, an example of the context in which the word was located in was “Water authorities Velt 
en Vecht and Reest en Wieden will conduct a trial with a mowing collection boat in the 
Oranjekanaal against exotics this week”. For ‘experiment’, this was “Such a two-staged 
experiment [for developing a new fish ladder] was recently executed at Water Authority De 
Dommel.”. 
To identify the relevant news articles, we added the search term ‘waterschap’ or 
‘wetterskip’ or ‘hoogheemraadschap’ (synonyms for water authorities in Dutch). An example of 
a search command would be ‘All of these words: experiment’ and ‘At least one of these words: 
waterschap wetterskip hoogheemraadschap’ in the ‘date range of 01-01-2008 to 31-12-2008’ in 
‘Dutch’. We checked whether each news article reported an innovative project by a water 
authority. We then took the sum of the hits per organization i during year t.  
Independent Variables 




category that the director represents on the board. There are four categories of directors who 
represent (1) inhabitants, (2) firm owners (excluding agricultural firms), (3) agricultural firms, or 
(4) nature. Representatives of the inhabitants are selected through a voting process by all 
inhabitants of the region in which the water authority operates. Representatives of firm owners 
are selected by the chamber of commerce. Representatives of agricultural firms are selected by 
the employer’s organization for the agriculture industry, the Dutch Federation of Agriculture and 
Horticulture. Representatives of nature are selected by the Dutch Forest and Nature reserve 
owners’ association. The province in which the water authority is located decides on the number 
of seats that each category has on its board of the directors. Hence, diversity is exogenous to the 
water authorities.  
Although the directors are all responsible for the appropriate execution of the water 
authority’s tasks, directors’ opinions on how this should be done may vary. In particular, their 
role as representative for a certain category may influence their opinion. For instance, a 
representative from agriculture will more likely seek to secure funds for projects that benefits 
local farmers. After their term, a more successful representative is more likely to be selected 
again (or voted in again), which is one of the prime individual goals of the directors.15 
Since every water authority is tasked with water management in its own region, water 
authorities do not face competition. As a population of organizations, they can be dismantled 
only by the national government. Even then, their existential right is vested in the constitution; 
thus, dismantling these organizations would require a change in the constitution, with all the 
onerous procedures involved. Indeed, such a move would involve the dismantling of all water 
authorities: a single water authority cannot be dismantled. Nevertheless, the province in which 
                                                 
15 In a random selection of 17 instances of task-related conflict in the meeting minutes, no evidence was found that 
certain categories of stakeholders are more likely to be in conflict with each other. Therefore, the total degree of 




the water authority is located, can decide on a merger between water authorities. If they are 
poorly performing, water authorities can in such a way be merged into more successful ones. 
Although the poor performance of these organizations may have less severe 
consequences than that for other types of organizations, such as firms that can go bankrupt, the 
decision-makers are incentivized to ensure good performance. First, as previously mentioned, 
they are required by law to make sure that the organization executes its tasks properly. Second, 
the performance of a water authority is frequently and publicly benchmarked with that of others 
(e.g., by the biennially publication of the “Waterspiegel” report by the Regional Association of 
Water Authorities). Being a decision-maker of a relatively poorly performing organization is 
thus not in the personal interest of the directors and top managers. This effect is exacerbated by 
the fact that directors serve a four-year term, after which they are subject to election or re-
nomination for the next term. Hence, it is in the board members interest to increase the 
performance of the organization, e.g., by accepting innovative projects that benefit the 
organization. 
 We used Blau’s heterogeneity index, which is the reverse of the Herfindahl-Hirshman 
homogeneity index: 





where H is the homogeneity index, S is the percentage of directors who are representative for 
category i, and n is the number of different categories. Subtracting this homogeneity index from 
1 yields Blau’s heterogeneity index (Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).  
Board of Directors’ Decision Making  
The minutes of the board of directors were converted to quantitative data by searching keywords 




analysis of language/text can provide an understanding of people’s cognitive schemes—or in 
other words, thought orientation (Woodrum, 1984). This analysis can therefore display the 
composition of the decision making that is applied by a (group of) person(s). 
The dictionaries were composed by performing an extensive literature review on politics. 
All studies listed by Eisenhardt & Zbaracki (1992) were investigated for measures. Additionally, 
we scanned the studies listed in Duriau et al. (2007) for overlapping themes measured by content 
analysis. Finally, we used a snowballing technique from the previously found articles to include 
as many relevant articles as possible. This process resulted in the investigation of 28 studies of 
political decision making.  
The studies that were relevant because they provided a helpful description, criterion, or 
questionnaire were searched to find reoccurring themes. These themes were underlined to 
provide a clear linkage. Based on these themes, we developed the dictionary. Some additional 
keywords were found inductively, when we found false hit rates by reading minutes and thereby 
deriving new relevant keywords. These new words are indicated with a *. The false hit rates 
were found by testing seven (0.5% of the total number of documents) randomly selected minutes 
of a minimum of 12 pages.  
To compose the final dictionary, the most relevant and valid keywords were chosen. This 
resulted in six keywords.16 To increase the reliability of the final dictionary, it was checked by 
two professionals, who were familiar with the topic of board of directors’ decision making and 
the methodology of content analysis. 
We assessed convergent validity by regressing performance on our politics measure. 
Politics have been found to influence performance (Walter, Kellermanns, & Lechner, 2012); 
                                                 





thus, our measure should do so similarly. Measuring performance as the net costs per inhabitant, 
we indeed find that politics have a negative effect on performance (β = -0.231, p = 0.014). 
Our final step was to establish discriminant validity. We did so by regressing two 
constructs that theoretically should not be related to politics: (1) the number of current 
collaborations and (2) the amount of slack resources.17 For both constructs, we found no 
significant effects. Thus, we are confident that our dictionary indeed measures politics. 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡. Welsh and Slusher (1986) argue that it is not the decision-maker’s intent but the 
focus and context in which a decision is made that identifies decision making as being political. 
The political orientation is thus measured by keywords that indicate a political context and focus.  
Although content analysis seems to be a valid measurement method, Hills and Mahoney 
(1978) recognize early on that political power is difficult to measure. According to Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1974), political power is not possible to accurately record by using questionnaires or 
interviews, as recall of power is not likely to be accurate. Although no method is perfect, these 
findings further support the use of content analysis for the measurement of political activity in 
decision making instead. Based on a review of past literature, we created a dictionary. An 
overview of the literature on political measurements that we drew upon is provided in table 1.  
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Overview of measures for politics 
Cat.  Measurement/Characteristic Author(s) 
A Being member of an (external) 
association 
Hills & Mahoney, 1978; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974  
B Unequal power distribution Elbanna & Child, 2007; Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; 
Shepherd & Rudd, 2014 
C Influence of people Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Kipnis, et al. 
1980; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974  
D Groups/ Coalitions/ Alliances Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Elbanna & Child, 2007; Kipnis, 
et al. 1980; Welsh & Slusher, 1986  
E Opportunistic behavior / Personal 
interests 
Elbanna & Child, 2007 
F Goal conflict Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Eisenhardt, 
Kahwajy, & Bourgeois, 1997 
G Interpersonal disagreements Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Eisenhardt, 
et al. 1997; Elbanna & Child, 2007 
H Persuasion (techniques) / Develop 
support 
Kipnis, et al. 1980; Welsh & Slusher, 1986 
I Hide or distort information to defend 
opinion 
Elbanna & Child, 2007; Kipnis, et al. 1980  
 






Dictionary for politics 
Cat.  English Dutch Total hits  False Hit rate Example 
D We think  Wij denken 3 .0000 “We think that that is 
politically an important 
signal" 
D We find Wij vinden 11 .0000 “We find that 
insufficient attention 
has been paid to nature” 
*D Fraction / 
Political 
group 
Fractie18 122 .1803 “The VVD-fraction is 
actually the one that has 
said in some meetings 
that…” 
D Our opinion Onze mening 6 .0000 “The development of 
nature restoration is, in 
our opinion, too 
passively executed…” 
E Preference Voorkeur 5 .0000 “Togetherness has the 
preference, but the 




Discussie 90 .2000 “The discussion on tax 
rates for agriculture and 
nature…” 
 
We then counted and summed the occurrences of each word per organization i in year t. 
Control Variables 
We control for several factors. First, to compare the effect of stakeholder diversity with the 
mainstream diversity literature, we control for gender diversity. We use Blau’s heterogeneity 
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index, which is calculated as the reverse of the Herfindahl-Hirshman homogeneity index: 





where H is the homogeneity index, S is the percentage of directors who are male/female i, and n 
is 2. Subtracting this homogeneity index from 1 yields Blau’s heterogeneity index (Barkema & 
Shvyrkov, 2007; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).  
Second, we control for the size of the organization, measured by the number of 
inhabitants in the region in which it operates. This variable is relevant because as the population 
increases, a water authority needs additional sewage treatment capacity. Size may affect 
innovativeness because it shapes the executive influence on innovation (Elenkov, Judge, & 
Wright, 2005).  
Third, we control for negative attainment discrepancy (NAD). Confronted with negative 
attainment discrepancy (Lant, 1992), organizations are motivated to innovate. Aspirations are 
measured as the net costs per organization i in year t, drawn from the annual reports and budgets 
of water authorities. Water authorities focus on costs, since they would be forced to increase 
taxes owing to budget overruns. Since decision-makers are elected, increasing taxes may 




⁄ |, where 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 denotes the aspiration level in terms of net costs of water 
authority i at time t and 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 denotes performance in terms of the net costs of water authority i at 
time t. For each observation where performance is higher than the aspiration level, we set this 
variable to 0. A more positive value denotes higher negative attainment discrepancy. 
Fourth, we control for slack resources. Slack resources influence innovativeness, as they 




level of cash reserves of water authority i at time t to measure slack resources. Cash is the most 
easily deployed resource and is thus an ideal measure for slack resources (George, 2005). Given 
the non-normal distribution of this value, we take the cubic root as our variable. 
Fifth, we control for the number of pages in source documents, since as the number of 
pages increases, the likelihood that there will be words that describe politics increases.  
Sixth, we control for the number of files per organization i in year t. A greater number of 
files means more (intense) board meetings, increasing the likelihood that there will be words 
describing politics and providing more room for discussion of innovation. 
Seventh, we add year dummies to control for environmental influences. By implementing 
year dummies, external events such as the national economic situation that affect all 
organizations equally and that may influence decision outcomes are controlled for.  
Eighth, we include firm fixed effects. The inclusion of such effects addresses possible 
factors that influence strategic decisions and innovativeness. Thus, differences in, e.g., 
organizational culture and political composition of the board, that remain stable over the years 
are controlled for.  
Analysis 
For the first dependent variable, politics, we employ the following fixed effects OLS (ordinary 
least squares) model:  
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸𝑖 + 𝑇𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝐶𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control variables for organization i at time t, 𝐹𝐸𝑖 denotes the fixed 
effects, 𝑇𝐸𝑡 denotes time the effects, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 denotes the idiosyncratic errors.  
 For the second dependent variable, innovativeness, we employ a fixed effects OLS model 




𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸𝑖 + 𝑇𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Endogeneity Test 
One potential concern is that the politics variable might be endogenous in the second equation 
(Shaver, 2005). If so, using an instrumental variable (IV) approach is preferred over OLS 
(Shaver, 2005). However, given that we have a low number of observations and given the drop 
in efficiency when using the IV approach, we should use an IV only if politics is endogenous 
based on post-estimation checks after the 2SLS estimation. 
We first run a 2SLS model, where we use the number of pages as an instrument for 
politics. The number of pages of all minutes of organization i at time t would increase the 
likelihood that there will be more words that describe politics. This instrument is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the other dependent variable, namely, innovativeness.  
First, we test the strength of the number of pages instrument. The F-statistic for the 
instrument is 172.689. This value far exceeds the threshold value of 10 proposed by Stock, 
Wright, and Yogo (2002). As such, we conclude that number of pages is a sufficiently strong 
instrument for politics. 
Subsequently, we check whether politics is endogenous. For politics, the associated 
Durbin chi2 score and Wu-Hausman F-statistic are 3.627 (p = 0.057) and 3.402 (p = 0.067), 
respectively. As such, we also fail to reject the hypothesis that politics is exogenous. Based on 
this result, we use the fixed effects OLS models, as they are more efficient than the 2SLS models 






We check the multicollinearity and the distribution of the independent variables. 
Multicollinearity does not seem to be an issue, as all VIF scores are lower than 10. We also 
check whether the assumption of normality is violated, by winsorizing the outliers of the politics 
variable at the high end at the 95 and 99 percentile. Skewness improves when we use the 95th 
percentile winsorization; thus, we use the 95th percentile winsorized independent variable. Table 
3 shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of each variable. Table 4 
provides the matrix of correlations among all variables.  
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics (n = 170) 
    Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Innov 2.38 2.13 0 13 
Stakeholder diversity 0.47 0.04 0.39 0.59 
Politics 176.05 173.22 0 642 
Gender diversity 0.30 0.07 0.09 0.44 
Size 681395 320361.7 107741 1350000 
NAD 1.18 3.74 0 33.96 
Slack 64.31 69.97 -90.43 334.17 
Number of pages 102.59 66.82 16 336 
Number of files 7.82 2.15 4 14 
ydm2009 0.15 0.36 0 1 
ydm2010 0.15 0.36 0 1 
ydm2011 0.14 0.35 0 1 
ydm2012 0.14 0.35 0 1 
ydm2013 0.14 0.35 0 1 







Table 4. Correlation matrix                
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Innov 1               
2 Stakeholder diversity -0.17 1              
3 Politics 0.04 -0.14 1             
4 Gender diversity 0.04 -0.24 0.15 1            
5 Size 0.21 0.17 -0.52 0.35 1           
6 NAD 0.07 0.07 0.02 -0.05 0.07 1          
7 Slack 0.06 -0.04 -0.11 0.12 0.07 0.06 1         
8 Number of pages 0.19 0.87 -0.20 0.09 0.18 0.05 0.03 1        
9 Number of files 0.03 0.01 0.46 -0.07 -0.20 0.07 0.00 0.56 1       
10 ydm2009 -0.04 0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.21 1      
11 ydm2010 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.07 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.18 1     
12 ydm2011 0.08 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.18 -0.18 1    
13 ydm2012 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.12 -0.10 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 1   
14 ydm2013 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.10 -0.06 -0.01 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 1  




Table 5 shows the results of the fixed effects OLS regression. Model 1 estimates the effect of 
stakeholder diversity on the extent of politics (with politics as the dependent variable), 
including several control variables. In model 2, we have a different dependent variable, 
innovativeness, which we regress on all the control variables. The third model reports a test of 
the second hypothesis, where, in addition to the control variables, we include the politics 
variable. The improved R2 for the full model (model 3) shows that it has superior fit when 
innovativeness is the dependent variable. 
Table 5 
Fixed-effects OLS results 
Model 1 2 3 
 
DV = Politics DV = INNOV DV = INNOV 
 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Stakeholder diversity  
(H1 +) 
625.307 0.049 -5.389 0.545 -2.070 0.814 
(317.188)  (8.884)  (8.803)  
Politics (H2 -) 
    
-0.005 0.013 




-166.832 0.577 2.101 0.803 1.215 0.883 
(299.282)  (8.382)  (8.220)  
Size 























Number of pages 
1.097 0.000 0.003 0.465 0.009 0.057 
(0.144)  (0.004)  (0.005)  
Number of files 
2.314 0.584 0.028 0.813 0.040 0.729 
(4.228)  (0.118)  (0.116)  
Constant 
-609.939 0.154 2.420 0.840 -0.817 0.945 
(428.187)  (11.993)  (11.819)  
Observations 170 170 170 
R2  0.861 0.444 0.470 
Firm-fixed effects and time effects are included in all models. 
 
In model 1, politics is the dependent variable. The positive coefficient is consistent with 
hypothesis 1 (p = 0.049). A one-unit increase in stakeholder diversity will, on average, increase 
the number of words that relate to politics by 625.307. However, since the values of our board 
diversity variable are between 0.39 and 0.59, we interpret the magnitude at a 0.04 increase (one 
standard deviation). A 0.04-unit increase in stakeholder diversity will, on average, increase the 




variable, it is difficult to interpret what a 0.04-unit increase means. As such, we use an example 
from our data where we keep board size equal. In this example, the organization has 17 
directors who represent inhabitants—3 for firms, 4 for agriculture, and 1 for nature. In another 
year, this organization has 15 directors who represented inhabitants—3 for firms, 7 for 
agriculture, and 0 for nature. This equals to a 0.04 change in the stakeholder diversity variable. 
By comparison, gender diversity has a negative effect (p-value = 0.577). Under the 
associated 95% confidence interval, a one-standard-deviation change in gender diversity may 
decrease or increase the number of words pertaining to politics in the range of -30.137 and 
16.79. With such high variance in impact, we cannot conclude that gender diversity has an 
effect on politics. 
We now turn to models 2 and 3, where innovativeness is the dependent variable. From 
model 3, it becomes clear that hypothesis 2, “Political decision-making negatively influences 
the innovativeness of an organization”, is supported, as the relationship with innovativeness is 
negative, with a magnitude of -0.005 (p = 0.013). For each extra word indicating political 
activity in the minutes of an organization, there will be, on average, 0.005 fewer innovations in 
that year. It is logical that the magnitude for the politics measure is very small, as this is based 
on a change in innovativeness with a single extra word found.  
We also report additional tests to understand the indirect and total effects of stakeholder 
diversity on firm innovativeness. We follow the approach of Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) 
by running two models (1 and 3) as seemingly unrelated regressions.19 Using bootstrapping 
(5000 samples), the bias-corrected and accelerated 90% confidence interval for the indirect 
effect of stakeholder diversity on firm innovativeness through politics is -14.198 to -0.034, and 
                                                 
19 We use this approach because it allows us to estimate the indirect effects of stakeholder diversity on 
organizational innovativeness. The Sobel test can also be used for this purpose; however, it assumes a normal 
distribution of the indirect effect. This assumption is likely to be violated, especially in small samples (Bollen & 





the coefficient is -3.318.20 A one-standard-deviation increase in stakeholder diversity, on 
average, thus decreases the number of innovation projects by 0.133 through the effects of a 
decrease in politics. With a 90% confidence interval, these effects range from -0.568 to -0.001. 
Hence, on average, we find partial support for a negative indirect effect of stakeholder diversity 
on firm innovativeness through politics. Given that we cannot conclude that stakeholder 
diversity has a direct effect on innovativeness (p = 0.814), we can conclude that we find partial 
support for hypothesis 3: politics fully (or at least very largely) mediate the stakeholder 
diversity-innovativeness relationship. 
In contrast, for gender diversity, we find an indirect effect on innovativeness through 
politics, and the effects of gender diversity on innovativeness range within a bias-corrected and 
accelerated 90% confidence interval from -1.646 to 5.474, with a coefficient of 0.885. A one-
standard-deviation increase in gender diversity (0.07) will, on average, increase the number of 
innovative projects by 0.062, while the effects can range from -0.115 to 0.383.  
  
Discussion 
This study contributes to the literature on board diversity, decision making, and innovation. 
Findings in the board diversity literature have been inconsistent. The diversity literature is 
specifically in need of further insights into the mechanisms by which diversity affects various 
outcomes (Lawrence, 1997). Thus, instead of examining the direct effects of board diversity on 
innovativeness, we focus on explaining and testing the mechanism by which board diversity 
influences innovativeness. We introduce a new concept, stakeholder diversity, which reflects 
the differences in members’ interests. Although different members may theoretically enrich the 
                                                 
20 We use a 90% confidence interval for three reasons. First, we have data on the complete population of 
organizations; thus, p-values are not relevant for hypothesis testing (Schwab, Abrahamson, Starbuck & Fidler, 
2011). Second, the economic impact is large (for a 0.133 decrease in innovativeness, the mean of innovativeness is 
2.38); thus for many cases, stakeholder diversity has a large impact. Third, the n is relatively small (n = 170); thus, 





team by providing unique resources, networks, and expertise (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Triana 
et al., 2013), when these members differ in their interest, discussions will become more 
political, mitigating the potential of such diversity. Our finding of an indirect positive effect of 
gender diversity on firm innovativeness, although statistically nonsignificant, shows that 
differences in interests (rather than background, as in gender) are key in explaining the kind of 
outcome for diversity. We also support prior literature (e.g. Engelen, Van den Berg, & Van der 
Laan, 2012) in showing that different types of diversity may have different mechanisms by 
which they affect outcomes (stakeholder vs. gender diversity), which can prove a fruitful 
avenue for future research. 
 This study contributes to the decision-making literature by showing the significant 
negative influence of board of directors’ political decision making on innovativeness. Hence, 
we provide evidence that the degree of politics in decision making affects organizational 
outcomes, over and above the effectiveness of decisions (Elbanna & Child, 2007).  
This study also adds to the innovation literature. Specifically, it shows that board of 
directors’ decision making should be considered an important antecedent to innovativeness. 
Thus far, politics in decision making is underemphasized in the literature on innovativeness. 
Additionally, this study shows the indirect negative effect of stakeholder diversity on 
innovativeness.  
This paper also makes a methodological contribution. We provide new measures for our 
dependent variables of interest: political decision making and the innovativeness of an 
organization. We derive a new dictionary to arrive at a new, quantitative measure of politics in 
decision making. Thus, we offer a renewed approach to measuring politics, hopefully 
stimulating future research. We formulate a new output measure of innovativeness based on an 
adapted version of content analysis. This method is generalizable to many other industries and 





For practice, the study shows that, all else equal, organizations with board members 
with diverse interests will negatively affect firm’s innovativeness. Firms that employ boards 
with significant stakeholder diversity should be aware of the pitfalls of such diversity and 
manage it accordingly. Specifically, conflicts should not be resolved politically. For instance, 
the chair of the board can influence the board to be more conscious of this situation.  
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Notwithstanding its contributions, this study has some limitations that offer areas for future 
research. One possible limitation of this study is the external validity. Although water 
authorities are government institutions, the findings should be generalizable to other 
organizations with a board of directors. These boards meet regularly to make strategic 
decisions, and they have responsibilities, such as budget and resource allocation. They also 
oversee a management team, very comparable to the executive committee, who handle daily 
matters. The water authorities’ board of directors is mostly engaging in decision control, in 
which case a homogeneous board may be more fruitful for the acceptance of innovation 
proposals. However, when the board also has other roles, such as initiating innovation 
proposals, stakeholder diversity can have a different net effect, as it enables the inclusion of 
more perspectives; however, the board’s attention conversely is scattered between more tasks 
(Dyer & Hatch, 2006; Krause et al., 2007). Our research setting has thus allowed us to 
specifically examine the effect of diversity when the board of directors solely engages in 
decision control and when board diversity has been determined exogenous. Nevertheless, 
replication in different settings is warranted. 
An alternative mechanism by which board-level political decision making may affect 
innovation is by repulsing innovation proposals from middle managers. In political decision 
making, decisions are made by the most powerful coalition. Hence, not every member is valued 
equally, and thus, not all opinions and viewpoints are considered similarly. Middle managers 




threshold for communication with the board. After all, decision-makers may not be open to 
other ideas, and they are intended to pursue alternatives that only further their own interests. 
Hence, politics in the board of directors’ decision-making process creates a less favorable 
context for middle managers to propose their ideas. Such unfavorable context limits the 
interaction between middle managers and top management, resulting in fewer innovation ideas 
that will be discussed in the board of directors’ decision-making process (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1997). Such effects could be a potential avenue for future research.  
Methodologically, some side issues should be noted. First, the minutes used to gather 
the data for the board of directors’ decision making were written by a professional secretary. It 
is possible for a secretary to slightly adapt certain discussions in order to omit unfavorable 
statements. On the other hand, we deem the minutes reliable, as they need to be approved by 
the entire board, and we observed that they usually quoted exactly what was said. Furthermore, 
because there were no predefined dictionaries available, we developed a new dictionary. 
Although internal validity should be verified, “most content analysis would benefit from the 
construction of special-purpose dictionaries” (Krippendorff, 2004) of this type.  
 
Conclusion 
We started this chapter by considering the conflicting findings in the board diversity-
organizational outcomes literature. Our fundamental point is that different types of diversity, 
specifically those that pertain to the interests of individual board members, have adverse effects 
by increasing the amount of politics in the board of directors’ decision-making process. In turn, 
this reduces the innovativeness of the firm. To test our theoretical predictions, we applied 
content analysis and developed unique dictionaries. We hope our research inspires others to 
further develop the literature on board diversity, decision making, innovativeness and other 
organizational outcomes. 






In deep water: Negative attainment discrepancy, organizational 
attention, and interorganizational relationship formation in the 
Dutch water authority sector 
 
Abstract 
The attention-based view can be used to explain what type of organizational changes are 
enacted, but this view is relatively silent on when decision-makers act upon their attention to 
enact such changes. Synthesizing the attention-based view with the behavioral theory of the firm 
fills this gap. We theorize that the influence of four categories of attention on interorganizational 
relationship formation is moderated by negative attainment discrepancy: a weaker relationship 
for attention on (1) internal issues and (2) different organizations in the external environment, 
and a stronger relationship for attention on (3) interorganizational collaboration and (4) similar 
organizations in the external environment. Applying topic modeling to longitudinal data from the 
Dutch water authority sector for 2008-2014, we find that organizations are more likely to form 
an interorganizational relationship when attention is on interorganizational collaboration and 
not on internal issues and different organizations; we also find that this effect is moderated by 
negative attainment discrepancy. We discuss theoretical implications, particularly with regard to 
extending the attention-based view and the behavioral theory of the firm, and phenomenological 





Organizational attention, defined as “the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time 
and effort by organizational decision-makers on both […] issues […] and answers” (Ocasio, 
1997: 189), has been used to explain why specific organizational decisions are made (Ocasio, 
1997). By understanding what an organization pays attention to, one can identify what type of 
answers the decision-makers notice, encode, and interpret, and where they focus their time, 
effort, and resources (Rerup, 2009; Sullivan, 2010; Wilson & Joseph, 2015). As such, 
organizational attention has been used to explain local versus distant search (Wilson & Joseph, 
2015), regulation setting by public organizations (Sullivan, 2010), and strategy change (Cho & 
Hambrick, 2006).  
Cho and Hambrick (2006) proposed that organizational change can be explained by 
changes in organizational attention. Those organizations that are more mindful of changes in the 
environment may change their organizational attention so that actions will be undertaken to 
ensure organizational fit with the environment (Cho & Hambrick, 2006). However, 
organizational change does not necessarily require a change in attention. In fact, the impetus for 
change may also come from within the organization in the form of unsatisfactory performance 
(Cyert & March, 1992). This paper intends to study when decision-makers act upon their 
attention to enact organizational change. 
The behavioral theory of the firm asserts that unsatisfactory performance is one of the 
main drivers of organizational change (Cyert & March, 1992). Organizations stick with the status 
quo unless performance is unsatisfactory (Cyert & March, 1992). Confronted with negative 
attainment discrepancy, i.e., when performance drops below the aspiration level of the decision-




performance. For instance, negative attainment discrepancy prompts organizations to engage in 
more efforts at business and technological innovation (e.g. Chen & Miller, 2007; Gaba & Joseph, 
2013; Greve, 1998b, 2003; Kacperczyk, Beckman, & Moliterno, 2015; Moliterno, Beck, 
Beckman, & Meyer, 2014; O'Brien & David, 2014), acquisitions (Iyer & Miller, 2008; Kim, 
Finkelstein, & Haleblian, 2015), divestitures (Vidal & Mitchell, 2015), R&D intensity (Lucas, 
Knoben, & Meeus, 2015) and R&D alliances (Tyler & Caner, 2016). 
 By synthesizing the attention-based view with the behavioral theory of the firm, we 
attempt to predict which organizational changes will be made and when. As organizational 
attention shapes what types of solutions are considered and thus what type of decision is made, 
negative attainment discrepancy provides the trigger for engaging in search and change. It is this 
paper’s aim to advance this synthesis. 
We study this topic by analyzing the formation of shared facilities through the 
interorganizational relationship (IOR) formation decisions of Dutch water authorities, though we 
consider other dependent variables in the discussion section. In this setting, the shared facilities 
are formed to reduce costs. The water authorities are responsible for managing water barriers, for 
maintaining the level and quality of water in waterways, and for sewage treatment in their 
respective regions. Given their territorial boundaries, water authorities are not strict competitors, 
although decision-makers are motivated to benchmark other water authorities; they do not want 
to underperform relative to their peers. Especially because a considerable portion of top 
management, as well as of the board of directors, are elected by the public, the decision-makers 
are motivated to perform well if they seek to be re-elected. Other decision-makers are nominated 
but still depend on their professional constituency, which pays attention to performance. 




incentive for all board members to perform well (e.g., the local community can criticize the 
inefficient spending of tax money). 
Shared facility formation is relevant in this research setting, as decisions about facilities 
are made by the top management team based on a finite set of options, which allows us to better 
examine the impact of organizational attention. Furthermore, studying shared facility formation 
in this setting allows us to examine and compare the effects of four attention foci that vary in 
their relatedness to the shared facility decision. We elaborate on this choice of setting in the 
Methodology section. 
In synthesizing the attention-based view and the behavioral theory of the firm and 
applying it to the IOR context, this study makes three contributions. First, by synthesizing the 
attention-based view with the behavioral theory of the firm, our contribution is to show how 
organizational attention shapes which type of decision is more likely to be made in response to 
negative attainment discrepancy. We also contribute to expanding and operationalizing the 
attention-based view by linking it more firmly with behavior decision theory and also by 
demonstrating that topic modeling can be used to measure broader categories of attention, to 
which other textual methods cannot do justice. Second, with regard to the behavioral theory of 
the firm, we aim to make a theoretical contribution by identifying the boundary conditions under 
which negative attainment discrepancy influences decisions, and more specifically, shared 
facility decisions. We also elaborate a theoretical answer not only to the question of whether the 
organization reacts but also in what direction this reaction occurs. Third, the IOR literature is 
increasingly exploring behavioral determinants (e.g. Tyler & Caner, 2016), and we contribute to 
this field by showing that a synthesis of attention-based and behavioral theories can shed new 




reduction initiatives, but these initiatives are actually quite important. 
 
 Conceptual development 
The attention-based view of the firm proposes that what decision-makers do depends on the 
issues and answers upon which they focus their attention (Ocasio, 1997). Attention is defined as 
“the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and effort by organizational decision-
makers on both (a) issues; the available repertoire of categories for making sense of the 
environment: problems, opportunities, and threats; and (b) answers: the available repertoire of 
action alternatives: proposals, routines, projects, programs, and procedures” (Ocasio, 1997: 189; 
emphasis in original). The central idea of this strand of research is that attention shapes the issues 
and corresponding potential answers upon which decision-makers focus (Rerup, 2009; Wilson & 
Joseph, 2015). 
 Attention can be paid to a variety of factors, such as technology (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; 
Kaplan, 2008), internal vs. external determinants of CEO succession (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), 
and competitive and market forces (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Researchers generally focus on a 
particular form of attention as befits their research question. This is understandable given the 
research methods they have at their disposal, which makes it difficult to hypothesize about 
broader categories of attention. 
In general, direct effects of organizational attention have been found to influence a 
variety of strategic actions, such as the development of an expansive global strategy (Levy, 
2005), technological responsiveness to competitors (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009), and speed of 
response to task and sector changes (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Yet, these papers considered an 




Kaplan, 2009). Similarly, an internal impetus for the need for change can explain how attention 
influences strategic actions. The behavioral theory of the firm provides a useful anchor upon 
which to theorize how such an internal impetus would work.  
A key objective of the behavioral theory of the firm is to understand when organizations 
decide to change their current practices and thus to search for alternatives. As Cyert and March 
(1992) explain, organizations are not engaged in a constant search for alternatives; such a search 
process is initiated due to specific cues: 
… we do not expect to find – and do not find – anything like a constant level of search. 
Rather, there are search procedures called into play on various cues such that for any 
given situation there is a standard search response. […] there is search when existing 
decisions are perceived as inadequate. (Cyert & March, 1992: 93) 
As illustrated by this quote, a search for alternatives is initiated when the organization encounters 
a problem. The following quote elaborates on this: 
Search within the firm is problem-oriented. A problem is recognized when the 
organization either fails to satisfy one or more of its goals or when such a failure can be 
anticipated in the immediate future. So long the problem is not solved, search will 
continue. (Cyert & March, 1992: 169-170) 
Thus, search begins when the current performance of the organization falls or is expected to fall 
below its goals, or in other words, when performance falls below the aspiration level (Cyert & 
March, 1992; Lant et al., 1992). Aspiration level denotes the value that serves as a threshold for 
an outcome to be deemed satisfactory by the decision-maker (Schneider, 1992). For the decision-
makers responsible for the organization, this aspiration level is determined by a mix of “the 




comparable organizations” (Cyert & March, 1992: 162). When performance falls below 
aspiration, this is considered negative attainment discrepancy, which denotes the “discrepancy 
between prior aspiration level and actual performance” (Lant, 1992: 624). The discrepancy is 
negative when actual performance is below aspiration level. 
 The two aspiration levels typically studied in the literature are social and historical. 
Historical aspiration level reflects the organization’s past performance, and social aspiration 
level involves the performance of comparable peer organizations (Argote & Greve, 2007). 
Although the original theory proposes that aspiration level is determined by a mix of historical 
and social performance (Cyert & March, 1992), historical and social aspiration levels are treated 
heterogeneously in the literature. Some scholars state that organizations pay attention to either 
one of the two levels (Greve, 1998b), while others argue that these levels have independent 
effects (Audia & Greve, 2006), and still others argue that both aspiration levels reinforce each 
others’ effects (Joseph & Gaba, 2015). Nevertheless, both aspiration levels similarly induce 
problemistic search. 
 The search stops when an alternative is discovered that will satisfy the aspiration of the 
organization. As Cyert and March (1992) argue: “We assume that organizations make decisions 
by solving a series of problems; each problem is solved as it appears; the organization then waits 
for another problem to appear” (p. 167). Having discovered the solution, the organization makes 
a decision and resumes its ongoing business.21 
                                                 
21 There are studies that find that the organization will be more likely to change as positive attainment discrepancy 
increases (e.g. Kacperczyk et al., 2015; Lehman & Hahn, 2013). This is the case when the change is risky. IORs 
cannot be labeled as risky in general; in fact, in some cases they are used to reduce risk (e.g. Hagedoorn, 1993; 
Oliver, 1990; Powell et al., 1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Thus, we refrain from hypothesizing on risk-taking 





When considering in-house production versus setting up a shared facility through IOR, there are 
two categories of attention that would be expected to play (the most) significant roles given that 
they are closely aligned with the two governance choices: attention to internal operations versus 
attention to the external environment.22 An organization attends to more issues and answers 
related to its internal operations (external environment) when it discusses problems, 
opportunities, and threats that are central to its internal operations (external environment) and 
when it discusses proposals, routines, projects, programs, and procedures that relate directly to 
its internal operations (external environment).  
If the focus of their attention is on internal operations, decision-makers will have 
greater knowledge of the possibilities and potential alternatives that are embedded in those 
internal operations. Some alternatives from the external environment may also be considered 
in the search process, which, from the viewpoint of the internally focused decision-maker, 
are more distant with respect to the internal alternatives. Alternatives that are more distant 
are difficult for the decision-maker to process, as their validity and potential are difficult to 
assess (Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015). To cope with their cognitive limitations, decision-
makers are prone to drop these more distant alternatives from the search process (Piezunka & 
Dahlander, 2015). As such, the alternatives considered in the search process will relate to the 
organization’s internal operations. Consequently, the decision adopted for solving the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Moreover, the threat-rigidity hypothesis proposes that as decision-makers increasingly experience the issue as a 
threat, due to psychological stress (among other reasons), they become restricted in information processing and 
constrict control (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Consequently, they will refrain from making changes and will 
remain with the status quo. In such cases, the decision-maker focuses on a different reference point as its aspiration 
level: the survival point. The organizations in our empirical setting have limited financial risks and cannot go 
bankrupt; hence, this point is irrelevant when hypothesizing about our setting. Accordingly, similar to Lim and 
McCann (2014), we do not assume that extremely poor performance threatens the firm’s survival. 
22 Although we acknowledge that this is just one dimension on which one can view organizational attention, we do 




problem will likely be an internal one. For instance, when costs are outrunning the budget, an 
organization in which organizational attention is on internal operations will seek to reduce 
waste in its processes to increase efficiency and thus reduce costs.  
Furthermore, because of cognitive limitations, individuals can only pay attention to a 
select number of issues, that is, attention is finite (Cyert & March, 1992; Ocasio, 1997). In 
other words, decision-makers are selective in their attention (Ocasio, 2011). The more 
decision-makers attend to internal operations, the less they can notice and act on other issues 
(Kahneman, 1973). Hence, different foci of attention compete: if one area gains attention, 
another area loses it (Sullivan, 2010). When considering the likelihood of shared facility 
formation, the attention-based view proposes that it is necessary that attention should be 
related to this strategic action (Ocasio, 1997). Thus, organizations that focus more on internal 
operations are unlikely to focus more attention on shared facility formation. In sum, we 
propose the following hypothesis. 
 
H1: When it experiences negative attainment discrepancy, an organization whose 
attention is focused on its internal operations will be less likely to form a shared facility 
through an IOR.   
 
Given our interest in shared facility formation through IORs, one element in the external 
environment to which the organization can pay attention is interorganizational collaboration. 
Organizations in which managerial attention is focused on interorganizational collaboration 
will be focused on issues pertaining to interorganizational collaboration, such as their own 




importantly, the types of alternatives that are considered in the possible set are driven by the 
attention of the decision-maker (Barreto, 2012). Therefore, organizations with greater 
attention to interorganizational collaboration will most likely have interorganizational 
collaboration in their available repertoire of action alternatives, and this alternative will also 
be higher in the order of the alternative set (Ocasio, 1997). That is, as the organization 
encounters a problem and engages in search behavior to solve the problem, 
interorganizational collaboration will likely be (at least) considered as a solution (Cyert & 
March, 1992). 
 
H2: When it experiences negative attainment discrepancy, an organization whose 
attention is focused on interorganizational collaboration will be more likely to form a 
shared facility through an IOR. 
 
Attention can also be paid to issues in the external environment that are non-collaborative in 
nature. These can be issues pertaining either to similar organizations or to other forms of 
organizations (e.g., NGOs, national government). Decision-makers who focus their attention 
on the non-collaboration issues of similar organizations will more likely come up with a list 
of alternatives that relate to these similar organizations. As they frequently attend to similar 
organizations, they are able to garner more information on them (Daft, Sormunen, & Parks, 
1988; Sutcliffe, 1994). Such scanning behavior has important benefits, including becoming 
aware of and understanding the changes occurring within the environment (Hambrick, 1982). 
It can also help the organization to plan its strategic moves in retaliation to competitor moves 




mechanisms are at play because the different water authorities are not competitors. 
In this setting, organizations attending to their peers can become more aware of the 
potential problems of other organizations. This allows them to compare the situations of 
those other organizations with their own situations. The decision-makers of the focal 
organization may realize that they could mutually tackle the problem by jointly developing a 
shared facility. Therefore, shared facility formation in response to negative attainment 
discrepancy is more likely when organizational attention is more focused on similar 
organizations. 
 
H3: When it experiences negative attainment discrepancy, an organization whose 
attention is focused on similar organizations will be more likely to form a shared facility 
through an IOR.  
 
Last, organizations can also pay attention to other forms of organizations, including not only 
suppliers but also NGOs or the national government. Similarly to the rationale behind the 
first hypothesis, decision-makers are selective in their attention (Ocasio, 2011). The more 
decision-makers attend to the non-collaborative issues facing other forms of organizations, 
the less they can notice and act on other issues (Kahneman, 1973; Sullivan, 2010). For a 
strategic action to be executed, it is necessary that attention should be related to this strategic 
action (Ocasio, 1997). Yet, attending to the non-collaborative issues of different 
organizations is likely not to include the option of shared facility formation.  
 In principle, it is possible to form shared facilities with some alternate forms of 




organizations are performing the same activity, which, similar to scale joint ventures, is less 
likely to occur between different forms of organizations (Hennart, 1988). Thus, when 
organizations attend to issues that are unlikely to pertain to shared facility formation, shared 
facility formation is unlikely to occur (Ocasio, 1997; Sullivan, 2010). In conclusion, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: When it experiences negative attainment discrepancy, an organization whose 
attention is focused on other forms of organizations in the external environment will be 
less likely to form a shared facility through an IOR.  
 
Although each attention category stands to impact the organizational change decision, 
different foci are likely to co-exist. That is, there may be competing foci of attention that 
direct the search process in opposite directions. For instance, an organization whose attention 
is on both internal operations and interorganizational collaboration may explore options for 
solving its negative attainment problem by increasing in-house activity performance. 
However, it may also explore ways of resolving the issue collaboratively. In such a case, the 
most satisfactory option will be chosen; however, attention alone is unable to account for this 
choice.23 Nevertheless, in our analyses, we will consider the effects of simultaneous foci of 
attention. 
 
                                                 
23 Given this, we are unable to construct ex ante hypotheses when two competing foci of attention are equally 






We study our research question in the context of shared facility formation – through IORs – 
among Dutch water authorities. Water authorities are not to be confused with water utilities (Van 
den Oever & Martin, 2015). Water authorities are public organizations whose primary activities 
entail the integral management of water (flood) barriers, water levels, and quality in waterways, 
as well as urban sewage treatment in their respective regions. They perform a crucial task 
because the Netherlands has a complicated system of drainage ditches, canals, and pumping 
stations, which serve to keep the low-lying parts of the country dry for habitation and agriculture. 
Water authorities have been in existence since the twelfth century and constitute one of the 
oldest forms of local authority in the country, having been vested in the Dutch constitution since 
1848 (Van den Oever & Martin, 2015).  
As of 2016, there were 22 water authorities in the Netherlands. Their boards of directors 
are chosen via public election every four years. Of these directors, five also typically make up 
the top management team (excluding the chair, who is appointed by the Crown). Water 
authorities represent a separate level of public governance, and thus they levy their own taxes. 
Unlike other more general government authorities, the water authorities are considered 
functional bodies whose remit is limited to public water management. Facing increased pressure 
to demonstrate and improve their legitimacy and cost efficiency (Van den Oever & Martin, 
2015), water authorities are increasingly engaging in interorganizational collaboration.  
For two reasons, water authorities offer an excellent arena in which to assess the 
aforementioned research question. First, as public organizations, they are likely to abide by the 




firm was originally developed with business firms in mind, research has shown that it can also be 
applied to public organizations (e.g. Jones, 2003; Manns & March, 1978; Salge, 2011).  
Second, the aspirations of water authorities can be measured particularly clearly. Their 
annual reports (which include budgets) are publicly available and follow a highly detailed and 
consistent format. This makes it possible to adequately compare budgets across organizations. 
We follow previous research in using budgets to measure aspiration levels (Bromiley & Harris, 
2014). Using budgets is advantageous over the traditional way of measuring aspiration levels 
(via “performance”) because the net costs as reported in the budget are more observable and 
verifiable (Blettner, He, Hu, & Bettis, 2015). Indeed, in their annual accounts, our sample 
organizations juxtapose their performance with their budgeted performance, further showing that 
the budget entails an aspiration level.  
We focus specifically on each organization’s decision to enter or form an IOR with 
another water authority (or group of water authorities), vs. keep its activity in-house. We study 
two different activities for which each water authority may form IORs: taxation and laboratory 
activities. Both cases entail a change in the governance regime of existing activities. Whereas 
these activities were previously held in-house, under an IOR, they will be governed by a separate 
entity, which will manage the activities for two or more water authorities. Studying these 
decisions is especially relevant to test our hypotheses, for two reasons. 
First, the water authorities have only two governance options: in-house or allying with 
other water authorities. Water authorities are legally bound to execute both tax and laboratory 
activities (where laboratory activities involve monitoring water quality). These organizations do 
not have the option to refrain from executing these activities; they cannot make acquisitions; and 




house production or allying horizontally.  
Second, in water authorities, top management is specifically tasked with making these 
IOR decisions; such decisions are not delegated to subunits as can happen in diversified firms. 
Thus, we can adequately apply organizational-level performance measures and organizational 
attention. In sum, focusing on the IOR decisions of these organizations helps us to tease out the 
effects of attention on the type of decision made, theoretically as well as empirically. 
Data collection 
Our unit of analysis is the IOR formation initiative for one of the two activities in a given year. 
We use a variety of archival resources that include seven years of data on 27 water authorities, 
from 2008 to 2014.24 For each water authority, we collected the (confidential) minutes and lists 
of decisions of all top management and board of director meetings, as well as all annual reports. 
The sample of this study consists of two activities (taxation and laboratory) of 27 water 
authorities over a period of up to seven years. In total, the sample comprises 346 observations.25  
Data for this study were collected from each water authority. To measure performance, 
aspiration level, and control variables, we gathered annual reports from the Dutch Chamber of 
Commerce website. To measure organizational attention, the literature has mainly used 
observable demographics of the top management team, surveys, interviews, case studies, or 
letters of shareholders; however, each of these approaches raises concerns regarding internal and 
external validity (Surroca, Prior, & Tribó Giné, 2016). Instead, we gathered another set of data 
directly from each organization: minutes and decision lists of the meetings of the ‘board of 
directors’, ‘top management team’, and other any committees involved (consulted) in decision-
                                                 
24 A large number of mergers occurred before 2008 in the water authority sector. Because we manually collected the 
data at each water authority, extending the time period to before 2008 would have greatly challenged the 
organizations’ memories. To also ensure their cooperation, we chose not to go back earlier than 2008. 
25 Because a few mergers occurred between 2008 and 2014, the number of observations is slightly lower than 




making. Given that the minutes of the top management team are confidential and designed for 
internal purposes, we are confident that these minutes adequately reflect organizational attention. 
After removing duplicates (decision list and minutes of the same meeting) the total number of 
documents is 7,680. Table 1 presents the number and type of documents per year. 
 
Table 1 
Count of different types of internal documents 
 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Minutes 
BoD 184 209 176 168 152 148 137 1,174 
TMT 299 267 256 266 275 251 178 1,792 
Committees 300 256 258 243 260 250 241 1,808 
Decision 
lists 
BoD 10 24 34 35 34 47 43 227 
TMT 291 344 341 322 343 375 426 2,442 
Committees 40 28 23 28 31 36 51 237 
 
To gain an adequate understanding of how decisions are actually made, we collected qualitative 
data on the IOR formation decisions of two organizations in our sample. We gathered archival 
documents and interviewed middle managers involved in the decision-making process. These 
data also helped us to interpret the minutes adequately. Judging from this, we are confident that 
the IORs we studied were formed to reduce costs. For instance, the archival documents 
frequently mention costs as an important motive of forming an IOR. Regarding laboratory 
activity, 
 [The new laboratory IOR] will also result in further savings of public resources. 
With the collaboration of [water authority X and Y], there will be a leap in scale, 




2011-2015 budget of [the laboratory IOR], a structural saving benefit of 
approximately [X amount of euros] annually. 
For the taxation activity, costs are also frequently mentioned in relation to IOR formation: 
Water authorities feel socially responsible and want to perform their 
responsibilities as well and as cheaply as possible for the public. The public also 
has the right to inspect the performance of the water authorities. It is clear that 
coordination and cooperation with third parties for the proper execution of the 
tasks of the water authority are becoming more important. This also applies to the 
way the water authorities organize the taxation and levying of their taxes. 
Our interviews further support these excerpts. When discussing why costs were frequently 
mentioned in the archival documents, one middle manager commented: 
That is something that is tangible. You can measure it directly or you can make it 
measurable. 
Topic modeling 
To measure organizational attention, we used a relatively new technique called topic modeling 
(Kaplan & Vakili, 2015; Wilson & Joseph, 2015). In political science, this technique has been 
applied to the study of political attention (Grimmer, 2010, 2013; Quinn et al., 2010). Applying 
this method to the minutes of the decision-maker meetings is an appropriate way to measure 
organizational attention because we can directly infer which overall topics were discussed in 
these meetings. In topic modeling, the co-location of words in a collection of documents (i.e., a 
corpus) can be used to infer the latent topics in those documents. As words co-occur more often 
together within a document and these co-occurrence patterns are shared between the documents, 




are specified before the documents are written (Blei, 2012). For writers, the choice of a topic 
serves as a basis for their selection of the words they use in the document. Therefore, by 
observing the words that are used within a document, one can derive the topic that characterizes 
the document.  
 In contrast to the second essay, for this essay it is much more difficult to create an 
appropriate dictionary for the construct of interest, i.e., attention. This makes word count analysis 
an inferior approach. Instead, topic modeling is more appropriate in this essay, as the overall 
change in the use of words reflects a change in attention (Duriau et al., 2007). Hence, attention 
can and should be captured by considering the full text, not just the use of certain words as 
specified in a dictionary.  
Topic modeling also holds important advantages over human-coded techniques. First and 
foremost, topic modeling is a more reliable and cost-effective method compared to human-coded 
techniques. Human-coded techniques also assume that the substance of topics and the rules of 
coding documents are known a priori (Quinn et al., 2010). One advantage of human-coded 
techniques is that the coding scheme used for text in documents can be highly sophisticated and 
contingent, increasing the validity of the study. Yet, especially when considering a large set of 
documents, the use of multiple coders becomes necessary, making it difficult to track whether (1) 
the same rules are used by the coders and (2) the coders use adequate rules to capture the 
constructs to be studied. Hence, provided that we as researchers are also boundedly rational, 
human-coded techniques may be superior when the amount of text to be studied is low, but 
computer-aided text analyses become superior as the amount of text increases. Another strength 
is that content analysis allows rendering the rich meaning of organizational documents in 




(Duriau et al., 2007).  
 A first step in topic modeling is to clean the corpus by removing specific words, 
numbers, punctuation and whitespace, and by transforming upper case letters to lower case 
letters (Grimmer, 2010).26 The words that are removed include various stop words (e.g., and, or) 
as well as specific words that do not constitute a specific topic per se.27 For instance, our 
collected documents include such words as minutes, decision list, page number, meeting, 
decision, which appear in nearly all documents but do not add any meaningful topics.  
Another problem we encountered was related to specific names of locations, projects, 
municipalities, and collaboration initiatives. Including these names would mean that topics 
would center on specific organizations, and thus the results of the topic model would not reflect 
granular accounts of organizational attention. Excluding these names would also be faulty, as 
they relate to internal operations (e.g., for project names) and the external environment (e.g., for 
municipality names). As a compromise, we chose to change the names of the projects into the 
word [projectname], the names of municipalities into the word [municipalityname], and so on.28 
Following these changes to the corpus, we removed all words that occurred fewer than 40 
times in the corpus, so as to reduce the noise in the analysis while eliminating words with unique 
typos (Grimmer, 2010; Levy & Franklin, 2014). To further support this effort, we removed 
words that did not occur in at least 10 (0.0125%) of the documents. The resulting final corpus 
allowed us to create a document-term matrix. In this matrix, the rows correspond to the 
documents in the collection and the columns correspond to the unique words that are used in the 
corpus. We ran our model using the Bayesian statistical technique of latent Dirichlet allocation 
                                                 
26 Although it is a common procedure for topic modeling, we intentionally did not stem the words in our corpus. In 
Dutch, words belonging to the same stem can actually have subtly different meanings. 
27 The full list is available upon request. 




(Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 2003). We limited the model to 40 topics.29 
Per topic, we observed the 10 most common words and assessed each word individually 
to determine which general topic it should be ascribed to. To do this, for each word, we looked at 
the paragraphs in which the word was mentioned in a random subset of documents, which 
improved semantic validity (Quinn et al., 2010). A large subset of words could be easily ascribed 
to a general topic (e.g., elections). When the interpretation of the word would be different across 
paragraphs in the random subset we studied, we left the interpretation open. Next, we began 
labeling topics by looking at the 10 most common words per topic simultaneously and thus 
assessed the general subject per topic. We labeled these topics by distinguishing among general 
categories: projects, internal organization, similar organizations in the external environment, 
different organizations in the external environment, interorganizational collaboration, budget, 
strategy, operations, and elections. In total, we had 11 topics that related to projects, 4 to internal 
organization, 3 to similar organizations (i.e., other water authorities) in the external environment, 
4 to different organizations (i.e., non-water authorities) in the external environment, 3 to 
interorganizational collaboration, 8 to budget, 1 to strategy, 5 to operations, and 1 to elections. 
The outcome of this process served as input to our organizational attention variables, to which 
we will return after discussing our operationalization of the dependent variable. 
Dependent variable 
IOR formation (IORFori, j,t). The dependent variable in this study is the event of the formation of 
a new IOR of water authority i's activity j at time t. We infer this event from the lists of decisions 
made by top management and annual reports. We checked whether these lists mentioned 
                                                 
29 There are not strict guidelines for the selection of the number of topics. We chose 40 topics, as selecting fewer 
resulted in topics that reflected vague attention items (e.g. municipalities, projects, budgets in general). Selecting 
more topics was also problematic as topics became overlapping (e.g. difference between topics constituted one or 




interorganizational collaboration pertaining to these activities and coded this variable 1 when the 
decision was made to form an IOR for activity j.  
Independent variables 
Organizational attention to internal operations (𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡). This is a continuous variable that is 
bounded between 0 and 1. We start by counting the number of topics that reflect internal 
operations; these topics included projects, internal organization, and operations. We then 
calculate the number of documents that are assigned with those particular topics per organization 
i in year t. Topics were assigned to a particular document if the topic loaded at least 20% on that 
document. We divide this number by the total number of topics of that organization i in year t. 30 
Organizational attention to interorganizational collaboration (𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡). To measure 
organizational attention to interorganizational collaboration, we used a similar procedure. The 
difference is that we count the number of topics that reflect interorganizational collaboration 
instead of the internal operations. 
Organizational attention to similar organizations (𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖,𝑡). To measure organizational 
attention to similar organizations, we count the number of topics that reflect attention to other 
water authorities.  
Organizational attention to other forms of organizations (𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡). To measure organizational 
attention to other forms of organizations, we count the number of topics that reflect attention to 
external organizations other than water authorities.  
Negative attainment discrepancy (𝑁𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡). Aspirations were measured as the net costs per 
organization i per year t. The net costs are the costs that are ascribed to the primary activities of 
the water authority and on which the revenues (not including taxes and other general revenues) 
                                                 





are subtracted.31 In the selection of this performance measure, we chose to diverge from prior 
literature, as our organizations are governmental and are not primarily driven by a profit motive. 
Rather, they focus on costs because running above the budgeted costs will force the organization 
to increase its primary source of revenues: taxes. This is undesirable for the decision-makers 
involved because raising taxes may cost them their positions in future elections. The public 
administration literature frequently uses efficiency- or cost-based measures of the performance 
of public organizations (e.g. Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2011; Brewer & Selden, 2000; 
Neshkova & Guo, 2012). 
In the literature, a common way to measure aspiration level is to take the average of the 
firm’s performance in prior years (historical aspiration) and/or the average of the performance of 
similar organizations (social aspiration). Although past and peers’ performance can help the 
organization set its aspiration level, there are important issues associated with these measures. 
For both historical and social aspiration levels, one issue is that they may not be adequate 
benchmarks for the organization’s performance for the following year. The organization may 
know of recent advancements or about important events that may occur in the next year. For 
instance, an organization may know that it will sell off one of its activities in the next year, 
which will have important consequences for its performance that year. Setting an aspiration level 
based on the organization’s historical performance would thus be problematic. Similarly, setting 
the aspiration level as a simple average of the performance of rivals is also problematic in such 
situations. 
 Instead, we argue that the budget will provide a better indicator of a firm’s aspiration 
level. Previous research has equated aspirations with budgets (Bromiley & Harris, 2014). By the 
end of the year, the organization constructs a plan that includes its costs, its revenues and its 
                                                 




ultimate performance for the next year. During that year, the organization will frequently 
benchmark its current performance against its projected performance. When actual performance 
begins to fall behind what was proposed in the budget (negative attainment discrepancy), the 
organization will become more likely to engage in decision-making.  
Decision-makers use information regarding prior years’ performance and similar 
organizations’ performance (among other types of information) to construct their budgets. 
Specifically, using historical aspirations and social aspirations may be faulty, given that decision-
makers place different emphases on this information depending on organizational age (Blettner 
et al., 2015), and simply using historical aspirations or social aspirations would not account for 
this. 
Hence, for the construction of the negative attainment discrepancy measure, we use the 
budget data from the annual report of the water authorities. Here, attainment discrepancy is 
measured by 𝑁𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = |
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
⁄ |, where 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 denotes the aspiration level in terms of the 
net costs of water authority i at time t, and 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 denotes performance in terms of the net costs of 
water authority i at time t. For each observation where performance is higher than aspiration 
level, we set this variable to 0. A more positive value denotes higher negative attainment 
discrepancy. 
Control variables 
In total, we include 13 control variables. First, we control for the number of topics discussed per 
organization per year. This is to control for the attention span of the organization. 
Second, to control for activity-specific fixed effects, we include a dummy variable for 
taxation activity. Laboratory activity was treated as the baseline.  




resources may be seen as attractive partners, thus increasing the likelihood that they will form an 
IOR. Following George (2005), we used the level of cash reserves of water authority i at time t to 
measure slack resources. Cash is the most easily deployed resource and is, as such, an ideal 
measure of slack resources (George, 2005). Given the non-normal distribution of this variable, 
we took its cube root. 
Fourth, we control for an interaction effect of slack resources and negative attainment 
discrepancy, consistent with earlier studies that have found said effect to influence IOR 
formation behavior (Tyler & Caner, 2016).  
Fifth, we control for a direct effect of the organization i already being in an IOR on 
activity j at time t. In an IOR, relation-specific investments can contribute to the performance of 
the organizations involved (Dyer & Singh, 1998); however, these investments are also limited in 
their recoverability. Thus, even though IOR performance may be unsatisfactory, organizations 
may stick with the current IOR because they have already incurred substantial sunk costs.  
Sixth, we measure the number of existing collaborations by counting the number of 
entities in which the organization had decision-making rights or a financial stake. We include 
this variable as a proxy for IOR experience. Organizations can develop capabilities that accrue as 
a result of historical processes of learning, which is especially important because partnering is 
difficult (Gulati, 1999; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
Seventh, we measure the total number of IOR formations for both activities over the past 
years by taking the sum of the IOR formation variable for all the years before t. This variable 
also serves as a proxy for IOR experience.  
Eighth, for each organization i for activity j at time t, we include a variable counting the 




t. This variable is included to account for any year-specific factors that may influence the general 
tendency of the organization to form an IOR. 
Ninth, we measure the number of municipalities that overlap with the region of the water 
authority because this can drive the organizational experience with interorganizational 
collaboration (as water authorities regularly collaborate with municipalities).  
Tenth, we include a count of the total number of organizations that are geographical 
neighbors of organization i at time t because organizations with a greater number of neighbors 
may more easily form an IOR given their increased number of opportunities to do so. 
Geographical proximity has been found to be an indicator for IOR partner selection because it 
facilitates knowledge transfer (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003). Indeed, the general tendency in 
this industry is for organizations to form IORs with geographically proximate organizations, 
thus, we account for the fact that some organizations may be better positioned for IOR 
formation. 
Eleventh, we include a continuous variable indicating the count of geographically 
neighboring organizations of organization i that form an IOR for activity j at time t divided by 
the total number of neighboring organizations of organization i. We include this variable because 
the focal organization has an ideal opportunity to enter an IOR if its neighbors are forming an 
IOR. 
Twelfth, we control for the number of neighboring organizations of organization i that are 
in a different IOR than organization i for activity j at time t. Because organizations tend to form 
IORs with geographically proximate organizations (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003), if other 
proximate organizations have already entered an IOR, there will be fewer opportunities – and 




Thirteenth, we count the number of organizations – other than the focal organization – 
with negative attainment discrepancy i at time t. If more organizations face negative attainment 
discrepancy in a given year, this makes it easier for an organization to form an IOR because 
these other organizations are also motivated to form an IOR. 
Analysis 
We employ an event history analysis to test our hypotheses. In this paper, the event is the 
formation of an IOR for activity j by organization i. In traditional event history analyses, the 
observation (here the organization) is removed from the dataset when the event occurs. Yet, an 
organization can form and replace its IOR in other periods. Because the underlying time process 
in the data is inherently continuous, we use a non-parameterized event history model: the Cox's 
proportional hazard model (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). Right censoring, caused by 
truncating the observation period at 2014, is routinely and robustly handled within event history 
analysis (Tuma & Hannan, 1984). Left censoring is present to some extent because some 
organizations had formed IORs before the start of the sample (mostly in 2007). Moreover, to 
account for dependencies between failure times, the effects of the covariates on the hazard rate 




 One of the most important sources of estimation bias in Cox’s proportional hazard 
models is the violation of the proportional hazard assumption. This assumption means “that the 
hazards of two units experiencing an event are proportional to one another and that this 
relationship is constant over time” (Gandrud, 2015: 3). We test this violation via post estimation 
procedures and find that the assumption is not violated for our variables of interest (p > 0.10), 
except for the interaction term between negative attainment discrepancy and attention to 
interorganizational collaboration (p = 0.000). To remedy this violation, we run an additional 
model in which we interact the interaction term between negative attainment discrepancy and 
attention to interorganizational collaboration with a time indicator, and the results are similar to 
the model without the interaction term with time. As such, we use the model without the 
interaction term with time to test our hypotheses.  
 
Results 
As an introduction to the results, Table 2 shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum of each variable. Table 3 provides the matrix of correlations among all variables. We 
checked multicollinearity and the distribution of the independent variables. Multicollinearity did 






Descriptive statistics  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (n = 346) 
    Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
IOR formation 0.13 0.33 0 1 
AttInt 0.5 0.25 0.01 0.95 
AttInterColl 0.06 0.06 0 0.3 
AttSim 0.13 0.21 0 0.73 
AttDiff 0.15 0.20 0 0.81 
NAD 1.18 3.73 0 33.96 
NoTopics 11.21 2.97 4 22 
TAX 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Slack  65.68 68.98 0 334.17 
InIOR 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Current collaborations 6.98 3.12 1 20 
Total no. of IOR form  1.17 0.92 0 4 
IOR form for other activity 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Number of municipalities in region 20.75 9.06 3 45 
Total number of neighbors 4.26 1.51 1 8 
Neighbors forming an IOR 0.21 0.33 0 1 
Neighbors in a different IOR 0.45 0.3 0 1 







Table 3. Correlation matrix (n =346)                     
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 IOR formation 1                  
2 AttInt -0.04 1                 
3 AttInterColl 0.03 -0.08 1                
4 AttSim -0.01 -0.59 0.03 1               
5 AttDiff 0.03 -0.52 -0.18 -0.16 1              
6 NAD 0.05 -0.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 1             
7 NoTopics 0.01 0.19 0.30 0.02 -0.38 -0.07 1            
8 TAX 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 1           
9 Slack -0.03 0.04 -0.13 0.12 -0.11 0.07 -0.00 0.00 1          
10 InIOR -0.07 -0.12 0.24 0.09 0.05 -0.04 -0.11 -0.04 -0.10 1         
11 Current collaborations 0.06 0.02 -0.11 0.35 -0.35 0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.05 1        
12 Total no. of IOR form  -0.08 -0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.30 -0.05 0.45 0.04 1       
13 IOR form for other activity 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.04 -0.19 -0.10 -0.16 1      
14 Number of municipalities in region -0.03 -0.17 -0.12 0.36 -0.15 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.16 -0.12 0.17 -0.13 -0.07 1     
15 Total number of neighbors 0.10 -0.07 -0.19 0.32 -0.03 -0.12 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.11 1    
16 Neighbors forming an IOR 0.47 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.34 -0.13 -0.22 0.26 0.01 0.04 1   
17 Neighbors in a different IOR -0.12 0.13 -0.33 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 0.17 -0.01 -0.22 -0.02 -0.24 -0.01 0.26 0.19 -0.01 1  





Table 4 presents the results of the Cox event history analysis. Model 1 includes all control 
variables. Model 2 includes, on top of the control variables, an interaction between attention to 
the internal environment and negative attainment discrepancy to test the first hypothesis. Model 
3 reports on a test for the second hypothesis, where, on top of the control variables, we include 
the interaction term between attention to interorganizational collaboration and negative 
attainment discrepancy. Model 4 includes all control variables and an interaction between 
attention to similar organizations and negative attainment discrepancy. In model 5, we include all 
control variables and an interaction between attention to other forms of organizations and 
negative attainment discrepancy.  Finally, model 6 includes all variables. The improved log 
likelihood for the full model shows that the full model has a superior model fit compared with 
the other models. Interpretation of the results will be on the basis of the full model (6) unless 
stated otherwise.32  
Hypothesis 1 predicted a moderation effect of negative attainment discrepancy on 
organizational attention to the internal operations effect on IOR formation. Our model supports 
this hypothesis with a p-value of 0.001. Assessing the marginal effect of interaction terms in 
non-linear models is difficult because the interaction term does not represent a cross-partial 
derivative as it does in linear models (Hoetker, 2007). To assess these marginal effects, we use 
the simulation-based approach of King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) as adapted for Cox event 
history analyses (Gandrud, 2015). This approach simulates the regression coefficients, in our 
case 1,000 times, assuming they are normally distributed (King et al., 2000). 
                                                 
32 Although the signs of the main variables of interest change when including all variables in this full model, we 
report on the final model only. Given that different foci of attention may be present simultaneously, it is important to 





Cox event history model results 
Model (n = 346) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
AttInt*NAD (H1 -) 
  -0.148 0.208       -1.492 0.001 
  (0.117)        (0.457)  
AttInterColl*NAD (H2 +) 
    3.272 0.001     3.918 0.000 
    (1.028)      (1.071)  
AttSim*NAD (H3 +) 
      0.041 0.935   -0.709 0.366 
      (0.503)    (0.785)  
AttDiff*NAD (H4 -) 
        0.081 0.452 -1.120 0.014 
        (0.107)  (0.455)  
AttInt 
-2.242 0.080 -2.254 0.079 -2.745 0.036 -2.252 0.077 -2.269 0.082 -2.729 0.037 
(1.282)  (1.282)  (1.309)  (1.274)  (1.305)  (1.312)  
AttInterColl 
-2.546 0.246 2.351 0.238 0.842 0.713 2.336 0.249 2.329 0.243 0.548 0.812 
(1.368)  (1.992)  (2.291)  (2.028)  (1.995)  (2.310)  
AttSim 
-4.167 0.002 -4.354 0.002 -4.906 0.001 -4.194 0.002 -4.278 0.003 -5.204 0.001 
(1.368)  (1.396)  (1.510)  (1.360)  (1.427)  (1.527)  
AttDiff 
-1.868 0.095 -2.118 0.078 -2.620 0.041 -1.874 0.093 -2.047 0.097 -2.833 0.031 
(1.120)  (1.200)  (1.284)  (1.115)  (1.232)  (1.312)  
NAD 
-0.075 0.236 0.003 0.970 -0.358 0.000 -0.076 0.232 -0.086 0.203 0.494 0.033 
(0.064)  (0.071)  (0.101)  (0.063)  (0.067)  (0.232)  
Slack 
-0.002 0.406 -0.003 0.391 -0.003 0.370 -0.002 0.386 -0.002 0.407 -0.003 0.265 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
NAD*Slack 
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
NoTopics 
-0.014 0.005 -0.021 0.755 -0.022 0.737 -0.13 0.841 -0.120 0.772 -0.022 0.735 
(0.069)  (0.068)  (0.064)  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.064)  
Tax  
0.986 0.842 1.044 0.03 0.991 0.001 0.987 0.005 1.025 0.003 1.067 0.001 
(0.350)  (0.349)  (0.311)  (0.351)  (0.341)  (0.323)  
InIOR 
-0.389 0.471 -0.380 0.503 -0.151 0.818 -0.388 0.472 -0.387 0.489 -0.096 0.884 
(0.540)  (0.568)  (0.657)  (0.540)  (0.559)  (0.662)  
Current collaborations 
0.132 0.026 0.133 0.026 0.133 0.340 0.132 0.28 0.133 0.024 0.138 0.033 
(0.059)  (0.060)  (0.063)  (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.065)  
Total no. of IOR form 
-0.606 0.092 -0.626 0.092 -0.711 0.083 -0.606 0.092 -0.621 0.094 -0.721 0.082 
(0.359)  (0.372)  (0.409)  (0.360)  (0.371)  (0.415)  
IOR form for other activity 
-0.357 0.181 -0.361 0.169 -0.396 0.143 -0.358 0.179 -0.354 0.179 -0.410 0.117 
(0.267)  (0.262)  (0.271)  (0.267)  (0.264)  (0.262)  
No. of municipalities in region 
0.006 0.658 0.009 0.501 0.004 0.744 0.006 0.662 0.008 0.571 0.007 0.621 
(0.013)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.014)  
Total number of neighbors 
0.550 0.000 0.572 0.000 0.591 0.000 0.551 0.000 0.563 0.000 0.618 0.000 
(0.107)  (0.110)  (0.105)  (0.109)  (0.108)  (0.109)  
Neighbors forming an IOR 
3.605 0.000 3.694 0.000 3.630 0.000 3.609 0.000 3.658 0.000 3.794 0.000 
(0.693)  (0.722)  (0.628)  (0.695)  (0.713)  (0.700)  
Neighbors in a different IOR 
-1.741 0.012 -1.853 0.010 -1.838 0.009 -1.739 0.012 -1.826 0.011 -1.897 0.008 
(0.694)  (0.723)  (0.700)  (0.689)  (0.720)  (0.720)  
Other organizations with NAD 
-0.437 0.326 -0.435 0.329 -0.452 0.303 -0.437 0.322 -0.429 0.329 -0.495 0.248 
(0.444)   (0.446)  (0.439)  (0.442)   (0.439)  (0.429)  
Log likelihood -126.328 -126.172 -124.563 -126.327 -126.264 -123.950 




Figure 1 depicts the moderation effect.33 The line depicts the marginal effect of attention to 
internal operations under different levels of negative attainment discrepancy. The differently 
shaded area around the line depicts the 95% probability interval of the simulation outcomes. The 
most transparent area displays the farthest extent of the probability interval. The less transparent 
area shows the central 50 percent of this interval, and the middle line shows the interval's 
median. It is clear that, given the attention to internal operations, organizations with low negative 
attainment discrepancy are more likely to form an IOR than organizations with high negative 
attainment discrepancy (where the marginal effect of attention to internal operations is lower).  
Hypothesis 2 predicted a moderation effect of negative attainment discrepancy on the 
effect of attention to interorganizational collaboration on IOR formation. The effect is significant 
with a p-value below 0.001. Figure 2 depicts the moderation effect. In this figure, it is clear that 
organizations with high negative attainment discrepancy are more likely to form an IOR in 
response to higher attention to interorganizational collaboration compared with organizations 
with low negative attainment discrepancy (where the marginal effect of attention to 
interorganizational collaboration is lower). From this figure, it is visible that, on average, when 
negative attainment discrepancy increases, the organization becomes more likely to form an IOR 
when its attention is on interorganizational collaboration.  
                                                 
33 Note that the negative attainment discrepancy range is truncated to show the interaction effects when negative 
















We proceed to test the moderation effect of negative attainment discrepancy on the attention to 
similar organizations effect on IOR formation. We fail to find a statistically significant positive 
effect. Figure 3 provides an illustration of this effect, in which it is visible that we fail to find a 
significant positive effect (the confidence interval at high negative attainment discrepancy 
overlaps the confidence interval at low negative attainment discrepancy).  
Figure 3 
Hypothesis 3’s interaction between negative attainment discrepancy and attention to 
similar organizations 
 
Last, we test the moderation effect of negative attainment discrepancy on the effect of attention 
to different types of organizations on IOR formation. We indeed find a significant negative effect 
(p-value = 0.014). Again, we depict the moderation effect in Figure 4. Given this figure, on 
average, when negative attainment discrepancy increases, the organization becomes less likely to 









Because we seek to understand the effects of attention when negative attainment discrepancy is 
high, we centered negative attainment discrepancy at a low and at a high value (the 5th and 95th 
percentiles, respectively).34 In table 5, we report these results. Note that only the direct effects 
vary when we center negative attainment discrepancy at a low versus a high value; therefore, the 
values in bold are the relevant effects to consider. 
The results are consistent with those reported previously. The effect of attention to 
internal operations is negative when the organization has low negative attainment discrepancy, 
                                                 
34 If we do not center the variables, we can only interpret the main effect of attention when keeping other variables 
constant, including the interaction effect. The interaction effect can only be held constant if one of the terms in it is 
set at 0. This is done by centering that variable (in our case, negative attainment discrepancy) and by looking at 




but the effect is stronger when the organization has high negative attainment discrepancy (H1) 
(the magnitudes are -2.729 and -14.294, and the p-values are 0.037 and 0.001, respectively). This 
also holds for attention to interorganizational collaboration (H2) (the magnitudes are 0.548 and 
30.931, and the p-values are 0.812 and 0.000, respectively), attention to similar organizations 
(H3) (the magnitudes are -5.204 and -10.7, and the p-values are 0.001 and 0.084, respectively), 
and attention to different organizations (H4) (the magnitudes are -2.833 and -11.521, and the p-
values are 0.031 and 0.004, respectively). This provides support for the fact that attention has a 
negative main effect when negative attainment discrepancy is high, providing further evidence 
for the interaction effect. 
We also explored the impact of three-way interactions given that different foci of 
attention can have opposite effects. What is important from these models is that the hypothesized 
effects generally remain, even when including the different three-way moderation effects.35 Last, 
we further discussed these findings with managers in our empirical setting, who confirmed that 
these organizations generally start to engage in organizational change in response to negative 
attainment discrepancy. The attention of top management was indeed guiding this search process 
for the type of organizational change (e.g., solving the problem internally vs. collaboratively). 
This further corroborates the internal validity of the study. 
  
                                                 





Cox event history model results when centering independent variables 
  Model (n = 346) 7 8 
 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
AttInt*NAD (H1 -) 
-1.492 0.001 -1.492 0.001 
(0.457)  (0.457)  
AttInterColl*NAD (H2 +) 
3.918 0.000 3.918 0.000 
(1.071)  (1.071)  
AttSim*NAD (H3 +) 
-0.709 0.366 -0.709 0.366 
(0.785)  (0.785)  
AttDiff*NAD (H4 -) 
-1.120 0.014 -1.120 0.014 
(0.455)  (0.455)  
AttInt 
-2.729 0.037 -14.294 0.001 
(1.312)  (4.186)  
AttInterColl 
0.548 0.812 30.931 0.000 
(2.310)  (7.726)  
AttSim 
-5.204 0.001 -10.700 0.084 
(1.527)  (6.189)  
AttDiff 
-2.833 0.031 -11.521 0.004 
(1.312)  (3.998)  
NAD 
0.494 0.033 0.494 0.033 
(0.232)  (0.232)  
Slack 
-0.003 0.265 0.026 0.000 
(0.003)  (0.006)  
NAD*Slack 
0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 
(0.001)  (0.001)  
NoTopics 
-0.022 0.735 -0.022 0.735 
(0.064)  (0.064)  
Tax  
1.067 0.001 1.067 0.001 
(0.323)  (0.323)  
InIOR 
-0.096 0.884 -0.096 0.884 
(0.662)  (0.662)  
Current collaborations 
0.138 0.033 0.138 0.033 
(0.065)  (0.065)  
Total no. of IOR form 
-0.721 0.082 -0.721 0.082 
(0.415)  (0.415)  
IOR form for other activity 
-0.410 0.117 -0.410 0.117 
(0.262)  (0.262)  
Number of municipalities in 
region 
0.007 0.621 0.007 0.621 
(0.014)  (0.014)  
Total number of neighbors 
0.618 0.000 0.618 0.000 
(0.109)  (0.109)  
Neighbors forming an IOR 
3.794 0.000 3.794 0.000 
(0.700)  (0.700)  
Neighbors in a different IOR 
-1.897 0.008 -1.897 0.008 
(0.720)  (0.720)  
Other organizations with NAD 
-0.495 0.248 -0.495 0.248 
(0.429)  (0.429)  
Log likelihood -123.950 -123.950 





This paper has contributed to the call for ‘a behavioral theory of the interfirm’ by specifically 
looking at how behavioral and attention-based concepts influence the organization’s propensity 
to form an IOR (Baum & Ingram, 2002; Gavetti et al., 2012). By synthesizing the attention-
based view with the behavioral theory of the firm, we show that the attention-based view can be 
extended to explain when and which organizational changes will be made. In particular, we show 
how organizational attention shapes the search procedure and eventually directs the decision 
towards – or away from – IOR formation.  
 The behavioral theory has previously been augmented with prospect theory to explain 
organizational risk-taking (Bromiley, 1991). That synthesis extended the behavioral theory by 
predicting that risky decisions are more likely to be made when performance drops below 
aspiration levels. Empirical studies have provided good support for the combined theory (Nickel 
& Rodriguez, 2002). However, this approach has recently been criticized, as the two theories 
operate at different levels of analysis, hence it is important to take into account the unit of 
aspiration setting (Kacperczyk et al., 2015). By combining the attention-based view with the 
behavioral theory of the firm, we further develop explanations for which types of decisions are 
made in the organization, this time remaining at the organizational level. 
We also provide a contribution to the IOR formation literature by focusing on an 
overlooked category of IOR: cost-reducing IORs. Although theoretical work emphasizes that 
IORs are formed for various purposes (Oliver, 1990), most IOR formation research is on IORs 
for R&D (e.g. Ahuja, 2000b; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Lee, 2010a). Cost-reducing 
IORs are more rarely studied, though, Gimeno (2004), for example, looked at how the formation 




study contributes to a broader literature on IORs and extends even behavioral-theoretic studies of 
R&D alliances (Tyler & Caner, 2016).  
We also make a methodological contribution by showing that applying topic modeling to 
the (internal) minutes of managerial meetings can be used to measure organizational attention. 
Compared with common ways of measuring this construct, such as interviews and (word count) 
content analysis of letters to shareholders, topic modeling on (internal) minutes provides superior 
internal and external validity. Using topic modeling, one is also able to unobtrusively capture 
broader categories of attention, which would be almost impossible with word count analyses. 
 
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
We acknowledge some limitations of this study. First, the empirical setting of this study was 
unique. Although it allowed us to collect comprehensive data and specifically track different 
forms of attention, we should be mindful of the idiosyncrasies of the setting and how they 
affected our theorization and findings. Specifically, we did not find a significant effect whereby 
organizations that are focused on similar organizations and are confronted with negative 
attainment discrepancy are more likely to form a shared facility through an IOR. This still 
warrants scrutiny. It is of interest to understand how such an attentional focus would play a role 
in a more traditional business setting, given that competitive pressures may exacerbate the 
tendency of firms to form a shared facility through an IOR.  
Second, as explained and shown throughout the different chapters of this dissertation, the 
behavioral theory of the firm fits very well with the research context. In particular, the tenet that 
organizations make decisions when performance is unsatisfactory resonates closely with the 




on the basis of traditional business firms (as its name implies), we would certainly expect the 
same to occur in firms. However, it still needs to be corroborated whether firms also act in the 
direction of their current attention given negative attainment discrepancy. Decision-makers in 
firms may be motivated to acquire more foresight about upcoming problems. If this is true, when 
studying a certain organizational change at time t, attention at t-1 and negative attainment 
discrepancy at t may be better suited to explaining organizational change. Given that decision-
makers in our context have somewhat limited incentives to foresee problems in the long-term or 
even past the near future, we did not use lags in the independent variables (nor could we have 
done so, given the limited number of observations). Hence, future research should also look at 
the temporal difference of how the different constructs interrelate in more traditional business 
settings. 
Third, in our setting, top management makes the decision to form IORs. This may be 
different in other settings (Gavetti et al., 2012). Nevertheless, we expect similar processes to 
occur; indeed, other work has found that IORs are sensitive to negative attainment discrepancy 
(Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Lungeanu, Stern, & Zajac, 2015; Schwab & Miner, 
2008; Shipilov, Li, & Greve, 2011; Tyler & Caner, 2016). In other settings, the scope of top 
management’s responsibilities may differ, but IOR formation should still be susceptible to 
organizational-level performance measures and organizational attention (Gavetti et al., 2012).  
Last, though studying cost-reducing IOR is a refreshing context for IOR research, future 
research could verify results with different categories of IORs. Recent work in this vein seems 






Organizational change does not necessarily require a change in attention: the impetus for change 
can also come from negative attainment discrepancy. We show that attention and negative 
attainment discrepancy together are powerful predictors of organizational change. Specifically, 
we develop the attention-based view by extending its theoretical reach not only to explain which 
types of decisions are made but also when decisions are made. We hope this inspires others to 
develop the attention-based view further by studying different types of decisions, different foci 
of organizational attention, and how they relate. We also add a dimension to the behavioral 
theory of the firm pertaining not only to the type (close vs. distant) and timing of search but also 
to its contents. Again, this is worthy of further research. 
Note: The citations here are to ensure that the corresponding references are included in the reference 
list: (Blei et al., 2003; Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Hagedoorn, 1993; 
Kacperczyk et al., 2015; Lehman & Hahn, 2013; Lehman, Hahn, Ramanujam, & Alge, 2011; Lim & 
McCann, 2014; Oliver, 1990; Powell et al., 1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Staw, Sandelands, & 
Dutton, 1981). 
 


















































































































































































































This paper extends the innovation adoption literature by studying the role of different actors in 
the innovation adoption process. We theorize that firms are more likely to adopt an innovation 
when their competitors have adopted that innovation, but this is more than a simple matter of 
serving the same role in an industry. In particular, we distinguish between (1) competitors with 
which the focal firm has a direct business relationship (direct competitors) and (2) competitors 
with which the focal firm has an indirect relationship through a mutual supplier (joint-supplier 
competitors). We theorize that firms will adopt an innovation when they are exposed to direct 
and joint-supplier competitors that have adopted the innovation. Furthermore, we explore the 
characteristics of suppliers that play a role in this process. We also theorize that continued 
adoption by the same firm strongly influences the focal firm to adopt. Studying these predictions 
in the global console video game industry for 2006-2013, we find that firms’ likelihood of 
adopting an innovation depend on whether their joint-supplier competitors have done so. Larger 
suppliers and joint-supplier competitors that continue to adopt the innovation are especially 
influential in this process. We discuss the underemphasized role of suppliers in the innovation 





Organizations adopt innovations at different rates. The key rationale behind the adoption process 
is that decision makers integrate their own private information with information on how many 
other organizations adopt the innovation (Greve & Seidel, 2015). As the number of adopters 
increases, this public information becomes more convincing, as it is assumed that others choose 
actions that benefit them, and decision makers eventually adopt because of isomorphic pressures 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Thus, other organizations that can adopt the innovation are paramount 
in explaining the adoption process.  
Other work has extended this literature by focusing on the role of different types of 
organizations in the adoption process. For instance, commercial communication efforts and 
medical journals played an important role in the adoption of the broad-spectrum antibiotic 
tetracycline (Van den Bulte & Lilien, 2001). Generally, mass media can stimulate the adoption 
process by sharing success stories of early adopters (Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999), but in later 
stages, media can also exacerbate normative pressures (Compagni, Mele, & Ravasi, 2015). 
However, in this case, these organizations are not part of the industry in which the innovation 
occurs.  
We know relatively little about the role of actors (e.g., suppliers) that are in the same 
industry in which the innovation is diffused but are unable to adopt the innovation themselves.36 
Modeling the effects of such intermediaries is important, as their role may be incorrectly 
attributed to the effect of other adopters. In fact, competitors and suppliers may have different 
interests and thus tendencies to share information on the innovation. Competitors, for instance, 
                                                 
36 Greve (2009) provides a notable exception, however, considering a case in which the supplier has developed the 
innovation. In that case, suppliers clearly play a role in the diffusion of an innovation. In our paper, we consider an 





have an interest in signaling and conveying maladaptive information to the focal firm (Greve & 
Seidel, 2015). As such, the focal firm may be better off learning from other types of firms in the 
industry, such as suppliers, that do business with the focal firm’s competitors but have no 
incentive to convey malicious information to the focal firm. Indeed, Wagner, Hoisl and Thoma 
(2014) showed that firms that share a law firm are more likely to cite each other’s patents, 
hinting at knowledge spillovers from indirect partners. This paper aims to separate the different 
roles of competitors and suppliers in the focal firm’s likelihood of adopting an innovation. 
Specifically, we investigate the following research question: “What roles do competitors and 
suppliers play in the focal firm’s tendency to adopt an innovation?” 
We address this question by observing the decision to adopt digital distribution by 
console videogame publishers in the global console videogame industry in 2006-2013.37 We find 
that competitors of the focal firm to which the firm is indirectly connected via a joint supplier 
(i.e., joint-supplier competitors) are more likely to adopt this innovation when those competitors 
have done so. Moreover, when the supplier is large and connected to adopters, the focal firm is 
more likely to adopt because the supplier has greater influence in persuading the focal firm to 
adopt. Finally, as the number of joint-supplier competitors that continue to adopt the innovation 
increases, the focal firm is more likely to adopt the innovation as well. 
These findings of our paper extend the innovation adoption literature in multiple ways.38 
First, we differentiate between the types of firms that may influence the focal firm to adopt an 
innovation. Specifically, we uncover the role of firms that cannot adopt the innovation in 
question, e.g., suppliers, but that share information on the innovation between firms. These 
                                                 
37 Although this is a process innovation, Greve (2009) showed that adoption decisions regarding process innovations 
are similar in essential ways to product innovation adoption decisions. 
38 The literature has labeled this the diffusion of innovation literature, yet we use the innovation adoption 
terminology because it more accurately describes the studied firm-level phenomenon: Innovation adoption is a firm-




intermediaries serve as cross-pollinators of the innovation. It is paramount to include these actors 
in a study of the adoption process, although they may not be adopters themselves.  
Second, we start to uncover which suppliers have greater influence in the focal firm’s 
decision to adopt the innovation. Earlier innovation adoption research has found that the 
adoption of certain types of firms, such as large and prestigious firms, make the focal firm more 
likely to adopt the innovation (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Haunschild & Miner, 1997). Although 
we find similar results, we argue that those social approval assets make the supplier more 
persuasive in its sharing of information on the innovation.  
Third, by building on the work of outcome-based imitation, we show that continued 
adoption of the same innovation by the same firm strongly influences the focal firm to also 
adopt. Hence, not only the decision to adopt but also the extent of adoption is important to 
explain adoption processes. More research on the type and extent of adoption is thus warranted. 
In summary, this paper builds novel theory for the innovation adoption literature by 
showing the importance of suppliers in sharing information on the innovation across a population 
of firms. 
 
Context: Global console video game industry, 2006-2013 
Before developing the hypotheses, we elaborate on our empirical setting to clarify the 
mechanisms we develop in the hypothesis development section. Our empirical setting is the 
console video game industry in 2006-2013. The traditional distribution channel for video game 
publishers has been the sales of video games through independent retail stores. With the 
introduction of seventh-generation video game consoles (PlayStation 3, Xbox360 and Wii), 




consumers.39 In this study, digital distribution is the innovation, where consumers can directly 
download their video games on their consoles. 
To effectively create and sell an Xbox360 or PlayStation 3 game, two different parties are 
needed: a game publisher and a game developer. The game developer actually designs and 
develops the game, whereas the publisher is responsible for the game's manufacturing, marketing 
and distribution decisions. Thus, each launch of a new game for a given console represents a 
network link between a game publisher and game developer. A network was constructed for each 
year in the period 2006-2013 for the worldwide video game industry for the Xbox360 and 
PlayStation 3. Hence, we constructed a bipartite network where the nodes constitute the game 
developers and game publishers and the ties are the games that these two firms jointly produce. 
The publisher is responsible for bundling the product of the developer with its own service; thus, 
we treat the developer as a supplier for the publisher (Adner & Kapoor, 2010).  
In this setting, video game publishers and developers share information on the 
distribution model in the co-development of their game. This can be information not only on the 
amount of games sales per distribution model but also on how the publisher addresses digital 
rights management and its relations with the retailer.40 Sales information is available to the 
developer, which is paid on a royalty basis. Moreover, the production and distribution of a game 
are very intensive, with a great deal of labor needed to create a game (most developers create one 
game per year). With such intense collaborative effort, the developer and publisher are highly 
likely to care about game distribution and development. Given these long lead times, other 
features of the innovation are also likely to be shared between the buyer and supplier. To boost 
                                                 
39 Publishers cannot offer mainstream games on the online platform for the Wii; hence, we include only games 
published for the Xbox360 and PlayStation 3. 
40 Although contracts are idiosyncratic, by considering a small sample of contracts that we were able to access, we 





product sales, a developer that works with a publisher that distributes its games digitally is likely 
to share this information with other publishers it works with. 
This is an appropriate setting for our research question for six reasons. First, video game 
publishers can publish each separate game digitally, physically, or both. Hence, we can observe 
the proportion of games that are published digitally, and if that number increases, then we would 
observe adoption of the innovation. As such, the lack of third distribution option facilitates a 
clean analysis of the process of adopting digital distribution.  
Second, the suppliers in this setting, which are the video game developers that produce 
the game, are paid a royalty fee for each game sold. Thus, the suppliers have an interest in 
maximizing the sales of the buyer, which is the publisher in this setting. Hence, we can more 
clearly observe how suppliers influence the innovation adoption process. 
Third, the firm’s decision to organize a transaction via a retail store versus a download 
transaction has far-reaching consequences for the firm. Download transactions do not necessitate 
the production, storage, and transportation of actual disks. Publishers do not necessarily need to 
invest in these disks but are now able to send the product to the customer and revise it 
subsequently. Publishers can also decide to use both distribution methods simultaneously for the 
same game. Thus, the adoption decision may seem straightforward; however, digital distribution 
also has a downside: it introduces tensions into the publisher-retailer relationship (Kumar & 
Ruan, 2006). The financial terms of physical and digital distribution are blurry, making it 
difficult for the publisher to make the adoption decision. This problem is important for 
publishers, which must understand the profitability of the innovation before engaging with it. 
Fourth, tie formation is instigated by the supplier in this setting, as the idea of a new 




in our study; i.e., the ties are not formed to gain more information regarding innovations.  
Fifth, we had access to the complete population of firms in the console video game 
industry. This access is crucial, as adoption events are interdependent; missing data on a portion 
of the population would raise estimation issues (Greve, Strang, & Tuma, 1995). 
Sixth, although competition is extreme, console video game publishers compete mainly 
on the (perceived) quality of their products. Digital distribution can support the competitive 
position by allowing the publisher to sell more games or to potentially increase their margin by 
eliminating the retailer; however, without (perceived) good games, the innovation itself is not 
expected to improve the competitive position of the publisher. Thus, we can rule out competition 
reasons for the adoption decision. 
 
Conceptual development 
The key assumption in the innovation adoption literature is that decision makers make the 
decision to adopt based on their own private information and public cues regarding whether 
others also adopt (Greve & Seidel, 2015). A considerable body of literature has found that as the 
focal firm is increasingly exposed to information on an innovation, it has an increasing 
likelihood of adopting the innovation (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Davis, 1991; Greve, 1996; 
Haunschild, 1993; Palmer et al., 1993; Westphal et al., 1997). The main argument is that as the 
number of adopting firms connected to the focal firm increases, the firm receives an increasing 
quantity of social information or influence, which subsequently increases its changes in adopting 
that same practice (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997; Haunschild, 1993; Kraatz, 1998). This 
frequency-based mechanism can explain innovation adoption (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). 




the number of other firms that adopts the innovation increases.41 First, increasing returns theory 
assumes that the profitability of the innovation is known, since the costs of an innovation can be 
inferred from its price and since returns are easily observable or obtainable from an external 
source (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993). Firms are more likely to adopt the innovation as more 
firms adopt it, since network externalities improve returns and/or adoption costs decrease (Katz 
& Shapiro, 1992). 
Second, learning theory assumes that an innovation’s profitability is ambiguous and that 
organizations must learn about the innovation to make a decision to adopt or not (Abrahamson & 
Rosenkopf, 1997). Observing that other firms are adopting an innovation conveys information to 
the focal firm that adopting the innovation has advantages; otherwise, the firms would have not 
adopted it (Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001).  
Third, the fad theory of bandwagons argues that gaining information on merely the 
number and identity of adopters drives other firms to adopt as well (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 
1997). Thus, this theory focuses on information regarding which firms have adopted the 
innovation instead of information on the innovation itself. The more firms adopt the innovation, 
the more it becomes the norm or even becomes legitimate to adopt the innovation (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). Thus, adopters exert isomorphic pressures, meaning that a firm that observes 
another firm performing a certain action is inclined to imitate it since the observed action is 
perceived to be rational (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). As complying with these isomorphic 
pressures generates legitimacy for the focal firm (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) 
and legitimacy in turn offers the firm improved access to the resources of other parties in the 
                                                 
41 In our setting, other theories, such as resource dependency and transaction cost economics, can explain why firms 
decide to adopt the new distribution model. These theories do not focus on information transfer. Since one of the key 
assumptions in the innovation adoption literature is that organizations adopt based on public cues of whether others 
adopt (through information exchange), we decided not to use these theoretical lenses to study our phenomenon. 




industry (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), firms are highly likely to conform to these pressures. 
The innovation adoption literature has further sought to uncover which types of firms are 
more likely to be relevant in influencing the focal firm to adopt an innovation. This is also 
known as the trait-based mechanism by which innovations diffuse (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). 
For instance, firms with which the focal firm has an alliance are more willing to share 
information and can be considered more trustworthy (Kraatz, 1998; Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 
2010). Moreover, firms that are more geographically proximate may be more influential because 
they are easier to observe and more relevant as competitors for the focal firm (Greve, 2009; 
Greve & Seidel, 2015; Lee & Pennings, 2002).  
The third mechanism by which organizations imitate others and, thus, innovations are 
diffused is outcome-based imitation (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). For outcome-based imitation, 
the consequences of adoption by others are the drivers for adoption by the focal firm (Haunschild 
& Miner, 1997). For instance, when the performance of other firms that adopt an innovation 
increases after that adoption, the focal firm also has an incentive to adopt. 
One important contribution to the innovation adoption literature was its synthesis with 
social network research. Specifically, Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1997) and Kraatz (1998) 
showed that a firm’s direct contacts (e.g., through a business relationship) are particularly 
influential since decision makers tend to base their decisions on social cues when facing 
ambiguous situations. Thus, as a baseline, we propose that the focal firm’s likelihood of adopting 







Although the literature has found strong support for the effect of the number of adopting firms on 
the focal firm’s likelihood of adopting the innovation, the general assumption has been that 
information flows from the adopting firm directly to the focal firm. Individuals from one firm 
discuss the innovation with another firm, and as such, the innovation is diffused throughout the 
population (Greve, 2011). As such, the indirect contacts of the firm matter insofar a firm’s 
partners carry the information and experience from their interactions with other partners to the 
focal firm (Ahuja, 2000a; Bastos & Greve, 2003; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). However, other 
types of firms, including those that cannot adopt the innovation, can also share information on 
the innovation.  
One particular ubiquitous type of firm is the supplier. A supplier may not be in a position 
to adopt all the practices that a buying firm may employ, specifically related to operational 
practices of the buying firm. As suppliers and buyers interact, they mutually adjust their design 
and operations functions, through which technical exchanges occur (Kotabe, Martin, & Domoto, 
2003; Takeishi, 2001). Both the buyer and supplier stand to benefit from these exchanges; hence, 
both have an incentive to share information. As a result of these exchanges, the supplier can 
become aware of any innovation the buying firm has adopted and, more importantly, can 
estimate its profitability and the way the innovation is implemented (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). 
For example, in their study on the motorcycle industry, Lipparini, Lorenzoni, and Ferriani (2014) 
found that buyers exchanged information and techniques on product concepts and assembly 
designs to suppliers. Similarly, Uzzi (1996) found that buyers and suppliers share information on 




company and plant, […] training about production methods and working practices (such as just-
in-time and lean production principles) to align and synchronize manufacturing and assembly 
processes" (Lipparini et al., 2014: 584). Furthermore, the sharing of some information with the 
supplier may be a technical requirement as part of the transaction. Thus, information on any 
adopted innovation can be shared in a buyer-supplier relationship. 
Suppliers rarely do business with only one buyer, since this situation invokes dependency 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As suppliers do business with multiple buyers, they can share the 
information on innovations garnered from one buyer with another buyer. Although the literature 
has focused mainly on information flows from the buyer to the supplier, Lipparini et al. (2014) 
provide a notable exception. Suppliers have an incentive to share information with their buyers, 
as sharing information can make it more difficult for the buyer to switch to other suppliers 
(Lipparini et al., 2014). Alternatively, suppliers that share information are likely to see their 
actions reciprocated (Coleman, 1988; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). An example of information 
sharing is that suppliers alert "partners about advances in state-of-the-art technologies and 
[propose] design alternatives to allow them to fulfill their customers' unique demands more 
completely" (Lipparini et al., 2014: 591). Information regarding these technologies may thus 
come from the buyer's competitors. Hence, suppliers are likely to share information on 
innovations adopted by other buyers.  
Thus, since buyers share information on their adopted innovations with suppliers, which 
can subsequently share this information with other buyers, we propose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The more the focal firm is exposed to an innovation by its joint-supplier 







Previous literature has argued that adopters can vary in their infectiousness as experienced by 
non-adopters. Grounded in institutional theory, this literature assumes that when facing 
uncertainty, managers look to admired firms for action (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Organizations with greater organizational celebrity, age, size, and prestige have been found to be 
more influential in the adoption process (Angst, Agarwal, Sambamurthy, & Kelley, 2010; Burns 
& Wholey, 1993; Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Haveman, 1993; Terlaak & King, 2007). The key 
mechanism is that such organizations are more infectious because others will adopt in order to 
achieve the same level of prestige or success or at least to gain their social approval (Burns & 
Wholey, 1993; Haunschild & Miner, 1997).  
Given that we have established that potential adopters receive information regarding the 
innovation via their suppliers, we pay specific attention to how the aforementioned 
characteristics may also matter for the suppliers. In this case, we do not use the term 
infectiousness, since the suppliers have not adopted the innovation themselves, but use the term 
persuasiveness. Persuasiveness can be considered the strength with which a social actor can 
create social impact (Nowak, Szamrej, & Latané, 1990). Although the same characteristics may 
be important, different processes exist for persuasiveness than for infectiousness.  
One established factor that plays a role is organizational size (Haunschild, 1993; 
Haunschild & Miner, 1997). On the one hand, larger suppliers have greater access to more 
resources to pay attention to and store the information of adopting buyers, which they can 




likely listened to, as their size bestows them with greater power in the buyer-supplier relationship 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Organizational size also makes organizational members more 
influential because more members are likely to be involved in the buyer-supplier interactions 
(Bellizzi, 1981; Kohli, 1989). As the number of members increases, they exert more social 
influence on the other party (Nowak et al., 1990; Wolf & Latané, 1983). 
Greater size is also often regarded as a form of success (Haveman, 1993). At the 
individual level, prior success fuels the individual’s credibility, which can make the individual 
more persuasive (Sternthal, Phillips, & Dholakia, 1978).42 Similarly, at the organization level, 
more successful organizations can be more persuasive insofar their information is credible. 
Combining these arguments, we propose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The larger the focal firm’s suppliers that are connected to buyers that 
have adopted an innovation, the more likely the focal firm is to adopt the innovation. 
 
Outcome-based mechanism 
Organizations are likely to adopt the practices of other organizations that they consider 
beneficial (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). This effect has been found in investment banker 
choices, where bankers were chosen because they were involved in deals with low 
acquisition premiums (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). In other studies, strikes in the French 
coal mine industry are more likely to occur after successful prior strikes (Conell & Cohn, 
1995), Japanese firms imitate successful prior entry modes (Lu, 2002), and American liberal 
arts colleges adopt the same successful practices as their network contacts (Kraatz, 1998). 
                                                 
42 In some cases, source credibility may be a liability instead. For a discussion of the conditions under which 




Thus, the level of exposure (frequency) and the type of firms that have adopted (trait) are not 
the only relevant factors; the outcomes of adopting the innovation are also important. 
An organization may find it difficult to assess the benefits of adoption of a particular 
innovation. However, a clear signal for benefits arises when an organization continues to 
adopt an innovation after initial adoption. When an organization adopts an innovation, it 
accumulates information that allows it to more accurately judge its value (Greve, 2009). 
Thus, continuing adoption by the same firm provides insight to other firms that the 
innovation is beneficial. In turn, other firms are also more likely to adopt the innovation as 
well. 
Similarly, suppliers can receive information on an innovation from their buyers. 
However, the supplier may find it difficult to accurately judge the benefits of an innovation 
since the operations between up- and downstream firms differ more than those of firms in 
the same position in the supply chain. However, continued adoption of an innovation is an 
unequivocal sign that the innovation is beneficial. Consequently, the supplier is likely to 
share the innovation information with its other buyers. The more that such joint-suppliers 
continue to adopt the innovation, the stronger the signal is to the focal firm, which is thus 
more likely to adopt the innovation as well.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the number of joint-supplier competitors that continue to adopt 






Figure 1 depicts the three hypotheses.  
 
Figure 1 




In this study, we used the full population of 100 video game publishers in the global console 
video game industry in 2006-2013 for the PlayStation 3 and Xbox360.43 In total, the sample 
comprises 312 firm-year observations. The panel is not balanced, since some publishers do not 
publish games every year and some publishers entered the industry in the sample period. These 
firms are essentially all the active video game publishers for the Xbox 360 and PlayStation 3 
worldwide. We drew our data from www.gamefaqs.com, a respected website in the video game 
industry with ties to the renowned website www.gamespot.com, which is the 65th most-visited 
site in the United States and the most popular site for video games (Zhu & Zhang, 2010). Similar 
studies on the video game industry have drawn from this same database (e.g. Venkatraman & 
                                                 
43 The Xbox360 was introduced in 2005, but we exclude the observations from 2005, since we have only a small 
number of observations in this period and measures (especially the network-related measures) can be thought of as 
outliers. The year 2005 includes only approximately one month’s worth of partial observations, since the Xbox360 




Lee, 2004). Information regarding ownership structures was gathered from 
www.mobygames.com, which has also been used in other research (De Vaan, Vedres, & Stark, 
2015).  
Dependent variable 
Innovation adoption (InnovAdopti,t). The dependent variable in this study is the occurrence of 
innovation adoption. The innovation is adopted when video game publisher i changes its 
distribution model toward digital distribution at time t. This variable is measured by dividing the 
number of distinctive games offered digitally by the total number of distinctive games offered44 
(this number includes games offered physically and digitally) per video game publisher per year. 
If this ratio changes positively from t-1 to t, we code this as 1, meaning that the firm has changed 
its distribution model to digital distribution in that year. Because hypothesis 3 concerns the effect 
of continued adoption by joint-supplier competitors, firms that change their distribution model 
are retained in the data. This approach is consistent with that used in other innovation adoption 
studies (Greve, 1998a, 2009).45 Since we study innovation adoption, a publisher that did not 
publish any games at t-1 is excluded for that year (since this publisher is treated as an entrant).  
Independent variables 
Number of indirect ties to joint-supplier competitors with a more digital distribution model. To 
test the first hypothesis, we considered the focal firm's tie portfolio at t-1. We then considered 
the tie portfolios of the developers in the focal firm’s tie portfolio. We counted the number of ties 
the developer had with its alters that had a more digital distribution model than the focal firm 
(the cut-off value is 10 percentage points) at t-1. We expect the coefficient to be positive. 
Size of suppliers that are connected to buyers with a more digital distribution model. We 
                                                 
44 These two numbers reflect the number of games published (thus, each title increases this number by one) and 
should not be confused with the number of games sold. 




considered the focal firm's tie portfolio at t-1, and we then considered the tie portfolios of the 
developers in the focal firm’s tie portfolio. We excluded the developers that did not have ties 
with publishers with a more digital distribution model than the focal firm (the cut-off value is 10 
percentage points) at t-1. For the remaining developers, we calculated the average size, which 
was measured by counting the total number of games developed per video game developer per 
year. 
Number of joint-supplier competitors that do not have a full physical distribution model that 
changed their distribution model to become more digital. To test the first hypothesis, we 
considered the focal firm's tie portfolio at t-1 and the tie portfolios of the developers in the focal 
firm’s tie portfolio. We counted the number of alters of the developer that did not have a full 
physical distribution model at t-1 and that changed their distribution model to become more 
digital at t-1. 
Control variables 
Our first set of control variables vary on three dimensions: (1) the type of firm (direct 
competitor, joint-supplier competitor, or conduit supplier), (2) the construct (number of ties 
(frequency), size of the supplier (trait), and number of joint-suppliers changing distribution 
models again (outcome)), and (3) firms that have a more digital or more physical distribution 
model than the focal firm. Table 1 shows how these dimensions jointly form the control variables 






Overview of measures 
    Number Size Age Subsequent changes 
Direct 
competitor 
Digital CV (baseline) CV CV CV 
Physical CV CV CV CV 
Joint-supplier 
competitor 
Digital IV (H1) CV CV IV (H3) 
Physical CV CV CV CV 
Conduit 
supplier 
Digital N/A IV (H2) 
Alternative 
IV (H2) N/A 
Physical N/A CV CV N/A 
IV and CV denote the independent variable and control variable, respectively 
 
Direct competitors were measured by considering the focal firm’s tie portfolio at t-1 and 
selecting the firms that are publishers in this portfolio. Joint-supplier competitors were measured 
by considering the focal firm's tie portfolio at t-1. We then considered the tie portfolios of the 
developers in the focal firm’s tie portfolio. Thereafter, we selected the developer’s ties with the 
publisher (excluding the focal firm). Conduit suppliers were measured by observing the focal 
firm’s tie portfolio at t-1 and selecting the suppliers in that portfolio that had connections with 
publishers with a different distribution model than the focal firm. 
The number of ties was measured as the count of video games jointly commercialized at 
year t. Size was measured by counting the total number of games developed/published per firm i 
per year t. The number of joint-supplier competitors changing their distribution model again was 
measured by counting the number of publishers that did not have a full physical distribution 
model and that changed their distribution model in year t. 
Finally, a more digital or more physical distribution model was measured by observing 
the distribution model of the focal firm and juxtaposing it with its competitor (direct or joint 
supplier) using a cut-off value of 10 percentage points. The full list of this set of control variables 
is visible in Table 1. 




firm’s susceptibility and propensity to adopt an innovation. 46 
Retail sales. Firms may be more likely to adopt the new distribution model if they rely less on 
their current distribution model. Therefore, we included a measure of retail sales per publisher. 
We calculated the sum of retail sales per publisher i per year t. Additionally, this control can be 
used to rule out resource dependency reasons for vertical integration (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), 
given that increased retail sales implies dependency. 
Reputation. We measured reputation by calculating the average critic score for the games 
developed by firm i at time t. To measure quality, we used the data from www.metacritic.com. 
Metacritic's score rating represents the opinions of the most respected critics writing online and 
in print in the form of a single number labeled a "metascore" by Metacritic. 
Degree centrality. We also controlled for the degree centrality of firm i at time t, which is 
defined as the number of ties that firm i has at time t. 
Betweenness centrality. The fourth control variable, the degree of diversity of information 
access, was measured by calculating the betweenness centrality for video game publisher i at 
time t. Betweenness centrality measures the centrality of the focal actor in a network and 
captures the extent to which a firm is located on the shortest path (i.e., geodesic) between any 
two actors in its network. Formally, firm i's betweenness centrality in year t is calculated as: 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑛𝑖)/𝑔𝑗𝑘
𝑗<𝑘
 
where 𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑛𝑖) refers to the number (𝑛) of geodesics (i.e., shortest paths) linking firms j and k 
that contain focal firm i. The term 𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑛𝑖)/𝑔𝑗𝑘 captures the probability that firm i is involved in 
the shortest path between j and k. Betweenness centrality is the sum of these estimated 
                                                 
46 We also considered game characteristics, particularly genre, as this could lead some developers to work with a set 
of publishers that are more likely to facilitate digital distribution. We juxtaposed the number of titles distributed 




probabilities over all pairs of firms (excluding the i-th firm) in the network. Betweenness 
centrality is normalized (i.e., divided by the maximum possible betweenness score at time t). 
Size. Smaller firms find it easier to adopt a new distribution model than larger firms do (Hannan 
& Freeman, 1977, 1984), especially with respect to how we measured the dependent variable 
here. To control for this effect, we counted the total number of games published per video game 
publisher per year. Additionally, this control allows us to rule out transaction cost reasons for 
vertical integration of the publisher into distribution, to the extent that increased frequency would 
push publishers to vertically integrate (Williamson, 1981). The total number of games published 
per video game publisher can be regarded as a proxy for the frequency with which transactions 
occur.  
Percentage of games distributed digitally. We controlled for the percentage of games distributed 
digitally at t-1, as the likelihood of adopting the innovation is different when the firm has a full 
physical model than when the firm has already started adopting the innovation to some extent. 
After penetration. We include an after-penetration dummy to account for factors that affect all 
sample firms in the same way. Because the new distribution model penetrated the industry in 
2010, this dummy variable takes the value 0 for all years after 2009. Industry-level effects such 
as improvements in broadband technology might make digital distribution more attractive and 
hence induce adoption of a distribution model. Additionally, the observation of a prestigious or 
large publisher adopting a digital distribution model might spur other firms in the sample to 
adopt a digital distribution model (Haveman, 1993). This possibility is also accounted for by the 
after-penetration dummy; as such, an observation would have the same influence on all firms in 
terms of whether to change their distribution model. 




firm i that have adopted the innovation at t-1. 
Figure 2 shows the industry network in 2009, which is the most interesting network 
before the complexity in interpreting the network becomes too great. The triangle-shaped and 
circle-shaped nodes are game publishers and game developers, respectively. The node color 
indicates the cumulative number of distribution model changes up to and including 2009. The 
darker the node, the more changes have been made in the period 2006-2009. The darkest nodes 
have changed their distribution model each year. 
 
Analysis 
We employed an event historical approach with repeated events to study the innovation adoption 
decision.47 In this case, the event is the choice of a firm to adopt a more digital distribution 
model. In traditional event history analyses, the observation (here, the organization) is removed 
from the dataset when the event occurs. However, an organization can adopt the digital 
distribution model further in other periods; i.e., it is not confined to adopt it only once.   
We used a discrete time model: a logistic regression with fixed effects. In discrete time 
analysis, logit models of dichotomous outcomes within pooled time series data are estimated, 
with multiple organizations observed at multiple intervals. These models allow us to estimate the 
hazard of the occurrence of an event such as distribution model adoption in any of t discrete time 
periods. Covariates are allowed, but not required, to vary between time periods.  
                                                 
47 We chose not to use the heterogeneous diffusion model (Greve et al., 1995), as this model cannot incorporate 
actors that cannot adopt the innovation, i.e., the suppliers. In particular, the characteristics of such actors cannot be 




We also included fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity among 
organizations. Organization-level fixed effects help control for previously found effects, such as 
cumulative technological experience (Pennings & Harianto, 1992a, b), routines for responding to 
environmental stimuli (Amburgey & Miner, 1992; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991), and organizational 
age (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Miller & Chen, 1994). Past research has shown that endogeneity 
in a firm's network position is an important issue in network research and that analyses of the 
consequences of network positions should include fixed effects (Lee, 2010b). Left censoring is 
not present in our data, since we consider all games published for the Xbox360 and PlayStation 3 
since their introduction (with the exception of games published in 2005, but this number is very 
small). Right censoring, caused by truncating the observation period at 2013, is routinely and 










As an introduction to the results, Table 2 shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum for each variable. Table 3 provides some additional descriptive statistics on the ties in 




publishers in-house.48 Of the ties, 97.50% of the ties are unique games; only in 2.50% of cases 
were two developers involved in the game, and therefore, a tie was drawn between the 
developers and between each developer and publisher. Finally, when we excluded games 
developed in-house, 32.16% of the games were developed by a publisher that contracted out 
publishing activities to another publisher (mostly to typical North-American or Japanese 
publishers).  
Table 4 provides the matrix of correlations among all variables. Several observations can 
be made. First, multicollinearity is likely to be an issue. Multicollinearity increases the standard 
deviations of the variables but does not violate the model's assumptions. As such, we decided to 
include the variables in the model and evaluate its conservative results. We ran models by 
entering one variable at a time and inspected the estimated parameters (e.g., sign change) to 
judge whether multicollinearity was affecting our results. We did not run a model with all 
variables, as this would exacerbate the multicollinearity issue.  
  
                                                 
48 Note that these games are not excluded for the construction of the dependent variable. Excluding these loops from 
the network impacts only the degree centrality variable. We ran additional tests without the degree centrality 






Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
    Variable Observations Mean S.D. Min Max 
Innovation adoption 490 0.38 0.49 0 1 
No. of indirect ties to adopting joint-
supplier competitors 346 0.68 1.77 0 15 
Size of suppliers with ties to adopting 
joint-supplier competitors 346 1.2 2.51 0 13 
Number of joint-supplier competitors 
that subsequently change to digital 346 0.63 1.54 0 10 
No. of ties to adopting direct competitors 346 0.16 0.9 0 12 
Size of adopting direct competitors 346 0.79 3.85 0 29.3 
No. of ties to non-adopting direct 
competitors 346 0.31 1.37 0 12 
Size of non-adopting direct competitors 346 0.84 4.01 0 40.4 
Size of adopting joint-supplier 
competitors  346 5.33 12.1 0 76 
No. of indirect ties to non-adopting joint-
supplier competitors 346 0.82 2.2 0 14 
Size of non-adopting joint-supplier 
competitors 346 3.09 8.68 0 55 
Number of joint-supplier competitors 
that have switched back to physical 346 0.49 1.31 0 9 
Size of suppliers with ties to non-
adopting joint-supplier competitors 346 0.89 2.07 0 13 
Retail sales 490 3.72 8.86 0 56.4 
Reputation  490 3.74 2.76 0 9.5 
Degree centrality 490 4.34 3.68 0 23 
Betweenness centrality  490 420.23 811.91 0 6316.48 
Size 490 7.88 11.62 1 76 
Percentage of titles distributed digitally  346 0.17 0.26 0 1 
After penetration 490 0.61 0.49 0 1 





Table 3. Additional descriptives 
Percentage of games developed in-house by the publisher 2126 / 4007 = 53.06% 
Percentage of games developed by two game studios 100 / 4007 = 2.50% 
Percentage of games where a publisher develops a game for a different publisher (excluding 
games produced in-house) 








Table 4. Correlation matrix 
         
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 






   
   
  
 
    
2 
No. of indirect ties to adopting joint-




   
   
  
 
    
3 
Size of suppliers with ties to adopting 




   
   
  
 
    
4 
Number of joint-supplier competitors 
that subsequently change to digital 0.21 0.53 0.39 1   
  
   
   
  
 
    
5 
No. of ties to adopting direct 
competitors 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.26 1  
  
   
   
  
 
    
6 Size of adopting direct competitors 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.73 1                
7 
No. of ties to non-adopting direct 
competitors 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.14 0.23 1               
8 
Size of non-adopting direct 
competitors 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.28 0.14 0.20 0.75 1    
   
  
 
    
9 
Size of adopting joint-supplier 
competitors  0.26 0.60 0.67 0.39 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.04 1   
   
  
 
    
10 
No. of indirect ties to non-adopting 
joint-supplier competitors -0.02 0.05 0.15 0.40 0.10 0.04 0.28 0.35 0.10 1  
   
  
 
    
11 
Size of non-adopting joint-supplier 
competitors 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.34 0.00 -0.01 0.22 0.27 0.00 0.50 1 
   
  
 
    
12 
Number of joint-supplier competitors 




    
13 
Size of suppliers with ties to non-




    
14 Retail sales -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.10 0.29 0.24 0.02 0.21 0.08 0.13 0.18 1   
 
    
15 Reputation  0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.32 1       
16 Degree centrality 0.12 0.23 0.18 0.29 0.07 0.05 0.27 0.19 0.18 0.34 0.20 0.31 0.36 0.51 0.18 1      
17 Betweenness centrality  0.17 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.11 0.09 0.36 0.25 0.20 0.42 0.25 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.16 0.79 1     
18 Size 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.25 0.08 0.10 0.37 0.24 0.12 0.40 0.24 0.28 0.36 0.70 0.22 0.77 0.66 1    
19 
Percentage of titles distributed 
digitally  -0.12 -0.02 0.01 0.28 0.02 -0.03 0.16 0.18 -0.01 0.39 0.46 0.21 0.43 0.00 -0.04 0.08 0.13 0.10 1   
20 After penetration 0.35 0.25 0.29 0.28 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.28 -0.14 -0.18 -0.04 0.17 -0.00 0.43 1  
21 
Number of other firms that have 




Table 5 represents the results of the conditional logit regression analysis using fixed 
effects. Model 1 includes all control variables, whereas Models 2 to 4 each include a variable 
that is used to test each hypothesis.  
For the hypothesis tests, we used a threshold for the p-values of 0.10 and focused on the 
effect magnitudes for the following three reasons. First, because we have data on the complete 
population of organizations, p-values are irrelevant (Schwab et al., 2011).49 Second, the 
magnitudes are relatively large such that for many cases, the independent variables have a large 
impact. Third, n is relatively small (n = 278); thus, p-values are likely to be higher. We have no 
means of increasing n, as we have the full population of organizations 
In model 2, we include the count of ties to joint-supplier competitors that have adopted 
the innovation and additionally control for the count of ties to joint-supplier competitors that 
have not adopted the innovation. Consistent with hypothesis 1, we find a significant and positive 
effect of the number of adopting joint-supplier competitors (p = 0.012). The odds ratio is 1.338.50 
Thus, for a focal firm with one additional tie to a joint-supplier competitor that has adopted the 
innovation, the odds that the focal firm adopts the innovation increase by 1.338.  
  
                                                 
49 One could argue that it is still relevant to use a stricter p-value threshold, as one could see our data as a “sample” 
for different populations and different “periods” for the same population. However, this view assumes that 
conditions remain the same across different populations or across different periods. Using statistical theory for this 
purpose is inappropriate (Schwab et al., 2011). We address such issues of external validity in the discussion section. 
50 Although we acknowledge the drawbacks of using the odds ratio to interpret the results (Hoetker, 2007; Zelner, 
2009), this is the best alternative available. Since we use a conditional fixed-effects logit model, it does not make 
sense to calculate the effects on different values of the variables, since these methods set the fixed effects equal to 0. 





Conditional fixed-effects logit results 
Table 5. Conditional fixed-effects logit results 
Model 1 2 3 4 
 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
No. of indirect ties to adopting joint-
supplier competitors (H1 +) 
  1.338 0.012     
  (0.156)      
Size of suppliers with ties to adopting 
joint-supplier competitors (H2 +) 
    1.390 0.008 1.475 0.005 
    (0.174)  (0.206)  
Number of joint-supplier competitors that 
subsequently change to digital (H3 +) 
      1.395 0.019 
      (0.198)  
No. of ties to adopting direct competitors 
1.380 0.279 1.617 0.171     
(0.411)  (0.568)      
Size of adopting direct competitors 
    1.119 0.060 1.128 0.042 
    (0.067)  (0.067)  
No. of ties to non-adopting direct 
competitors 
0.982 0.865 1.013 0.907     
(0.107)  (0.115)      
Size of non-adopting direct competitors 
    0.989 0.783 0.976 0.583 
    (0.038)  (0.044)  
Size of adopting joint-supplier competitors  
    1.027 0.219 1.018 0.445 
    (0.023)  (0.024)  
No. of indirect ties to non-adopting joint-
supplier competitors 
  0.836 0.039     
  (0.072)      
Size of non-adopting joint-supplier 
competitors 
    1.090 0.001 1.083 0.003 
    (0.029)  (0.029)  
Number of joint-supplier competitors that 
have switched back to physical 
      0.834 0.224 
      (0.124)  
Size of suppliers with ties to non-adopting 
joint-supplier competitors 
    0.646 0.001 0.676 0.007 
    (0.089)  (0.098)  
Retail sales 
0.951 0.087 0.943 0.069 0.947 0.124 0.960 0.246 
(0.028)  (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.034)  
Reputation  
1.203 0.103 1.264 0.045 1.376 0.015 1.384 0.024 
(0.136)  (0.147)  (0.180)  (0.199)  
Degree centrality 
1.171 0.113 1.199 0.097 1.373 0.007 1.345 0.014 
(0.116)  (0.131)  (0.161)  (0.163)  
Betweenness centrality  
1.000 0.375 1.000 0.588 1.000 0.186 1.000 0.248 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Size 
1.051 0.189 1.071 0.108 1.053 0.230 1.055 0.220 
(0.040)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  
Percentage of titles distributed digitally  
0.012 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.006 0.000 
(0.011)  (0.023)  (0.014)  (0.008)  
After penetration 
10.723 0.000 7.900 0.000 6.557 0.001 6.355 0.002 
(5.493)  (4.345)  (3.812)  (3.820)  
Number of other firms that have adopted 
0.974 0.679 0.969 0.622 0.994 0.923 0.980 0.761 
(0.062)  (0.063)  (0.066)  (0.066)  
Log likelihood -85.732 -79.731 -69.332 -65.479 






By comparison, the effect of direct competitors is stronger (odds ratio is 1.617) yet 
statistically less significant (p = 0.171). Thus, on average, an additional direct competitor that has 
adopted the innovation will increase the focal firm’s odds of adoption by 1.617. Non-adopting 
direct competitors have a negligible effect on the focal firm’s decision to adopt. However, non-
adopting joint-supplier competitors do have a significant negative effect, with an odds ratio of 
0.836 (p = 0.039). 
Hypothesis 2 is tested in model 3, where, in addition to the control variables in model 1, 
we control for the average size of suppliers with ties to non-adopting joint-supplier competitors. 
We find a significant positive effect of the average size of suppliers with ties to adopting joint-
supplier competitors that have adopted the innovation (p = 0.008). The odds ratio is 1.390; 
therefore, as the average size of suppliers with ties to adopting joint-supplier competitors 
increases by 1, the odds that the focal firm adopts the innovation increase by 1.390. Thus, we 
find support for hypothesis 2. 
The size of direct competitors also matters (odds ratio is 1.119, p = 0.060). In comparison 
with the effect of supplier size, however, this effect is weaker in magnitude. The size of non-
adopting direct competitors and the size of joint-supplier competitors (both adopting and non-
adopting) have little influence. Nevertheless, the size of suppliers that serve as conduits for non-
adopting joint-supplier competitors matters greatly (odds ratio = 0.646, p = 0.001). 
Finally, in model 4, we test hypothesis 3. We find a significant positive effect of the 
number of joint-supplier competitors that continue to adopt the innovation after initial adoption 
(p = 0.019). The odds ratio is 1.395; hence, when one additional joint-supplier competitor 
continues to adopt the innovation, the odds that the focal firm adopts the innovation increases by 





In our previous models, to test hypothesis 2, we chose to measure the average supplier size to 
show that the trait-based mechanism is also present when including the supplier in the adoption 
process. As a robustness check for this mechanism, we also chose to analyze the effect of the 
average age of the supplier. Age is a reflection of experience and expertise, especially in rapidly 
changing industries. At the individual level, those with high expertise have a greater social 
influence than those with low expertise (Sternthal et al., 1978; Wolf & Latané, 1983). At the 
organization level, organizations with more experience are likely to be more persuasive such that 
buyers are more likely to adopt the insights received from older suppliers.  
In model 5 of Table 6, we test this effect of average supplier age. Consistent with the 
effects of supplier size, we find a significant and positive effect of the average age of suppliers 
with ties to adopting joint-supplier competitors (p = 0.040). The odds ratio is 1.133. Thus, as the 
average age of suppliers with ties to adopting joint-supplier competitors increases by 1, the odds 
that the focal firm adopts the innovation increase by 1.133. 
Although average size and age may have an effect, we ran an additional test in which we 
studied the effect of the focal firm’s largest and oldest supplier (measured by maximum size and 
age instead of the average) since one large or old supplier may have a different effect than the 
average effect of the focal firm’s suppliers. In models 6 and 7, we test for this possibility. As 
indicated in the results, the magnitudes remain significant and scarcely differ in magnitude.  
We also examined the sum of the size and age of the focal firm’s suppliers. The results 
remain significant, while the magnitude decreases. As such, we believe that our results are robust 





Robustness checks for conditional fixed-effects logit results 
Table 6. Conditional fixed-effects logit results 
Model 5 6 7 8 9 
 IV = Age IV = Size IV = Age IV = Size IV = Age 
 Avg value Max value Max value Sum Sum 
 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
No. of indirect ties to adopting joint-supplier 
competitors (H1 +) 
          
          
Size of suppliers with ties to adopting joint-
supplier competitors (H2 +) 
  1.390 0.008   1.190 0.001   
  (0.173)    (0.060)    
Age of suppliers with ties to adopting joint-
supplier competitors (H2 +) 
1.133 0.040   1.161 0.013   1.081 0.001 
(0.069)    (0.069)    (0.025)  
Number of joint-supplier competitors that 
subsequently change to digital (H3 +) 
          
          
No. of ties to adopting direct competitors 
          
          
Size (M6)/Age (M5 + 7) of adopting direct 
competitors 
1.143 0.029 1.096 0.136 1.120 0.036 1.026 0.533 1.041 0.157 
(0.070)  (0.067)  (0.061)  (0.042)  (0.003)  
No. of ties to non-adopting direct competitors 
          
          
Size (M6)/Age (M5 + 7) of non-adopting 
direct competitors 
0.951 0.356 0.992 0.764 0.961 0.385 0.998 0.749 0.993 0.394 
(0.052)  (0.025)  (0.044)  (0.007)  (0.008)  
Size (M6)/Age (M5 + 7) of adopting joint-
supplier competitors  
1.072 0.029 1.012 0.515 1.040 0.173 0.988 0.017 0.996 0.527 
(0.034)  (0.018)  (0.030)  (0.005)  (0.007)  
No. of indirect ties to non-adopting joint-
supplier competitors 
          
          
Size (M6)/Age (M5 + 7) of non-adopting 
joint-supplier competitors 
1.009 0.795 1.050 0.022 0.986 0.678 0.987 0.137 0.982 0.011 
(0.037)  (0.022)  (0.034)  (0.009)  (0.007)  
Size (M6)/Age (M5 + 7) of suppliers with 
ties to non-adopting joint-supplier competitors 
1.069 0.307 0.694 0.003 1.030 0.577 1.015 0.652 1.027 0.100 
(0.070)  (0.086)  (0.055)  (0.033)  (0.016)  
Retail sales 
0.969 0.355 0.946 0.115 0.962 0.263 0.932 0.050 0.947 0.125 
(0.033)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  
Reputation  
1.360 0.018 1.345 0.016 1.333 0.023 1.320 0.028 1.331 0.027 
(0.177)  (0.165)  (0.169)  (0.167)  (0.172)  
Degree centrality 
1.367 0.007 1.294 0.028 1.330 0.013 1.180 0.138 1.246 0.052 
(0.159)  (0.151)  (0.153)  (0.132)  (0.141)  
Betweenness centrality  
0.999 0.117 1.000 0.680 1.000 0.222 1.000 0.941 1.000 0.637 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Size 
1.039 0.363 1.052 0.260 1.045 0.311 1.075 0.108 1.084 0.080 
(0.044)  (0.048)  (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.050)  
Percentage of titles distributed digitally  
0.003 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.011 0.000 
(0.004)  (0.025)  (0.011)  (0.022)  (0.012)  
After penetration 
6.971 0.001 5.485 0.003 6.372 0.001 7.838 0.000 7.795 0.000 
(4.107)  (3.089)  (3.709)  (4.419)  (4.532)  
Number of other firms that have adopted 
0.935 0.364 0.993 0.917 0.928 0.328 0.982 0.776 0.935 0.357 
(0.069)  (0.065)  (0.071)  (0.064)  (0.068)  
Log likelihood -67.127 -71.491 -67.300 -74.264 -68.952 




We also ran models with a different dependent variable. In these models, we examined 
the first instance in which the focal firm changed its distribution model. With such 
operationalization, we did not have repeated events. Therefore, we decided to run a Cox event 
history model. The outcomes of these models are listed in Table 7 (models 10-13).  
The results change significantly with this alternative dependent variable, where most 
effects become non-significant. The magnitudes retain their original sign, with the exception of 
the number of joint-supplier competitors that continue to adopt the innovation after initial 
adoption. This result may be an artifact of the data, as firms that have not begun to adopt the 
innovation even after other firms continue to adopt the innovation (in this short time period) have 
particular characteristics that may make adoption less beneficial for them. The overall decrease 
in statistical significance may be partly due to the 30% decrease (to 193 observations) in the 
already small sample size. 
In Table 8, we again ran different specifications for our second hypothesis, where we 
examined age instead of size in model 14. The effect is positive and significant for age. Again, 
we also ran different specifications for the size and age of suppliers, examining the maximum in 
models 15 and 16 and the sum in models 17 and 18. The results are consistent with the effects 
found in the conditional logit models, further supporting hypothesis 2. 
Given that the platform providers Microsoft and Sony may be driven by different factors 
to adopt, in an unreported robustness check, we also examined whether the results changed 
significantly when they were removed from the population and found no significant change. 
Although the hypothesized effects are not fully supported across all our models, the 
overwhelming support across most models provides evidence that hypotheses 1 and 3 are 





Cox event history model results 
Table 7. Cox event history model results with first adoption as the dependent variable 
Model 10 11 12 13 
 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
No. of indirect ties to adopting joint-
supplier competitors (H1 +) 
  0.038 0.301     
  (0.036)      
Size of suppliers with ties to adopting 
joint-supplier competitors (H2 +) 
    0.057 0.115 0.075 0.035 
    (0.036)  (0.035)  
Number of joint-supplier competitors that 
subsequently change to digital (H3 +) 
      -0.170 0.189 
      (0.129)  
No. of ties to adopting direct competitors 
0.131 0.107 0.134 0.110     
(0.081)  (0.084)      
Size of adopting direct competitors 
    0.031 0.006 0.031 0.004 
    (0.011)  (0.011)  
No. of ties to non-adopting direct 
competitors 
        
        
Size of non-adopting direct competitors 
        
        
Size of adopting joint-supplier competitors  
    -0.006 0.442 -0.003 0.750 
    (0.008)  (0.008)  
No. of indirect ties to non-adopting joint-
supplier competitors 
        
        
Size of non-adopting joint-supplier 
competitors 
        
        
Size of suppliers with ties to non-adopting 
joint-supplier competitors 
        
        
Retail sales 
-0.040 0.005 -0.039 0.006 -0.047 0.006 -0.049 0.005 
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.018)  
Reputation  
0.141 0.001 0.143 0.002 0.148 0.001 0.150 0.001 
(0.044)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.046)  
Degree centrality 
0.179 0.003 0.168 0.008 0.153 0.014 0.172 0.014 
(0.060)  (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.070)  
Betweenness centrality  
-0.000 0.016 -0.000 0.024 -0.000 0.016 -0.000 0.017 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Size 
0.098 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.104 0.000 
(0.018)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.022)  
Percentage of titles distributed digitally  
        
        
After penetration 
        
        
Number of other firms that have adopted 
-0.007 0.128 -0.007 0.122 -0.007 0.150 -0.007 0.135 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
Log likelihood -224.435 -224.307 -223.810 -223.429 






Robustness checks for Cox event history model results 
Table 8. Cox event history model results with first adoption as the dependent variable 
Model 14 15 16 17 18 
 IV = Age IV = Size IV = Age IV = Size IV = Age 
 Avg value Max value Max value Sum Sum 
 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
No. of indirect ties to adopting joint-supplier 
competitors (H1 +) 
          
          
Size of suppliers with ties to adopting joint-
supplier competitors (H2 +) 
  0.076 0.026   0.011 0.020   
  (0.034)    (0.005)    
Age of suppliers with ties to adopting joint-
supplier competitors (H2 +) 
0.047 0.015   0.050 0.004   0.008 0.011 
(0.019)    (0.017)    (0.003)  
Number of joint-supplier competitors that 
subsequently change to digital (H3 +) 
          
          
No. of ties to adopting direct competitors 
          
          
Size (M13)/Age (M12 + 14) of adopting 
direct competitors 
0.010 0.476 0.024 0.000 0.012 0.389 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.199 
(0.014)  (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.001)  (0.005)  
No. of ties to non-adopting direct competitors 
          
          
Size (M13)/Age (M12 + 14) of non-adopting 
direct competitors 
          
          
Size (M13)/Age (M12 + 14) of adopting 
joint-supplier competitors  
-0.013 0.268 -0.007 0.318 -0.012 0.221 -0.002 0.451 -0.000 0.870 
(0.012)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
No. of indirect ties to non-adopting joint-
supplier competitors 
          
          
Size (M13)/Age (M12 + 14) of non-adopting 
joint-supplier competitors 
          
          
Size (M13)/Age (M12 + 14) of suppliers with 
ties to non-adopting joint-supplier competitors 
          
          
Retail sales 
-0.040 0.005 -0.049 0.009 -0.040 0.005 -0.040 0.009 -0.037 0.014 
(0.014)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Reputation  
0.145 0.001 0.145 0.001 0.143 0.001 0.140 0.002 0.144 0.001 
(0.044)  (0.046)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.045)  
Degree centrality 
0.185 0.003 0.157 0.009 0.188 0.003 0.180 0.007 0.185 0.006 
(0.062)  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.066)  (0.067)  
Betweenness centrality  
-0.000 0.009 -0.000 0.010 -0.000 0.005 -0.000 0.022 -0.000 0.009 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Size 
0.100 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.094 0.000 
(0.018)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.019)  
Percentage of titles distributed digitally  
          
          
After penetration 
          
          
Number of other firms that have adopted 
-0.007 0.144 -0.007 0.125 -0.007 0.128 -0.007 0.139 -0.007 0.129 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
Log likelihood -223.813 -223.232 -223.537 -223.736 -224.017 





Our findings provide novel insights into innovation adoption. We show that (large) suppliers 
play an important role in the adoption process, and this finding has several important research 
implications. 
We make several contributions to the innovation adoption literature. First, we show 
how different types of firms in the ecosystem may affect how innovations diffuse. Although 
previous research focuses specifically on firms that can adopt the innovation themselves (e.g., 
Compagni et al., 2015; Greve, 2011; Greve & Seidel, 2015), we pay specific attention to a type 
of firm that cannot adopt the innovation itself. Although attention has been devoted to other 
parties that cannot adopt the studied innovation, such as the mass media (Abrahamson & 
Fairchild, 1999; Burns & Wholey, 1993), we study a party that is within the focal firm’s 
ecosystem. We show that suppliers share information regarding the innovation with their 
buyers and can, as such, be regarded as cross-pollinators of the ecosystem. If one does not 
include this party in the network, a spurious direct spillover effect may be observed between 
competitors. Therefore, we suggest that future research include all parties in the ecosystem 
when modeling the adoption of such an innovation in a particular industry. 
Second, exploring the role of suppliers may elucidate the reasons that geographically 
proximate firms have a greater influence on the adoption decisions of the focal firm than more 
distant firms do. The main argument in this literature has been that information on the 
innovation is spread through interpersonal networks and that such networks are best developed 
among proximate firms (Greve, 2011). However, since suppliers are typically geographically 
close to their buyers (Martin et al., 1998), our findings elaborate on the previously identified 
effects of geographical proximity. 
Third, we start to reveal the characteristics of suppliers that are relevant in influencing 




focal firm’s decision to adopt more strongly than smaller firms (Burns & Wholey, 1993; 
Haunschild & Miner, 1997). We find that such characteristics also play a role in the 
persuasiveness of suppliers in sharing information on an innovation. 
Fourth, continued adoption has been found to influence other organizations to adopt as 
well. Whereas initial adoption may hint to other organizations about the benefits of the 
innovation and may create an institutional pressure to adopt, continued adoption can provide a 
signal to other organizations on the benefits of adoption. Hence, although initial adoption may 
be important, the innovation adoption literature can benefit from also studying the extent of 
adoption. 
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
Notwithstanding its contributions, this study has limitations that suggest areas for future 
research. We have focused on a fundamental feature of the firm: its distribution model. 
Competitors may be especially reluctant to provide information regarding their distribution 
models, which constitute a core feature of their activities. Studying the influence of direct and 
joint-supplier competitors in other types of innovations may extend the generalizability of the 
mechanisms we found. Furthermore, qualitative work in this area may uncover more granular 
accounts of these different mechanisms. 
In this study, we did not measure the performance outcomes of employing different 
distribution models. The performance outcomes of learning from direct competitors may differ 
from those of learning from joint-supplier competitors. Since we do not have digital sales data, 
we are unable to answer this research question in this setting. Although difficult to acquire, 
information acquired from direct competitors may entail more specifics regarding the 
implementation of the new distribution model, whereas suppliers may fall short in providing 
such information. Although we observe that firms learn from their suppliers and we cannot 
conclude that they learn from their direct competitors, those few firms that are able to learn 




implementation of the distribution model. Thus, studying the performance consequences of 
learning from different sources may prove fruitful. 
We investigated the console video game industry, which is competitive and rapidly 
changing (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). Whether the same results hold for other industries 
remains an area for future research. First, the results are likely to apply to other cultural 
industries, and the nature of relationships between buyers and suppliers is similar. Second, we 
believe that the results hold for other competitive, rapidly changing industries, but research on 
whether the proposed mechanisms apply the same in stable and less competitive industries is 
also warranted.  
Finally, in this industry, a significant number of buyers (video game publishers) are also 
suppliers (developing games in-house). This may also have implications for the generalizability 
of the study, as buyers would be more aware of the behavior of suppliers. Such awareness may 
help buyers to better defend against knowledge spillovers. On the other side, suppliers may 
have an additional incentive to share information with other buyers, since the buyers are 
competitors by virtue of their own game development activities. Hence, replicating this study’s 
findings in other settings is warranted. 
 
Conclusion 
In closing, we view this study as an important initial step in determining how an innovation 
diffuses in an established industry. We find that competitors learn about the costs and benefits 
of an innovation through their mutual suppliers. That is, suppliers serve an important role in 
this adoption process as cross-pollinators between the different competitors in an industry. 
Large suppliers are especially influential. We hope that these insights stimulate further work in 
the literature on innovation adoption. 
 
Note: The citations here are to ensure that the corresponding references are included in the reference list: (Greve, 2009; Hoetker, 2007; Zelner, 2009). 
 














































































































































































































Main findings and conclusions 
 
Organizational change is difficult. It requires strong motivation such as performance shortfalls 
(Cyert & March, 1992). In this dissertation, I have taken a behavioral perspective on 
organizational change, specifically studying the role of the decision-maker. In general, this 
dissertation contributes to the organizational theory and strategy literatures by showing when, 
why, and which organizational changes are adopted. The individual papers make the following 
contributions. 
The first essay (chapter two) – Business model change: Managerial roles and tactics in 
decision-making – uncovered two tactics, leveraging external agreements and continuously 
informing top managers, that allow middle managers to convince top managers to accept a 
business model change initiative. These findings extend – and to some extent modify – the 
literature on managerial roles in change initiatives. Specifically, Burgelman (1983b) found that 
middle managers who had identified opportunities for new activities generally needed to 
develop awareness about the promise of these new activities without revealing their plans 
prematurely. This view might have become somewhat outdated, given the growing intensity of 
corporate information and control systems and the tightening of organizational slack under 
global competition (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Martin, 2014). In my case, middle managers 
were more open to top management from the onset, and used more visible decision-directing 
tactics. As such, my findings represent an alternative configuration to the covert resource and 
communication pathway that Burgelman (1983b) described. 




begun examining the process of business model change and its various stages, we know 
relatively little about how such processes progress from stage to stage, which my study 
elucidates. Conceptually, I argue that middle managers are well positioned to recognize and 
seize opportunities for business model change or innovation, but also that they can then drive 
the process of deciding in favor of the change. Empirically, I elucidate that middle managers 
attempt to direct top management’s business model change decisions by leveraging external 
agreements and by continuously informing them about the progress of research on initiatives. I 
thus advance a view of business model change and innovation as a longitudinal decision-
making process, within which specific mechanisms and roles can be studied in depth. Rather 
than the recent emphasis on top management and individual leadership (see also Sosna, 
Trevinyo-Rodriguez, & Velamuri, 2010; Svejenova, Planellas, & Vives, 2010), I develop a 
perspective that sees business model change as a middle-up sense-making process that proceeds 
via the continuous provision of information. Finally, the novelty of my findings relative to the 
extant organizational change literature (described above) suggests that the tactics and other 
processes involved in business model change may differ in structural ways from those involved 
in other types of organizational change. That is, business model changes are more fundamental 
in terms of economic impact, more complex, and involve more critical economic partners, 
given that business models pertain to the very logic of how organizations create, deliver, and 
capture value with its buyers, suppliers, and economic partners (Amit & Zott, 2001; Zott & 
Amit, 2010). 
The second essay (chapter three) – Clear blue water: The mediating role of politics in 
the board diversity-organizational innovativeness relationship – contributes to the literatures 
on board diversity, decision-making, and innovation. The findings in the board diversity 
literature have been inconsistent. The diversity literature is specifically in need of further 
insights into the mechanisms by which diversity has an effect on various outcomes (Lawrence, 




focus on explaining and testing the mechanisms by which board diversity influences 
innovativeness. I introduce a new concept, stakeholder diversity, which reflects the differences 
in members’ interests. 
 For the decision-making literature, the study contributes by finding the importance and 
significant negative influence of political board of directors’ decision-making on 
innovativeness.  
On another note, this study adds to the innovation literature. It shows that board of 
directors’ decision-making should be considered an important antecedent to innovativeness, 
and it should be recognized as an important indicator for innovativeness. So far, the degree 
politics in decision-making is underemphasized in literature on innovativeness. The results of 
this study thus have important implications for future research on innovativeness. Additionally, 
this study shows the indirect negative effect of stakeholder diversity on innovativeness. Past 
research has shown that paying attention to stakeholders increases firm innovativeness 
(Flammer & Kacperczyk, 2016), yet I show that having the interests of stakeholders reflected in 
the board will decrease firm innovativeness. Nevertheless, such reflection could have other 
(symbolic) consequences, such as more stakeholder support that eventually can increase firm 
performance (Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014).  
 The third essay (chapter four) – Being in deep water: Negative attainment discrepancy, 
organizational attention, and interorganizational relationship formation in the Dutch water 
authority sector – contributes to the call for ‘a behavioral theory of the interfirm’ by 
specifically looking at how attention-based and behavioral concepts influence the 
organization’s propensity to form a shared facility through an IOR (Baum & Ingram, 2002; 
Gavetti et al., 2012). By synthesizing the attention-based view with the behavioral theory of the 
firm, we show that the attention-based view can be extended to explain when and which 
organizational changes will be made. In particular, we show how organizational attention 




 I also provide a contribution to the IOR formation literature by focusing on an 
overlooked type of IOR: cost-reducing IORs. The bulk of IOR formation research is on IORs 
designed to increase the innovation output of the focal firm (e.g. Ahuja, 2000b; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Lee, 2010a). Cost-reducing IORs are rarely studied. A notable exception 
is Gimeno (2004), who looked at how the formation of IORs by rivals influences the focal firm 
to form an IOR in the global airline industry. IORs are formed for a variety of reasons (Oliver, 
1990), thus focusing on another major motivation than innovation helps inform a more general 
view of IOR formation and eventually consequences. 
The fourth essay (chapter five) – “In this world, it’s copy or be pasted”: The role of 
suppliers in innovation adoption – generates novel insights on the adoption of an innovation. I 
show that (large) suppliers play an important role in the adoption process. This has several 
important research implications. I make several contributions to the innovation adoption 
literature. First, although previous research focuses specifically on firms that can adopt the 
innovation themselves (e.g. Compagni et al., 2015; Greve, 2011; Greve & Seidel, 2015), I pay 
specific attention to a type of firm that cannot adopt the innovation itself. Although attention 
has been paid to other parties that cannot adopt the innovation, such as the mass media 
(Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999; Burns & Wholey, 1993), I study a type of firm that is part of 
the focal firm’s ecosystem. I show that suppliers share information regarding the innovation 
with their buyers and can as such be seen as cross-pollinators of the ecosystem. If one does not 
include this party in the network, a spurious direct spillover effect may be observed between 
competitors instead. Therefore, I suggest that future research include more parties in the 
ecosystem when modeling the adoption of such an innovation in a particular industry. 
Second, I start to uncover the characteristics of the suppliers that matter for their 
influence on the focal firm’s decision to adopt the innovation. Larger firms have been found to 
have a stronger influence on the focal firm’s decision to adopt (Burns & Wholey, 1993; 




persuasiveness of suppliers in their sharing of information on an innovation. 
Third, continued adoption by the focal firm has been found to influence other 
organizations to adopt as well. Although initial adoption may provide a hint to other 
organizations about the potential benefits of the innovation and may create an institutional 
pressure to adopt, continued adoption can provide a signal to other organizations on the 
benefits of adoption. Hence, although initial adoption may be important, the innovation 
adoption literature can benefit from also studying continued adoption. 
This dissertation not only provides theoretical contributions, but is also unique in other 
ways. First, essays one, two, and three employ a unique research setting, the Dutch water 
authority sector, which has not been studied in the organization theory and strategy literatures. 
Studying the same complex phenomenon in different settings alleviates the risk that we build 
knowledge that is simply idiosyncratic to a single setting, e.g. the vast amount of studies in the 
interorganizational relationship literature are in the biotechnology industry; my third essay 
refreshes this research by studying a different setting. Of course, the Dutch water authority 
sector is not without its own idiosyncrasies, thus replications in different settings are warranted. 
The behavior of the parastatal water authorities fitted the theoretical assumptions of 
behavioral theory neatly (e.g. satisficing instead of maximizing). They are unique inasmuch as 
they can be seen as business firms given their clear tasks (managing water barriers, for 
maintaining the level and quality of water in waterways, and for sewage treatment in their 
respective regions), yet also have a top management that is elected and can levy their own 
taxes. Their visibility to the public as parastatal organizations makes them less risk seeking, 
increasing the relevance of studying their organizational change efforts. However, this visibility 
makes them also more inclined to provide unique and in-depth data (in most cases they are 
obliged to provide the data), making them an ideal object of study. 
Second, in particular essay two and three, and to some extent essay one, capitalize on 




directors. Gathering a fine-grained data on a large number of organizations (the total 
population) in different years requires a considerable amount of effort. Yet, if we want to move 
forward in the field of organization theory and strategy, we will need to do this. We will need 
to develop and test theory on large scale samples (or better yet, populations) while still being 
able to exactly pinpoint the actors that are responsible for the actions of the organization. Only 
then might we be able to move from testing associations between concepts to testing causation. 
Third, I also make several methodological contributions. Each essay employs a different 
method: a qualitative case study research design for essay one, topic modeling for essay two, 
word count content analyses for essay three, and a more conventional quantitative approach in 
essay four. In essay one, I started with archival documents and then generated further 
inferences via interviews. This is not unprecedented, even in strategic management (Crossan & 
Berdrow, 2003) - but this is not typical in organizational change research, where most 
qualitative research follows a classical ethnographic approach starting with and primarily based 
on interviews (e.g. Dutton et al., 2001; Howard-Grenville, 2007; Piderit & Ashford, 2003). Yet 
archival documents can be especially valuable as a primary data source for research on change 
decision-making, for three reasons. First, evidently, the contents of the documents may be used 
to uncover different tactics. Specifically, accessing the original documents used as inputs into 
decisions (as opposed to just minutes or ex post reports) provides a direct window into how 
managers framed the decision. Second, the frequency and type of documents may provide 
evidence for a certain type of tactics, as it did in this study. Third, the very choice of language 
used in writing such documents may be an issue selling tactic in itself (Sonenshein, 2006). 
When studying the framing and selling of change initiatives, any biases discovered when 
examining archival documents can actually inform the research. In addition, despite their many 
strengths, interviews by themselves may invoke not only recall but also rationalization biases 
arising from interviewees’ beliefs about who directed the decision. 




and many other studies). Overall, I show that an approach starting with in-depth analysis of the 
archival documents that served as inputs into decisions is suited to the study of organizational 
change decisions. Furthermore, this is all the more so when the decisions under study unfold 
over long periods and challenge traditional managerial roles, two conditions that exacerbate the 
risk of bias in retrospective interviews. I believe that this definitely applies to decisions about 
business model changes, among others, but further comparative research would be required to 
confirm under what conditions my research approach is preferable to conventional interview-
led techniques for studying decision-making about organizational change more generally. 
 In essay two, I created new measures for political decision-making, and the 
innovativeness of an organization. I introduce the new construct stakeholder diversity, which I 
measure by taking into account the diversity of interest of the board members. For politics, I 
provided an overview on the measures used in previous studies. Based on this overview, I 
formulated a new measure/dictionary based on content analysis, which forms a novel measure 
as contribution. Another aspect of this is that politics is measured quantitatively in this study. 
So far, most studies used a qualitative approach, most often in the form of case studies. This 
quantification of the variables will hopefully contribute to revitalizing the decision-making 
literature. For innovativeness, I formulated a new output measure based on an adapted version 
of content analysis. This method is generalizable to many other industries and situations, 
contributing to a solution for the reported difficulties in finding a reliable and generalizable 
method for measuring innovativeness. 
In essay three, I make a methodological contribution by showing that applying topic 
modeling on the (internal) minutes of top management, board of director, and committee 
meetings can be used to measure organizational attention. Ordinary ways of measuring this 
construct, such as interviews and (word count) content analysis from letters to shareholders 
have been criticized. Interviews may suffer from issues of reliability and replicability, whereas 




business audiences, and are likely written by communication personnel rather than the top 
managers (Surroca et al., 2016). Given that topic modeling on (internal) minutes is not affected 
by these problems, it is significantly superior in terms of its internal and external validity.  
Using topic modeling, one is also able to unobtrusively capture broader categories of attention, 
which would be nigh impossible to do for word count content analyses. 
Overall, the dissertation contributes to the literature on organizational change by 
studying when, why, and which organizational changes are adopted. Jointly, the dissertation 
shows that organizations adopt changes when the decision-making process of the board of 
directors is less political (essay two), top management is confronted with negative attainment 
discrepancy (essay three), and when specific external constituencies start or continue to adopt a 
particular change (essay four). The dissertation also explicates why organizations change. 
Middle managers play an important role in convincing top management through the use of 
various tactics of the need of organizational change (essay one) and top management is 
motivated to search for solutions in the adversity of negative attainment discrepancy (essay 
three). Last, the dissertation shows that in particular those organizational changes are adopted 
which are (1) proposed by middle managers that tie the change initiative to broad strategic 
agreements of the organization and continuously inform top management on the initiative 
(essay one), (2) in line with the organizational attention of top management, e.g. when 
organization attention is on collaboration, the organization is more likely to form an IOR as 
form of governance change (essay three), and (3) (continued) adopted by joint-supplier 
competitors, where bigger suppliers play a more prominent role (essay four).   
In sum, essay one shows that middle managers play a prominent role in proposing 
organizational change, although their willingness to propose such changes may be dependent 
on the degree of politics as speculated in essay two. Essay three then shows that the motivation 
and attention of the top manager is important, which may in part be driven by the initiatives and 




perspective showing that ideas for change do not only come from within the organization, but 
similar organizations in the focal organization’s environment play a large role as well. 
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
General limitations 
The studies in this dissertation also need to be replicated in order to create repeatable, 
cumulative knowledge (Bettis, Helfat, & Shaver, 2016). I collect forms of population data for 
all four essays, thus there is no major concern regarding generalizing the results to the 
corresponding population. However, one can replicate the study in a different context or with 
different research methods (Bettis et al., 2016). The water authority sector, while of great 
importance to study, at least for the territorial well-being of the Netherlands, comes with its 
own idiosyncrasies. Hence, important caveats apply.  
First, my qualitative work done for the first essay shows that water authorities typically 
comply with the assumptions of the behavioral theory of the firm. Yet, as also argued in chapter 
4, decision-makers in this context may have less incentives to proactively solve upcoming 
problems. Therefore, some of the factors, like negative attainment discrepancy, have a more 
immediate effect in this setting, while in other settings, negative attainment will sought to be 
solved when it is predicted to exist. Thus, the overall findings would need to be replicated to 
observe whether the temporal dynamics are similar for traditional business firms. 
Second, water authorities do not face product-market competition. As a population of 
organizations, they can only be dismantled by the national government. Even then, their 
existential right is vested in the constitution, thus dismantling these organizations would require 
a change in the constitution with all the necessary onerous procedures involved. This has 
important implications the fourth chapter. There, it is of interest to understand how attention to 
similar organizations would play a role in a more traditional business setting, given that 





Third, the role of top management in this setting is more restricted to approving and 
deciding on organizational change, rather than being the source of change itself. This is more 
unique to these organizations compared to regular firms. Hence, it may be easier for middle 
managers to bring initiatives to the attention of top management in our case study, since these 
initiatives do not as strongly compete with the ideas of top management as in firms. This is 
especially relevant for chapter 2. Also, continuous informing top management will likely be 
more difficult in other settings as top managers do not only decide on, but are also a source for 
organizational change. Moreover, top managers and directors in the water authority are, by 
virtue of being elected, more politicians than water managers. As such, they may be especially 
mindful of these external agreements and complying with them than managers would. 
Fourth, the water authorities’ board of directors’ tasks are similar to those of public 
firms, yet some subtle differences exist. The primary role of the board of directors is restricted 
to engaging in decision control. Although the directors are all responsible for the appropriate 
execution of the water authority’s tasks, directors’ opinions on how this should be done may 
vary. Especially their role as representative for a certain category may influence this. For 
instance, a representative from agriculture will more likely seek to secure funds for projects 
that benefits local farmers. After their term, a more successful representative is more likely to 
be re-nominated (or re-elected); which is one of the prime individual goals of the directors. 
This has important implications for the third chapter, as this means that a homogeneous board 
may be more fruitful for the acceptance of innovation proposals. However, when the board also 
has other roles, such as initiating innovation proposals, stakeholder diversity can have a 
different effect as it allows for the inclusion of more perspectives (Dyer & Hatch, 2006; Krause 
et al., 2007). Overall, thus, replication in different settings is warranted. 
 One could also use different research methods, e.g. by using alternate proxy variables 




measure politics as discussed in the third essay. In time, undoubtedly different methods and 
models will be developed that will allow researchers able to get an even better grip on the exact 
causal relationships among constructs. As those methods and models are developed, I 
encourage researchers to thoroughly test the findings from these essays. However, for each of 
essays one, two and three, I have revisited a relevant manager to check the internal validity of 
the findings of these essays, which she endorsed.  
Specific limitations 
Notwithstanding the contributions of this dissertation, limitations remain. In essay one, I have 
looked at a business model change initiative and what tactics middle managers employ to 
persuade top managers for the initiative. Although I argued conceptually about differences 
between business model change and other forms of organizational change, further work, 
including empirical tests, would be necessary to understand exactly what is different and 
similar about the business model change concept. Such studies would pave the way for more 
research on business model change and broaden the understanding of organizational change 
more generally. 
 In essay two, I juxtaposed the stakeholder diversity concept with gender diversity and 
empirically showed their different effects. Given data limitations, I did not juxtapose the 
stakeholder diversity concept with other types of diversity (e.g. diversity in functional 
background). Further exploring how stakeholder diversity differs from other diversity concepts, 
especially in the mechanisms linking them with various outcomes, remains warranted. 
In essay three, I showed that looking at negative attainment discrepancy and 
organizational attention in tandem allows us to predict when and which decisions will be made. 
However, I only have shown this to be correct in one instance: when the decision concerns 
governance change. I hope that this demonstration does inspire future research to explore 
different types of decisions and different foci of organizational attention.  




adoption of an innovation. I based my theory on the imitation model by Haunschild and Miner 
(1997), yet more factors may play a role in the adoption of an innovation when it is facilitated 
by suppliers, as I uncover. Thus, one can further explore which factors can influence the 
susceptibility of the focal organization to be particularly inclined to imitate the newly adopted 
practices of joint-supplier competitors. 
 
Conclusion 
In closing, the potential avenues for future research portrayed here are intended to serve as 
inspiration for more work on organizational change. Essays one and two have extended lines of 
research by adding new issue selling tactics in the case of business models, theorizing the 
differences between ‘ordinary’ organizational change and business model change (essay one), 
and showing the impact of politics on organizational innovativeness (essay two). Essays two, 
three, and four redirect lines of research by introducing a new type of (board) diversity (essay 
two), by synthesizing the attention-based view and the behavioral theory of the firm (essay 
three), and by introducing the role of the supplier in the adoption of innovations (essay four). 
Therefore, in the end, this dissertation does not only provide answers, but also forms more 
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